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A bstract
The policy instrum ent of central banks everywhere has usually been 
a short-term  nominal interest rate. This means th a t central banks have 
adopted operating procedures whose goal has been to  produce some desired 
level of money market interest rates. Although the Bank of England was in 
many respects the pioneer of these operating procedures, theoretical and em­
pirical attention has focused almost exclusively on the Federal Reserve. This 
thesis aims to redress this imbalance by examining -  in detail -  the sterling 
money market and the operations of the Bank of England.
This task is carried out in two parts. Pari I  reviews central banks’ use of 
the interest instrum ent more generally, beginning with an historical sketch 
of the evolution of central bank money market operations. This sketch is 
complemented by a critical discussion of two im portant concepts relating to 
such operations, namely interest rate smoothing and money base control. A 
simple analytical model is then developed to illustrate the determ ination of 
money market interest rates by the central bank.
Pari I I  specifically concerns the money market operations of the Bank of 
England, and their implications for the behaviour of sterling money market 
interest rates. First, a model of the term structure of money m arket interest 
rates is derived. Its predicted behaviour in reaction to a change in the Bank’s 
official rate is then empirically verified. Next, the yield on eligible bills -  the 
Bank’s intervention asset -  is examined. It is argued that these assets carry 
an excess liquidity premium, arising from the Bank’s constraints on their 
issue. Finally, an empirical model of the overnight interest rate -  the UK 
equivalent of the federal funds rate -  is developed, and the reasons for its 
volatility are investigated.
4
Acknowledgem ents
I am  extremely fortunate, as a student interested in central banks, to have 
had Charles Goodhart as my supervisor. I thank him for getting me started 
in, and then guiding me so expertly through, the largely uncharted research 
terrain  represented by the sterling money market. I am also indebted to John 
W hittaker for stirring my interest in central banks and for encouraging me 
to study what they actually do, rather than what many economics texts say 
they do.
Countless individuals working in the London markets -  especially those 
a t two venerable money market institutions, namely the Bank of England 
and Gerrard and National -  patiently explained to me how things are done 
in the so-called “real” world. I thank them. Away from the “real” world, 
David Webb kindly made resources available to me at the Financial Markets 
Group. W ithout them  I could not have completed this thesis. The success of 
the Group is a sure sign that those who are in the “real” world will continue 
to rely on those outside it for their insights. Thanks are also due to the 
following people: Dick Brealey and Jenny Ireland for their support of my 
work on the City Research Project; Richard Pattinson for invaluable data; 
Richard Payne for his primer on RATS and ARCH; and Dirk Schoenmaker 
and Spencer Dale for constructive comments on much of the work in this 
thesis.
Finally, I am hugely grateful to my wife Sarah - for supporting me (and 
my work), for putting up with me (and my work), but mostly for being my 
constant reminder that, whilst everything may be economics, economics isn’t 
everything.
6C ontents
Page
In trod u ction
11
17
1. T he In terest R a te  Instrum ent in H istory 23
1.1. Origins - The Bank of England
1.2. Early Parallels - Europe
1.3. Late Followers - The Federal Reserve
1.4. W artime Disruption
1.5. Open Market Operations
1.6. Figures
2. T he In terest R a te  Instrum ent in  T heory  45
2.1. Interest R ate Smoothing
2.2. The Money Base as an Instrument
3. T he D eterm in ation  o f  M oney M arket In terest R ates 65
3.1. Banks and the Money Market
3.2. An Analytical Approach
3.3. Refinements
3.4. Figures and Tables
4. T he S terling M on ey M arket and  B ank o f  E ngland O perations 107
4.1. The Sterling Money Market
4.2. Transactions Technology
4.3. Bank of England Operations
4.4. Two Recent Developments
4.5. Figures and Tables
Part I I
75. T he Term  Structure o f  M oney M arket In terest R a tes  143
5.1. A Model of Money Market Interest Rates
5.2. Empirical Evidence
5.3. Assessment
5.4. Concluding Remarks 
5.6. Figures and Tables
6. T he E xcess L iquidity P rem ium  on  E ligib le B ills  175
6.1. The Evolution of the Bill Market
6.2. The Yield on Eligible Bills
6.3. Accepting: Bills as Credit Instrum ents
6.4. The Excess Liquidity Premium: Causes
6.5. The Excess Liquidity Premium: Effects
6.6. Concluding Remarks
6.7. Figures and Tables
7. T he B ehaviour o f  th e  O vernight In terest R a te  225
7.1. The Overnight Funds Market
7.2. Determinants of the Spread
7.3. Estimating a Model of the Spread
7.4. The Variance of the Spread
7.5. Concluding Remarks
7.6. Figures and Tables
7.7. Appendix: Alternative GARCH Models
C onclusion  275
R eferences 281
8Figures
Page
1.1. Bank ra te 1800-1914: annual minimum, maximum and changes 43
1.2. Bank rate in the nineteenth century: seasonal fluctuations 43
3.1. Optimal reserve inventory 104
3.2. The determ ination of the money market interest rate 105
4.1. The price of money market instruments: bills versus CDs 139
4.2. Bill yield -  LIBOR (1988-1993) 140
4.3. CD yield -  LIBOR (1988-1993) 140
4.4. Official discount rate (1975-1993) 141
4.5. Official discount rate — LIBOR (1975-1993) 141
5.1. The cost of one day funds: equation (5.6) 167
5.2. The money market term  structure before an expected fall in the stop rate 168
5.3. The money market term  structure before an expected rise in the stop rate 169
5.4. The stop rate and 7 day LIBOR (1988-1991) 170
5.5. The spread between the stop rate and 7 day LIBOR (1988-1991) 171
5.6. The stop rate and 7 day LIBOR (Jian-Sept 1992) 172
6.1. Eligible bank bills held by the Bank of England (1975-1993) 214
6.2. Gross annual assistance by the Bank of England (1971-1993) 214
6.3. LIBOR/Treasury bill yield spread (1975-1993) 215
6.4. LIBOR/bank bill yield spread (1975-1993) 215
6.5. Treasury bill/bank bill yield spread (1975-1993) 216
6.6. Average LIBO R/bank bill yield spread and gross assistance 216
6.7. Sterling acceptances: total outstanding (1987-1993) 217
6.8. Sterling acceptances and industrial production: annual growth (1987-1993) 217
6.9. Sterling acceptances: share of total bank lending (1987-1993) 218
6.10. Sterling acceptances: share accepted by the clearing banks (1987-1993) 218
6.11. Market discount rate — stop rate (1988-1993) 219
96.12. Bill yield (including fees) — LIBID (1988-1993) 219
6.13. Bank bills: to tal holdings (1987-1993) 220
6.14. Bank bills: holdings by the clearing banks (1987-1993) 220
6.15. Annual acceptance growth: clearing banks versus other banks 221
7.1. The intraday distribution of the overnight rate (Jan-M ay 1994) 263
7.2. The effective overnight rate versus 7 day and 1 m onth LIBOR (1992-1993) 264
7.3. The spread between the effective overnight rate and stop rate (1992-1993) 265
7.4. Day-of-the-week patterns in the spread 266
7.5. REM AINDER versus SIZE after each round of operations 267
Tables
3.1. Bank reserves in five countries 106
4.1. Sterling money market instruments outstanding (1993) 142
4.2. Payment statistics: average daily clearings (1993) 142
5.1. Mean difference between money market rates and the stop ra te 173
5.2. Volatility of money market rates 173
5.3. Mean change in the one month rate around a stop rate change 174
6.1. LIBOR/eligible bill yield spread (1980-1993) 222
6.2. Largest users of acceptances 223
7.1. Intraday overnight rate: sample variance (Jan-May 1994) 268
7.2. Intraday overnight rate: intraday changes (Jan-May 1994) 268
7.3. Spread between overnight rate and stop rate (Annual 1991-1994) 269
7.4. Spread between overnight rate extremes and stop rate (Annual 1991-1994) 269
7.5. Spread between overnight rate and stop rate (Daily 1991-1994) 270
7.6. Spread between overnight rate extremes and stop rate (Daily 1991-1994) 271
7.7. The money market shortage: size and timing of removal 272
10
11
Preface
The contents of this thesis represent research done on a number of differ­
ent -  but closely related -  fronts over a period of two years. Some of this 
material has already been published in a number of separate papers. Instead 
of reproducing this research here in its original form, I have substantially 
revised it, and have added yet further material, so as to create a more unified 
and continuous structure. The result is, hopefully, more substantial than the 
sum of the initial parts, and its organisation as a book reflects my intention 
to publish it in this form.
The central strand of my initial research was done for the City Research 
Project, a three year study into the international competitive position of 
London in financial services. This Project was funded by the Corporation 
of London and managed by the London Business School, and consisted of a 
collaborative effort on the part of numerous academics and consultants. My 
work was supervised by Charles Goodhart who, with characteristic insight, 
directed my efforts into areas which are of great interest to practitioners and 
central bankers, but into which few academics have yet ventured.
My contribution to this Project eventually took the form of two Subject 
Reports on domestic money markets and central bank operations, which were
12
the result of extensive fieldwork and interviews with money market partici­
pants and central bank officials in London, Paris, Frankfurt and New York. 
The first Subject Report, The Domestic Money Markets o f the UK, France, 
Germany and the US, was a detailed comparative study of the domestic 
money markets and central bank operations in four countries. The second 
Subject Report, European Monetary Union and the Sterling Money Market, 
examined the implications of European Monetary Union for money market 
arrangements and central bank operations in Europe and in the UK, and 
made several recommendations concerning the sterling money market and 
the operating practices of the Bank of England. Both Reports were pub­
lished by the London Business School (in conjunction with the Corporation 
of London) in January 1994, and generated considerable media interest1. A 
shortened version of the main recommendations, and of their motivation, was 
also submitted to, and published in Banking World (“Reforming the Sterling 
Money Market” , April 1994).
The work done for the City Project forms the basis of two chapters -  3 
and 4 -  at the centre of this thesis. So as not to dilute the main focus, which 
is intended to concentrate on the UK, a considerable amount of material on 
other domestic money markets and on the implications of European Monetary 
Union has been omitted. W hat is included, instead, are the results of two 
other strands of research, also on the theme of central banking and money 
markets, which were initiated while I was completing my work on the City 
Project.
The first of these strands was partly analytical and partly historical, and 
comprised a joint effort with Forrest Capie (City University Business School) 
and Charles Goodhart to produce a monograph on the development of central 
banking. This research was funded by the Bank of England, and was prepared 
for a symposium marking the Tercentenary of the Bank. My own contribution 
to the monograph lay in the preparation of two appendices. One appendix 
describes the evolution of the open market operations of several of the major
1Articles reporting the Subject Reports appeared in the Evening Standard, the Finan­
cial Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Independent, International Securities Lending and 
Euromoney.
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central banks. The other, more substantial, appendix provides a concise, 
standardised outline of the history of 32 central banks. Both appendices 
were compiled on the basis of information obtained directly from these central 
banks and provide an accurate, and hopefully authoritative, introduction to 
the development of central banking in these countries.
The monograph was presented at a symposium, arranged by the Bank 
of England, in June 1994. This symposium was attended by over 130 cen­
tral bank Governors, and was possibly the largest such gathering on record. 
The monograph is forthcoming shortly in a volume to be published by the 
Cambridge University Press.
A number of points emerged from this historical examination which use­
fully complemented my research on contemporary money markets and central 
bank operations. These are incorporated in chapters 1 and 2. First, there 
was a remarkable continuity in the Bank of England’s money market oper­
ations, whose basic structure was already in place by 1825. Second, many 
other central banks operated in more or less the same way: that is, they 
provided reserves to the banking system, on demand, by standing ready to 
discount eligible short-term securities. These stylised facts pointed to several 
-  not entirely unknown -  shortcomings in the economic literature on central 
bank operating procedures. For example, the common description of central 
bank operations as interest-rate “smoothing” was clearly overly simplistic and 
seemed to ignore the fact that central banks had already begun to use their 
discount rates as an instrument to pursue their objectives. Similarly, many 
of the proponents of money base control -  and there are always proponents -  
somehow seemed to overlook the fact that early central banks had essentially 
tried, and had failed, to set strict quantitative limits on the supply of bank 
reserves. Indeed, part of the reason why they became central banks in the 
first place was that the banking system was potentially unstable in the face 
of limits on the supply of reserves.
The second strand of research was more analytical and focused on the 
issue of how the money market operations of the Bank of England actually 
affected sterling money market interest rates. Initial efforts took the form 
of joint research with John W hittaker (initially at Nottingham, and now
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at Staffordshire University). The work examined the implications, for the 
money market yield curve, of the Bank of England’s practice of lending over 
a range of maturities. This research resulted in a joint paper, “Optimal 
money market behaviour and sterling interest rates” , which is forthcoming in 
The Manchester School. Chapter 5 contains a revised version of this paper.
Two further analytical papers form the basis of chapters 6 and 7. These 
inquire in greater detail into two features of the sterling money market which 
repeatedly came to my attention during my work on the City Project. The 
first concerns the liquidity premium on eligible bills (the assets purchased by 
the Bank in its daily operations), while the second relates to the volatility of 
the overnight interest rate. As it turns out, these features are closely related 
and suggest -  even more strongly than the investigation for the City Project
-  that it may indeed be appropriate for the Bank of England to reconsider 
its current money market operations.
My studies of domestic money markets and central bank operations in 
these markets over the past two years have convinced me that these topics 
demand further research. The determination of short-term interest rates by 
central banks -  rather than the determination of some monetary aggregate -  
was one of the earliest policy actions in a monetary economy. It has remained 
one of the most fundamental policy actions and affects countless economic 
decisions in an immediate and direct fashion. Yet research on this issue 
remains small compared with the volumes written about the central bank’s 
influence on the money supply, and the role of money in economic decisions.
Similarly, money markets are less well understood than other financial 
markets. This is surprising since money markets are closely related to the 
importance which banks have assumed as borrowers, lenders and providers 
of payment services. Indeed, academics are almost always surprised to learn 
that the volume of trading in domestic money markets dwarfs that of (say) 
domestic stock markets. Yet academic research conducted on stock markets
-  particularly in recent years on their so-called microstructure -  remains 
considerable as against the research efforts invested in money markets. It is 
hoped, therefore, that this thesis goes some way towards encouraging others 
that the sterling money market is an interesting and important research topic.
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Much of the research described above has been presented at seminars -  
several of them at the Bank of England -  and at conferences. These have been 
invaluable for eliminating errors of fact and (I hope) of reasoning from the 
contents of the thesis. In particular, I thank attendants at the Money, Macro 
and Finance Research Group term meetings and conferences in 1992, 1993 
and 1994, and seminar participants at the Bank of England, the London 
Business School, Oxford University and the London School of Economics. 
The author, however, claims responsibility for any views expressed in this 
thesis, as well as any errors.
\
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Introduction
The policy instrument of central banks everywhere has, almost without 
exception, been a short-term nominal interest rate. Sometimes, during peri­
ods of economic disruption such as wartime or depression, short-term (and 
even long-term) interest rates have been fixed directly, by statutory control. 
More typically, however, central banks have controlled short-term interest 
rates indirectly, by undertaking money market and other transactions whose 
effect has been to achieve a desired market interest rate.
The use of an interest rate instrument by central banks has a long his­
tory. There is ample evidence that, since their establishment, most central 
banks typically stood ready to discount certain financial instruments, thereby 
accommodating increased demands for currency and bank reserves and con­
straining the increases in short-term market interest rates which would other­
wise have emerged (see Capie, Goodhart and Schnadt 1994). In other words, 
central bank discount rates have usually represented a ceiling, which could be 
raised or lowered at the discretion of the central bank, above which market 
rates seldom rose. Conversely, central banks, notably the Bank of England, 
would sometimes quell undesirably low market interest rates by selling finan­
cial assets to the private financial sector. In this way central banks lowered
18
the reserves of the banking system, forced banks to discount paper with them, 
and made their discount rates “effective” in the market.
Throughout their history, therefore, central banks have adopted operat­
ing procedures which have been variously described in the academic litera­
ture as interest rate “smoothing”, interest rate “targeting”, or interest rate 
“control”. Essentially, these terms all point towards the fact that monetary 
policy is implemented via operating procedures which produce a desired level 
of short-term nominal interest rates. W ith the passage of time and the de­
velopment of financial markets, particularly money markets, these operating 
procedures have naturally evolved and have become increasingly streamlined 
and sophisticated. And whilst there has been considerable convergence in 
operating procedures across central banks, historical factors and regulatory 
preferences still account for some important differences in the operating pro­
cedures of central banks2.
Theoretical and empirical interest on central bank operating procedures 
and short-term interest rate determination has focused almost exclusively on 
the US. Thus the relevance of factors such as reserve requirements, bank re­
serve management, open market operations and discount window borrowing, 
have all usually been examined within the institutional context of the Federal 
Reserve System and the federal funds market. One of the many insights of 
this literature, however, is the importance of the institutional environment 
in conditioning the behaviour of economic agents and hence the behaviour 
of economic variables such as short-term interest rates. This places limits on 
the ability of this literature to explain behaviour within other contexts, such 
as the UK, where the operating procedures of the Bank of England, as well 
as arrangements in the sterling money market, differ considerably from those 
in the US. Consequently, these remain less widely understood, and are less 
frequently the subject of formal examination3.
It is the aim of this thesis to redress this imbalance by examining more 
closely the operating procedures of the Bank of England (hereafter also the
2See Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989) or B atten et al (1990)
3Notable exceptions are Goodhart (1984, 1987) and Llewellyn (1990).
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Bank), and their impact on money market interest rates. This task is carried 
out in two parts, with the emphasis moving from the general (Part I) to the 
specific (Part II).
Part I  comprises three chapters and begins, in chapter 1, with a brief 
historical sketch of the development of central bank money market operations 
and their use of an interest rate instrument. This is done, first, to validate 
the claim that was made at the outset of this paper, namely that central 
banks have virtually always used an interest rate instrument. Secondly, it 
illustrates the remarkable continuity in this aspect of central banking, which 
was developed largely by the Bank of England during the nineteenth century, 
and highlights that it has been common to many central banks.
Drawing on this historical sketch, chapter 2 questions two ideas which 
have arisen in the literature regarding the interest rate instrument. The first 
is the notion that central banks are merely engaged in short-term interest 
rate “smoothing”, where this has usually been taken to mean the elimination 
of seasonal fluctuations in money market interest rates. Whilst this notion is 
not incorrect, it is seriously incomplete since it ignores the crucial fact that 
the short-term nominal interest rate is the monetary instrument, whose level 
is chosen to attain some policy target. It is thus not just seasonal fluctuations, 
but all fluctuations from this desired level which are “smoothed” by central 
banks. What is more, seasonality in money market interest rates is then not 
prima facie evidence that interest rates are not being smoothed, since central 
banks may be using their interest rate instrument in a seasonal fashion.
The second notion is that central banks should not in fact be using interest 
rates as their instrument at all but should, instead, be using some quantity 
variable, such as the money base. Even though this argument has been 
shown to be extremely problematic4, especially in terms of implementation, 
it is indeed a hardy perennial. For this reason, a recent proposal for money 
base control by McCallum (1989) is examined and its operational flaws are 
pointed out.
W ith a sharper concept of the interest rate instrument, both in history
4See for example Foot, Goodhart and Hotson (1980) or Goodhart (1989).
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and in theory, chapter 3 develops a more analytical picture of the relation­
ship between banks, the money market and the central bank and explores 
how this relationship permits central banks to influence, fairly precisely, the 
level of money market interest rates. The foundation of this picture is bank 
reserve management, in which the money market plays a fundamental role by 
allowing banks to borrow and lend reserves to meet their settlement obliga­
tions. The money market itself, however, cannot equilibrate the demand and 
supply of reserves at the aggregate level, providing a role for the central bank 
to manage aggregate reserves and, in the process, influence money market 
interest rates.
Part II  comprises four more or less self-contained chapters, all of which 
specifically concern the money market operations of the Bank of England and 
the consequent behaviour of interest rates within the sterling money market. 
Chapter 4 sets the scene by describing these operations in some detail, as 
well as other relevant features of the sterling money market, such as the 
instruments which are traded and how these trades are settled. This avoids 
repetition and duplication in subsequent sections.
Chapter 5 traces the effects of the maturity of the Bank’s money mar­
ket lending on the term structure of sterling money market rates. The daily 
practice of the Bank is to invite institutions to rediscount eligible bills whose 
unexpired maturity is under one month5 at the Bank’s official discount rate. 
When this official rate is expected to change, institutions are not indifferent 
to the maturity of the bills which they rediscount with the Bank, since this 
affects their implied cost of funds. This may cause very short term money 
market interest rates to move in the opposite direction to the anticipated 
change in the official rate. The chapter first derives this interest rate be­
haviour -  which may be described as term structure “pivoting” -  in a simple 
model, and then verifies the behaviour using daily money market interest rate 
data.
Chapter 6 continues to deal with the Bank’s use of the bill market for
5Alternatively, the Bank invites institutions to sell bills under repurchase agreement 
whose m aturity is also typically less than one month.
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conducting its money market intervention, although the focus here is on the 
yield on eligible bills. The fact that the Bank stands ready to buy these in­
struments has caused their yield to be below equivalent money market rates, 
for example those on unsecured wholesale sterling loans (i.e. LIBOR). Whilst 
this is perfectly consistent with the existence of a liquidity premium on bills, 
this premium has not remained constant over time and has tended to widen 
significantly over recent years. This suggests the presence of constraints on 
the supply of acceptances, which is how bills are created. The chapter exam­
ines various possible constraints, and finds that the Bank’s own regulation of 
the bill market may be a primary candidate.
One of the problems associated with an excessive liquidity premium on 
bills is that these instruments become costly to hold, either because they are 
difficult to fund profitably or because they involve a capital loss when redis­
counted with the Bank. These costs create incentives for those institutions 
which hold bills -  predominantly the clearing banks -  to engage in strategic 
behaviour in order to offset these costs. In particular, this strategic behaviour 
on the part of the clearing banks aims to influence overnight interest rates in 
a manner which allows these banks, on average, to borrow overnight funds 
more cheaply. To be successful, however, this behaviour must not be pre­
dictable, with the result that strategic behaviour may increase the volatility 
of the overnight interest rate. Chapter 7 thus examines the behaviour of the 
sterling overnight rate and looks at the factors which influence both the mean 
and the variance of this rate.
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C hapter 1
The Interest R ate Instrum ent 
in H istory
Although the Sveriges Riksbank was established before the Bank of Eng­
land -  in 1668 -  it took another two centuries for the former bank to achieve 
the status of a fully fledged central bank1. Indeed, it was not until 1897 
that the Riksbank obtained the monopoly note issue in Sweden. The Bank 
of England (the Bank), on the other hand, assumed the role of a monopoly 
note issuer relatively early2 and developed many of the functions associated 
with this role well before the other central banks which were established in 
Europe during the nineteenth century. One of these functions was to influ­
ence the level of short-term interest rates -  which is the focus of this thesis -  
and hence this chapter traces the origins and development of the interest rate 
instrument beginning, in section 1, with the early operations of the Bank of 
England. The Bank Charter Act of 1844, which placed strict limits on the 
fiduciary issue of the Bank, represents a natural dividing line through the 
Bank’s early activities as regards interest rates. Up until the Act, the Bank’s
1This chapter borrows extensively from Capie, Goodhart and Schnadt (1994), which 
contains summaries of, and provides references to, the development of central banking in 
England, Europe, the Americas and elsewhere.
2Officially in 1844, although Bank of England notes were more widely used than other 
bank notes long before this.
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24 CHAPTER 1.
discount rate -  known as Bank rate -  was not actively deployed by the Bank 
in response to gold outflows, although by 1844 a well-developed system had 
evolved whereby the banking system could obtain reserves from the Bank. 
From 1844 onwards, and until the start of the first world war in 1914, this 
system of reserve provision continued to function as before, but the Bank’s 
discount rate was actively applied to protecting its gold reserve. Furthermore, 
during this latter period several techniques were developed, now summarised 
by the term open-market operations, for making the Bank’s discount rate 
effective in the London money market.
Section 2 looks at some of the early parallels to the Bank’s use of Bank 
rate, particularly in Europe, where central banks were also beginning to use 
their official discount rates to protect their gold reserves and -  although 
much less frequently -  undertake open-market operations. Section 3 briefly 
traces US banking experience before the founding of the Federal Reserve 
System (the Fed) in 1914. Like all other central banks before it, the Fed also 
maintained a discount facility (known as the discount window) through which 
it provided reserves to the banking system at a discount rate of its choosing. 
However, since the founding of the Fed coincided with the start of the first 
world war, which considerably altered monetary and economic conditions in 
the US and elsewhere, the discount policies of the Fed and other central banks 
reflected these changes. In particular, as discussed in section 4, these policies 
reflected the needs of government finance rather than the preservation of gold 
reserves. Moreover, discount policies were typically augmented with a host 
of direct measures for influencing capital flows and the availability of credit, 
which persisted until after the second world war. Thereafter, as described in 
section 5, the primary monetary instrument in most countries again became 
the official discount rate. By this time, however, central banks had developed 
a better understanding of the relationship between bank reserves and money 
market interest rates, and also had the ability to manipulate this relationship 
through open-market operations. As these operations became increasingly 
sophisticated, so too did central banks’ control of money market interest 
rates.
1.1. ORIGINS  -  THE BANK OF ENGLAND 25
1.1 Origins — The Bank o f England
1694-1844
The Bank of England was established in 1694 as the first chartered bank 
in England, and was authorised to issue bank notes (redeemable in gold), 
trade in bills of exchange and bullion, and accept deposits3. Its position as 
a monopoly note issuer was virtually guaranteed from the outset due to leg­
islation which prevented the establishment of other joint stock banks (Smith 
1936). Thus, while numerous small, private banks arose during the eighteenth 
century, none competed seriously with the Bank in the issue of notes. By 1770 
most London bankers had ceased to issue notes altogether and used Bank of 
England notes for inter-bank settlement in what had become a well-developed 
clearing system.
The restrictions on joint stock banking meant that the early banking 
system which emerged in England comprised a large number of small banks, 
without any significant branch network. This in turn provided a role for a 
market in bills of exchange (short-term debt instruments) as a mechanism for 
redistributing reserves (specie or Bank notes) amongst banks. By purchasing 
bills, surplus banks could employ otherwise idle balances to acquire interest- 
bearing assets whilst at the same time providing reserves to banks (and other 
borrowers) in a geographically separate area. Specialist bill brokers quickly 
developed to facilitate this trade in bills and an active discount market was 
in place in London by the end of the eighteenth century (King 1936).
Given the role of the discount market in allocating reserves amongst 
banks, the London market discount rate responded to the aggregate demand 
for reserves. An increase in the demand for reserves, for example, would 
cause bills to be sold into the discount market, thereby driving up the mar­
ket discount rate. Whilst this would encourage surplus banks to lend reserves 
by buying these higher-yielding assets, the aggregate supply of reserves was 
clearly constrained by the fact that banks were unwilling to let their re­
3For an early history of the Bank see Andreades (1909), Bowman (1937), Clapham 
(1944) or Giuseppi (1966).
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serve holdings fall below some lower limit for prudential reasons. Increased 
currency withdrawals, usually due to seasonal increases in the demand for 
currency, would thus result in sharp increases in the market discount rate 
(King 1936 and Scammel 1968).
As the largest bank, the Bank of England routinely rediscounted (pur­
chased) bills in the discount market, although concerns about credit risk 
meant that the Bank would consider as eligible only those bills which car­
ried at least two good London names, and which had an unexpired maturity 
not exceeding 65 days. Whilst the Bank’s discount rate -  Bank rate -  could 
be altered at the discretion of the Bank, the absence of any well-articulated 
linkages between Bank rate and the wider economy meant that its directors 
would have seen little reason to change this rate during the Bank’s early 
years.
In any event, Bank rate, along with all other interest rates, was subject 
to a legal maximum of 5% under Usury Laws which had been in force since 
1714. Consequently, Bank rate was held at 4% for most of the eighteenth 
century (it was raised to its legal maximum from 1773 onwards; see Hawtrey 
1938).
The Bank’s willingness to rediscount bills placed a ceiling on the market 
discount rate, since banks and bill brokers would simply sell bills to the Bank 
whenever the market discount rate threatened to rise above Bank rate. The 
Bank thus found that its purchases of bills would increase dramatically at 
certain times of the year -  when cash demands were high -  and then fall 
again once the market discount rate fell below Bank rate. In this way, the 
Bank’s discount facility provided an automatic mechanism for increasing the 
supply of reserves, which on most occasions prevented seasonal fluctuations 
in the demand for currency from developing into liquidity crises. Concerns 
about the level of its reserves, however, sometimes led the Bank to reduce, 
or attem pt to curtail altogether, its discounting activities. This only accen­
tuated the liquidity crisis, with the result that the Bank invariably resumed 
its lending to avoid a full-blown panic (see chapter 2).
One such crisis occurred in 1825, precipitated in part by the Bank’s refusal
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to discount bills. Although the Bank subsequently reversed this decision 
when the crisis worsened (a detailed account is given in King 1936, pp.35-70), 
many country banks had, by this time, failed. This prompted a significant 
reorganisation of the banking system, both from within and on the part of 
the Bank of England. The changes from within the banking system stemmed 
from the hesitancy that was shown by the Bank in discounting bills. To reduce 
their reliance upon the Bank, most country banks chose to stop discounting 
bills with the Bank, and held liquidity in the form of call deposits with the 
bill brokers instead. The bill brokers -  who secured these deposits by holding 
bills -  continued to discount with the Bank of England, and so became the 
regular counterparties in the Bank’s bill transactions. Since they now held 
considerable bill portfolios, and usually stood ready to buy or sell bills, these 
bill brokers were transformed into principals and became known as discount 
houses.
The 1825 crisis also highlighted the weaknesses of the banking system that 
had evolved under the restrictions on joint stock banking. These restrictions 
were thus lifted the following year, albeit only for those banks operating 
outside London. London banks had to wait until 1833, when the Bank’s 
charter was renewed, to gain the privilege of operating on a joint stock basis. 
At the same time, the Bank obtained exemption from the Usury Laws, and 
for the first time could raise Bank rate above 5%. However, it would be 
another ten years before the Bank would begin to utilise its freedom to vary 
Bank rate: between 1833 and 1844 Bank rate was only raised above 5% once 
(during a crisis in 1839) and was changed only eight times (Hawtrey 1938).
During the early nineteenth century the Bank began to show an increas­
ing awareness of the relationship between fluctuations in the reserves of the 
banking system and the market rate of discount. Seasonal changes in the 
demand for currency were one source of such fluctuations. Another source 
of fluctuation was related to the Bank’s role as banker to the government. 
This function meant that the Bank held the accounts into which govern­
ment receipts flowed and out of which disbursements were made. Since taxes 
were paid into these accounts every quarter, just before dividends on govern­
ment stocks were paid out, the discount market would experience a periodic
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shortage of reserves, which drove the market discount rate up to Bank rate, 
followed by a surplus of reserves, which drove the market rate below Bank 
rate again. This led the Bank to introduce, in 1829, a system of regular ad­
vances (against security) just prior to the four dividend dates in the year (see 
Clapham 1944 or King 1936). These advances were usually made at, or near, 
the prevailing market rate: this gave institutions an incentive to apply for 
advances in anticipation of higher rates, thereby smoothing -  to some extent 
-  fluctuations in market rates.
By 1830, therefore, a well-developed -  but indirect -  system was in place 
whereby the wider banking could obtain reserves from the Bank of England. 
In the event of a reserve shortfall, banks would withdraw call loans from 
the discount houses. The houses, having secured these loans by purchases 
of bills, would rediscount bills at the Bank of England. This mechanism 
has remained virtually unchanged until the present day and has shown a 
remarkable continuity against the numerous innovations which have changed 
the appearance of the sterling money market4.
1844-1914
The Bank Charter Act of 1844 marks the beginning of a period during 
which Bank rate was actively used as a monetary instrument. As noted by 
Hawtrey (1938, p.23):
“The prim ary purpose of the Act of 1844 had been to secure the con­
vertibility of the Bank of England note by a limitation of the issue. If the 
system relied on for th a t purpose [i.e. simply refusing to discount] was to be 
suspended, some other safeguard was essential. The desired alternative was 
found in a high Bank rate, the deterrent effect of which ... had been gaining 
recognition for a number of years” .
Since closing the discount facility in order to uphold the reserve minimum 
stipulated in the 1844 Act was not feasible, Bank rate gradually became seen 
as the instrument whereby the gold reserve of the Bank could be protected in
4Obviously the B ank’s operations have not remained totally unchanged. Chapter 4 
provides a detailed description of the Bank’s current operations. Chapter 6 also charts the 
latter evolution of the discount m arket and the bank’s operations.
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the face of sustained gold outflows, either for internal or for external reasons. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates this clearly: Bank rate remained virtually constant be­
fore 1844, whereafter it was changed frequently, with more than five changes 
per year becoming the norm.
Whilst the Bank had clearly taken a step in the direction of becoming a 
central bank in 1844, commercial considerations remained important to its 
directors, who realised that maintaining Bank rate at high levels would result 
in the attrition of the Bank’s portfolio of earning assets (bills). Discount 
houses had little incentive to discount bills with the Bank when Bank rate 
rose above market rates. This steadily eroded the Bank’s bill portfolio as 
its existing holdings matured. As illustrated by figure 1.2, such commercial 
considerations meant Bank rate began to exhibit an increasingly seasonal 
pattern over time, as the rate was lowered during the periods of so-called 
“easy money” which followed periods of reserve stringency. This pattern 
became especially clear after the adoption of the gold standard by many 
other countries after 1870, for reasons which are discussed again below.
Periods of “easy money”, when a surplus of reserves pushed market dis­
count rates below Bank rate, posed another problem for the Bank of England. 
Low rates made it less profitable for country banks to invest their surplus re­
serves in the London market, which then aggravated the rise in rates when 
activity revived. They also encouraged expansion at times when the Bank 
was expecting a stringency of gold in the near future, which meant Bank rate 
would have to be raised to a higher level to sustain reserves Occasionally, 
therefore, the Bank wished to raise market rates to the level of Bank rate so 
as to make its rate “effective”, and the directors of the Bank realised that 
this could be achieved by withdrawing reserves from the banking system. But 
how was this to be done?
Selling bills would have been an obvious solution, were it not for the fact 
that the Bank’s bill portfolio was small at precisely those times when market 
rates were low relative to Bank rate. Similarly, borrowing reserves would 
have done the job, but conflicted with the Bank’s avowed practice of not 
paying interest on its deposits. This left outright sales of Consols (government 
perpetuities), which the Bank held in sizeable quantities. However, this may
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have imposed losses on the Bank since Consols would have to be sold when 
longer-term rates were likely to be above short-term rates (ease in the discount 
market) and purchased again when longer-term rates were below short-term 
rates (stringency in the money market).
These constraints led the Bank to engage in repurchase agreements against 
Consols: that is, Consols were sold spot and simultaneously repurchased 
forward. This transaction effectively meant that the Bank borrowed short­
term funds, but avoided the capital losses which could have been incurred 
on selling Consols outright and buying them back at a subsequent date. 
According to Clapham (1944, p.295) such repurchase agreements were first 
employed during the 1830s, but they did not become a regular feature of 
the Bank’s operations until after 1870. Even then, problems remained with 
this technique, because the Stock Exchange participants to whom the Bank 
sold Consols were themselves insufficiently reliant upon the discount market 
for funds. This led to instances where the Bank sold Consols, only to find 
that the institutions who bought these securities were in turn funding these 
purchases with advances from the Bank. Thus the Bank’s operations would 
leave bank reserves unchanged and so too the market discount rate. To 
counteract this problem the Bank sometimes took the more direct step of 
borrowing funds (via repurchase agreements) directly from large lenders who 
wished to lend funds in the discount market (Sayers 1957). The Bank also 
sometimes sold Consols directly to the large joint stock banks instead of on 
the Stock Exchange.
1.2 Early Parallels — Europe
Whilst the Bank of England had been virtually the only nascent central bank 
during the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century saw central banks (or 
their precursors) being established in many European countries. Amongst 
others, these included the Banque de France (1800), the Nederlandsche Bank 
(1814), the Prussian Bank (1846, which became the Reichsbank in 1876) and 
the Banque Nationale de Belgique (1850) (see Capie, Goodhart and Schnadt 
1994). In each case an important function of these banks was to discount
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bills, usually of a good quality and a short maturity. The result was that 
they all provided a discount facility similar to that of the Bank of England. 
As in England, Usury Laws (or government decrees) typically prevented these 
banks from raising their official discount rates beyond 5%. The Banque de 
France, for instance, maintained its rate at 4% between 1820 and 1847, whilst 
the precursors to the Reichsbank hardly ever changed their discount rates 
from 4%. As in England -  and more than likely because of the more active 
use of Bank rate there -  the European central banks also began to vary official 
discount rates more frequently after the middle of the century.
Data on the official discount rates of the European central banks between 
1844 and 1900 in Palgrave (1903) illustrates this development clearly. Before 
1850, virtually no changes are recorded in official discount rates. Between 
1850 and 1900, however, the official discount rate was changed 109 times 
in France, 155 times in Germany, 160 times in Belgium and 173 times in 
Holland5.
The parallels do not end there. The emergence of the seasonal pattern in 
Bank rate described in the previous section also occurs in the discount rates 
of the continental central banks, especially after 1875 (tables are provided in 
Palgrave 1903). By this time nearly all the countries considered were on a 
gold standard. The reasons for this seasonal variation are the same as before: 
the need to protect gold reserves against gold outflows caused official rates 
to be raised, whilst the accumulation of excess reserves and the desire to 
invest these in interest-bearing assets caused rates to be lowered again. The 
President of the Reichsbank in 1880, when questioned why the Reichsbank 
had begun to discount at a preferential rate below its official discount rate, 
gave the following reply:
“I can assure you th a t at no time and under no circumstances has the 
management of the bank taken an action for the purpose of paying the highest 
possible dividends .... But, gentlemen, I cannot be completely indifferent as 
to whether funds of the bank are employed or lie sterile in its vaults ... As 
I see it, the Reichsbank should not look for business, but neither should
5This is still less than in England, where Bank ra te  was changed no fewer than 392 
times.
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it decline a proper opportunity to invest its funds in safe, bankable paper”
(cited in Bopp, 1956, p .38).
During the era of the international gold standard, then, many central 
banks followed the lead taken by the Bank of England and employed their 
official discount rates to regulate and protect their gold reserves. This did not 
mean, however, that discount policy operated according to rigid rules, free 
from judgement or discretion. To the contrary, to quote another President of 
the Reichsbank in 1890:
“In determining the discount policy of a central bank, account m ust be 
taken not only of the size but also of the character of the monetary demands 
made of it. An export of gold requires sharper countermeasures than a tem ­
porary withdrawal of gold into domestic circulation. A monetary demand 
based on overspeculation and overproduction requires sharper restrictions 
than a periodic increase in monetary demand at the turn of the quarter of 
the year which is grounded in the whole structure of the normal process of 
payments. These differences cannot be expressed in numbers and therefore 
discount policy cannot be regulated according to a purely mechanical prin­
ciple” (cited in Bopp, 1953, p .30).
During the operation of the international gold standard some of the con­
tinental central banks also began to develop similar techniques to those of 
the Bank of England for making their discount rates effective. The Reichs­
bank is the most prominent example, and began to use open-market sales of 
Treasury bills in 1901 to withdraw surplus reserves from the banking system 
(Bopp 1956).
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1.3 Late Followers — The Federal R eserve
Throughout the nineteenth century, and until 1914, the United States had 
no institution which resembled the central banks that had been established 
elsewhere. Two national banks had been in operation over the periods 1791- 
1811 (the First Bank of the United States) and 1817-1836 (the Second Bank 
of the United States), but these were distinguishable from other banks mainly 
because they acted as depositories for public funds (see Timberlake 1993). 
Limited central banking functions were also carried by the Independent Trea­
sury, formed in 1841 (see Taus 1943), including what may be seen as the first 
open-market operations which were carried out “with a view towards reliev­
ing pressure upon the money market of New York” (cited in Timberlake 1993, 
p .79). However, these operations remained isolated instances rather than a 
coherent strategy for reserve provision.
Since 1863, US banking operated according to the so-called National 
Banking System, under which all note-issuing banks were compelled to cover 
their note issues by holdings of Treasury debt (see Friedman and Schwartz 
1963). Whilst this arrangement effectively created a uniform national cur­
rency, it also made the supply of notes inelastic, since banks first had to 
obtain government debt before they could expand their note issue. This 
problem was compounded further by national restrictions on branch bank­
ing, as well reserve requirements. All these features resulted in a banking 
system which was extremely poor at dealing even with seasonal (and hence 
fairly predictable) variations in the demand for cash, let alone unexpected 
changes in cash demand. As in England, where the London discount market 
had developed for purposes of redistributing reserves amongst geographically 
isolated country banks, the New York money market arose to recycle reserves 
from surplus to deficit banks. It thus became commonplace for country banks 
to place their surplus reserves with New York banks in the form of call loans 
(see Goodhart 1972). As in England, however, aggregate variations in the 
demand for reserves caused sharp fluctuations in New York money rates and, 
in such circumstances,
“... call loans proved to be among the most illiquid of assets. Experience
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taught the country banks th a t their correspondents in New York found it 
difficult to cash their deposits in such a situation. Consequently, immediately 
the slightest indication of a defect occurred, there was a scramble by the 
country banks to withdraw their balances en bloc from New York .... The 
New York banks were driven to  suspend payment, and those country banks 
who had not withdrawn their funds in time had to suspend also” (Smith 
1936, p .139).
In the absence of any mechanism for accommodating changing demands 
for currency (reserves), a role which was played by the discount facilities of the 
central banks described above, it is therefore unsurprising that the National 
Banking System was prone to frequent banking crises, with severe panics 
occurring in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893 and 1907 (Mishkin 1991 and Calomiris 
and Gorton 1991).
Tallman and Moen (1993), and more recently Donaldson (1994), have con­
firmed that seasonal liquidity factors were a significant driving force behind 
these banking panics, a view which was held by many early commentators 
on the subject (e.g. Sprague 1910 and Kemmerer 1910). Indeed, without a 
central bank to provide reserves, money market interest rates would rise to 
extremely high levels as banks attempted to obtain reserves in the New York 
money market. Weekly data examined by Donaldson indicates that during 
the crises of 1873, 1884 and 1907, short-term interest rates reached levels of 
161%, 66% and 50% respectively, levels that were far in excess of anything 
seen in London or on the continent. According to a report by the Senate 
Banking and Currency Committee in 1907:
“... during the year 1907 the range of interest for call money was from 
2 to  45 percent in January, from 2 to 25 percent in March, from 5 to 125 
percent in October, from 3 to 75 percent in November, and from 2 to 25
percent in D ecem ber  The blighting effect of these violent fluctuations of
the interest rates is demonstrated by the rate charged for 90-day time loans, 
which during November and December, 1907, were running as high as 12 to 
16 percent, with no business done in time loans of a longer period during 
the entire month of November and no business being done at times on prime 
commercial bills during the same months” (quoted in Burgess, 1946, p .196).
The severity of the crisis of 1907 prompted the formation of the National
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Monetary Commission to study the domestic and international monetary 
system and to seek ways of increasing the “elasticity” of the US currency 
supply.
It was relatively clear that the outcome of the Commission would involve 
the establishment of a central bank, although the size of the US as well 
political concerns about the governance of such a bank militated against the 
formation of a single “United Reserve Bank” as proposed by Paul Warburg 
(1911). Instead, the Commission’s Report, which was published in 1910, laid 
the foundation for a Federal Reserve System  (or Fed), This began operations 
in 1914, and was comprised of 12 Federal Reserve banks, who were the owners 
of the Fed, acting under the umbrella of the Federal Reserve Board6.
Aside from its ownership features, the Fed was not unlike most other cen­
tral banks. Like them, the individual Federal Reserve banks were authorised 
to operate a discount facility -  dubbed the “discount window” -  under which 
they could purchase bills of exchange (known as banker’s acceptances in the 
US) at a rate chosen by them, thereby providing an automatic mechanism 
for providing member banks with reserves. According to Burgess (1946):
“The Reserve Banks ordinarily stand ready to buy the eligible banker’s 
acceptances which may be offered to them. There have indeed been times 
when eligible acceptances have been refused; but generally speaking the re­
serve banks have been passive rather than active in their specific purchases of 
acceptances and have expressed their policy by changes in the rates at which 
purchases were made” (p.43; emphasis added).
Initially, each Federal Reserve bank posted its own discount rate (or set of 
rates, where more than one type of instrument was rediscounted). Although 
discount rates could differ between Reserve banks until the second world war, 
changes in these rates had to be approved by the Board (Meulendyke 1989). 
Furthermore, open-market operations did occur, although these initially took 
the form of outright purchases of securities, usually with a view to increasing 
the Reserve banks’ interest-bearing assets, or to foster the market in banker’s
6For details on the structure and early operations of the Fed see Wicker (1966) or 
Beckhart (1972).
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acceptances. They were clearly not undertaken to withdraw reserves in order 
to make discount rates effective. It was only some years later, in the early 
1920s, that the effect of these individual purchases on short-term money 
market interest rates, and in turn on credit conditions, was recognised7. The 
Governor of the New York Fed at the time, Benjamin Strong, thus proposed 
that discount policy and open-market operations should become coordinated, 
leading to the formation of the Open Market Investment Committee in 1923s.
1.4 W artim e D isruption
The Fed had not even begun operations when hostilities broke out in Europe 
in July 1914. In England, this led to a massive surge in discounting at 
the Bank of England. Although Bank rate was increased, the demands for 
currency remained so high that (emergency) legislation was passed which 
permitted the Bank to increase its note issue beyond any limit prescribed 
in law. It was not long before the currency which had gone into circulation 
began to return to the banking system, swelling banks’ reserves. This increase 
in reserves was amplified by the expansion of government spending, much 
of which was financed by short-term borrowing in the form Treasury bills 
and so-called Ways and Means advances provided by the Bank of England. 
The net result was the creation of a large surplus of reserves which, in the 
absence of action by the Bank, caused short-term market rates to fall. Thus 
an innovation was called for:
“The Bank proceeded to borrow at call in the discount m arket all sums 
offering at a fixed rate of interest ... At the same time, the Government, 
instead of putting Treasury bills up to competitive tender offered them  with­
out limit of total amount to the market at a fixed rate of discount. The 
effect was to prevent the rates quoted in the discount market for call money 
and bills falling below these fixed rates. If the rates offered failed to a ttrac t 
as much money as the Government needed, the deficiency was made good
7See chapter 3 for further discussion on this issue.
8Which eventually -  in 1935 -  became the Federal Open Market Committee. See Wicker 
(1966).
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by advances from the Bank of England ... which injected a  fresh supply of 
money into the market and made it more disposed to lend. Thus the market 
was really governed by the Treasury bill rate, and Bank ra te  was practically 
superseded by it. This system continued ... throughout the war and till April 
1921” (Hawtrey 1938, p .130).
Notice that, under such conditions seasonal fluctuations in currency use 
became irrelevant as far as money market interest rates were concerned: large 
reserve surpluses, together with large holdings of Treasury bills, meant that 
banks were never in a position where they had to meet increased demands 
for reserves by discounting paper in the market or at the Bank (this point is 
taken up again in chapter 2).
In the US the picture was different, although the implications for sea­
sonal fluctuations were the same. Rapid expansion in economic activity led 
to an influx of gold and to a massive increase in borrowing from the Fed’s 
discount window. Discounts and advances to member banks rose from aver­
age levels of around $30 million in 1915-1916 to a peak of $2500 million in 
1920. Over the same period the average number of member banks accommo­
dated through the discount window rose from around 650 to just under 5000 
(Burgess 1946). Not surprisingly, therefore, seasonal fluctuations in currency 
use were accommodated by seasonal variation in discount window borrow­
ing, with short-term market interest rates staying at or near the level of the 
discount rate. Levels of borrowing remained positive throughout the 1920s, 
although they were reduced somewhat by gold inflows and Reserve bank pur­
chases of securities. Interestingly, this situation was totally reversed during 
the 1930s, when inflows of gold became so large that bank’s held unprece­
dented levels of excess reserves (see Morrison 1966). The Fed consequently 
used its power, acquired under the Banking Act of 1935, to double banks’ 
reserve requirements, thereby effectively withdrawing reserves.
Variants of the UK and US experience doubtless occurred in many coun­
tries, with banks either holding a large surplus of reserves, or becoming in­
debted to their central bank (see Eichengreen 1992). In each case, however, 
central banks sought to maintain short-term interest rates at the levels cho­
sen by the monetary authorities, although this level increasingly came under
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the influence of governments during and between the wars. As Sayers (1957) 
put it:
“Under the impulse of war finance, the technique of the central bank is 
manipulated so as to  conform to events rather than to control them. Central 
bankers become the slaves of deficit finance” (p.20).
This meant that interest rates -  sometimes both short and long, as in the 
US -  were maintained at extremely low levels for long periods of time, as 
governments pursued so-called “cheap money” policies to reduce the cost of 
government borrowing and to stimulate capital formation. Bank rate, for 
example, was held at 2% for most of the 1930s, with market rates usually 
remaining even lower. This state of affairs persisted throughout the second 
world war and until 19519. Similarly, the US discount rate remained at very 
low levels, and was usually ineffective even at these levels. During the war 
the US Treasury bill rate was officially pegged by the Fed, at |% , as were 
longer term government bond rates (Timberlake 1993).
Deficit finance, and the concomitant drive for cheap money, had another 
implication for the interest rate instrument:
“... experience has taught us that the interest rate ... is a blunt instru­
ment: it works too slowly in encouraging or discouraging in the right direction 
.... So we have moved towards the idea that the interest rate should be held 
pretty  stable, and on the low side. And if this is done, it follows th a t the 
desired changes in activity must be encouraged, and the undesired changes 
discouraged, by other weapons” (Sayers 1957, p .31).
These “weapons” comprised direct controls of every imaginable kind. Ex­
change controls, credit ceilings, interest rate ceilings, and liquidity require­
ments all became a common feature of the financial landscape in many coun­
tries during and between the wars. It is important to note, however, that 
these controls were meant to augment the interest rate instrument rather 
than to replace it. Central banks everywhere continued to operate as they
9As before, it was the Treasury bill rate which became the relevant official ra te during 
the war. See Sayers (1957).
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had previously, namely to offer a discount facility under which certain eligible 
institutions could borrow reserves by selling or pledging certain eligible assets 
to the central bank. Irrespective of the other monetary weapons that were de­
ployed by governments and central banks, therefore, discount windows were 
never closed.
1.5 Open-M arket O perations
In one respect, deficit finance created an advantage for interest rate man­
agement. Almost everywhere, central banks found that their portfolios of 
short- and long-term government securities were much larger as a result of 
the government debt issues which occurred during the wars (and the Great 
Depression). When conditions normalised, this naturally improved their abil­
ity to undertake open-market sales or purchases of assets in order to make 
their discount rates effective. Unwanted variations in short-term money mar­
ket interest rates could now be eliminated from both directions. Increases in 
the demand for reserves could be accommodated either via automatic dis­
counts (or advances) or via open-market purchases, both of which prevented 
rates in the market from rising. Alternatively, decreases in the demand for 
reserves could be “mopped up” by an automatic decrease in discounts or, if 
necessary, by an open-market sale of assets (either on an outright or a repur­
chase basis), thus preventing rates in the market from falling. Government 
war finance, together with the evolution of broader and more liquid money 
markets, thus paved the way for a more precise and active role for (money) 
market operations as a means of achieving a desired level for short-term in­
terest rates.
Here, the Federal Reserve took the lead. In 1951 it ceased fixing the 
prices of longer-term government bonds, and began to operate according to a 
“bills-only” technique: that is, the Fed would buy or sell Treasury bills to in­
crease or decrease bank reserves (see Meulendyke 1990). The counterparties 
in these transactions were a relatively small group of specialist institutions -  
known as primary dealers -  who undertook to make markets in government
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securities. The Fed also frequently augmented these operations with repur­
chase agreements involving government securities and banker’s acceptances, 
although these transactions were, until the 1970s, only undertaken with non­
bank primary dealers. W ith the development of the federal funds market in 
New York in the mid-1950s10, the federal funds rate emerged as an indicator 
of reserve availability within the banking system. If reserves were scarce, 
banks would be borrowing from the discount window, and the federal funds 
rate would be driven to equality with the Fed’s discount rate. If reserves were 
plentiful, the federal funds rate would begin to fall, suggesting that the Fed 
should undertake open-market sales (i.e. borrow reserves).
These operations were only slightly more sophisticated than those of the 
Bank of England, whose techniques remained much the same as before. An 
increase in the demand for reserves meant that the discount houses would 
approach the Bank to sell bills (or obtain advances). Reserve surpluses were 
removed through the sale of Treasury bills. As already noted, this mode 
of operation remained basically unchanged until 1980 when the Bank, like 
the Fed, resorted to the more frequent use of open-market operations as a 
mechanism for supplying reserves. These changes, and the Bank’s current 
money market operations, are presented in detail in chapter 4.
Unlike the Fed and the Bank of England, most European (and other) 
central banks did not initially undertake open-market operations to vary the 
level of bank reserves in the post-war period. Instead, they continued to rely 
upon their discount facilities to provide reserves until the 1970s and 1980s 
(see Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh 1989). Changes in reserve requirements 
were also often used to achieve the same effect as open-market operations, 
with Germany being a particularly good example (see Deutsche Bundesbank 
1989). Raising the level of reserve requirements has exactly the same result as 
an open-market sale of securities11: both reduce the existing level of reserves
10This market was one in which member banks could lend their reserve balances a t 
the Fed to other member banks on an overnight (or longer) basis. Consequently, “the” 
federal funds rate refers to an overnight interest rate (see Minsky 1957, Boughton 1972 or 
Goodfriend and Whelpley 1986).
n Of course, higher reserve requirements impose a higher tax on banks, and from this
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relative to the level o f required reserves and, by increasing the scarcity of 
reserves, potentially force banks “into” the discount window.
The use of reserve requirements in this way (i.e. as a mechanism to 
support the central bank’s interest rate instrument) is a far cry from the 
conventional interpretation of reserve requirements, which treats them as 
a constraint on the capacity of the banking system to expand its balance 
sheet. Although this interpretation of reserve requirements is presented in 
most monetary textbooks, it is invalid since a necessary condition for its 
validity is that the supply of reserves is quantitatively constrained by the 
central bank. The historical description up to this point indicates that this 
has never been the case, at least not as long as there have been central 
banks12. The persistence of this interpretation, then, may be ascribed either 
to the belief that central banks have sought to place absolute limits on the 
level of bank reserves (which is clearly counterfactual) or that central banks 
should place absolute limits on the level of bank reserves. In order to maintain 
continuity at this stage, this latter issue is taken up again in chapter 2.
A useful summary of more recent changes in the manner in which cen­
tral banks have determined the level of short-term nominal interest rates is 
provided by Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989), who note that:
“ ... recent changes in central banks’ money market operating techniques 
and procedures display several common tendencies. Firstly, steps have been 
taken in many countries to restrict or discourage recourse by the banks to 
conventional open-ended central bank credit facilities .... Secondly, central 
banks in many countries have in recent years made increasing use of flexible 
market operations ... for counteracting influences on reserves over which 
central banks have little direct control. Thirdly, in many countries the burden 
of reserve requirements has been lowered in recent years, and only limited 
use is now made of changes in reserve requirements as a means of making 
adjustm ents in banks’ reserve positions” (pp.7-8).
Nonetheless, closer observation reveals many differences, which may in­
volve the frequency of operations, the official counterparties, the type of
perspective are not the same as a sale of securities.
12For a discussion of these and other issues related to reserve requirements see Goodfriend 
and Hargreaves (1983) and Stevens (1991).
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transactions, and limits on the access to the discount facility. These dif­
ferences, in turn, have implications for the behaviour of short-term interest 
rates and are examined again in chapter 3 and also throughout Part II, in 
the context of the sterling money market.
1.6. F I G U R E S 43
1 .6  F ig u r e s
Figure 1.1.
Bank R ate 1800-1914: 
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CH APTER 1.
C hapter 2
T he Interest R ate Instrum ent 
in T heory
The historical sketch presented in the previous chapter has illustrated the 
continuity in the operations of the Bank of England and those of other central 
banks. It has argued that these operations have been consistent with the 
interest rate as the monetary instrument. Although this argument is strongly 
suggested by the historical record, the academic literature on this subject has 
been more ambivalent. It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight -  and 
bring into question -  two prominent sources of this ambivalence.
First, section 1 explores the idea that central banks are engaged in 
interest-rate smoothing. This has usually been taken to mean that central 
banks seek to eliminate seasonal fluctuations in money market interest rates. 
Whilst not incorrect, this notion is seriously incomplete, since it ignores the 
crucial fact that short-term interest rates are the instrument of monetary pol­
icy, whose level is chosen by the central bank to achieve some policy target.
Second, section 2 questions the idea that the monetary instrument can, 
and possibly even should, be some quantity variable, like the money base, 
instead of a price variable, i.e. a short-term interest rate. This has always 
been rejected by central bankers, as well as by academics who stress the 
institutional aspects of monetary policy, usually because of implementation
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problems. Nonetheless, many academics persist in their belief that a (simple) 
choice exists over the monetary instrument. To dispel this notion, a recent 
proposal for money base control is examined, and its operational problems 
are highlighted.
2.1 Interest R ate Sm oothing
2.1.1 T he disappearance o f interest rate seasonality
Sayers (1976) provides perhaps the most concise statement of central bank 
interest rate management as it was practised by the Bank of England (and 
other central banks) in the years leading up to 1914:
“... the Americans had at this time a rather inelastic monetary system, 
and one of the biggest sources of demand for gold from London was to meet 
variations in the circulation requirements of the American economy. This 
was an economy still substantially geared to annual cropping, and it was no 
coincidence th a t the Bank had more often than not to face an autum nal drain 
of gold to New York. Was such a seasonal movement ... to be ignored by 
the Bank? .... Discretion was ... expected, whatever the Act of 1844 and its 
prophets had said. It was perhaps within narrow limits, but judgement was 
undoubtedly called for, in deciding whether the week’s conditions (or indeed 
the day’s) necessitated a movement of Bank rate; in this sense, the Bank 
was already in its manipulation of Bank rate engaged in central banking” 
(emphasis added).
After 1914, this scenario changed, especially as regards the behaviour of 
interest rates. Seasonal fluctuations in short-term nominal market interest 
rates virtually disappeared, both in the US and in all European countries, as 
did seasonal fluctuations in the official interest rates of the Bank of England 
and the other continental central banks. Moreover, interest rate seasonals 
have never subsequently reappeared to any significant extent (see Mankiw 
and Miron 1986).
The most frequent explanation for this disappearance of seasonality is 
the founding of the Fed in 1914. Whilst this is certainly not an incorrect
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explanation, it is argued here that it omits an important part of the story. 
Furthermore, this explanation has led to a somewhat ambiguous character­
isation of the interest rate instrument in the literature, which this section 
seeks to clarify.
Miron (1986) was the first to argue formally that it was the creation of 
the Fed which finally furnished an elastic currency in the US, thereby accom­
modating the reserve fluctuations which drove these interest rate seasonals. 
Clark (1986) challenged this argument on the grounds that it inadequately 
accounts for the worldwide disappearance of seasonality, and suggests that 
the dissolution of the international gold standard may have been a key factor. 
Taking up this challenge, Barsky, Mankiw, Miron and Weill (1988) proposed 
an explanation in which the creation of the Fed was reinstated as the primary 
causal factor: by eliminating the need for seasonal gold flows from other coun­
tries, they argued, the establishment of the Fed also eliminated the seasonal 
interest rate reaction of other central banks to these gold flows.
The historical account of the previous chapter suggests that, if anything, 
both the suspension of the gold standard and the founding of the Fed appear 
to be relevant in explaining the disappearance of seasonality. However, a 
third factor, rarely mentioned in the literature, also seems essential.
Recall that by 1914 the Bank of England was the only central bank which 
sought to make its official discount rate effective with any regularity, and 
did not even do so all the time. Elsewhere, central banks usually let mar­
ket rates fall below official rates or, if anything, lowered their discount rates 
down to market rates in order to maintain their stock of earning assets. The 
newly formed Federal Reserve banks would have behaved this way. W ith­
out a significant portfolio of financial assets, they could not have countered 
any seasonal fall in market rates below the discount rate. This implies that 
seasonal variations in market rates, whilst perhaps not as extreme as before, 
would have persisted even with the Fed and without the gold standard.
Some evidence for this may be found by going back to the experience of 
the Bank of England in the first part of the nineteenth century, when the 
banking system experienced seasonal fluctuations in reserves -  as it does to
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a limited extent even today -  due to variations in domestic currency use. 
Although Bank rate did not vary, market discount rates did: seasonal reserve 
ease caused rates to fall below Bank rate in the absence of any operations by 
the Bank to withdraw reserves. The establishment of a central bank in the 
US will, similarly, have placed a ceiling on market interest rates. Rates would 
have been free to fall below this ceiling, however, and would have done so on 
a seasonal basis unless member banks for some reason remained permanently 
indebted to the Fed, or the Fed undertook open-market operations to make 
its discount rate effective.
The disappearance of seasonality, then, was not only due to the founding 
of the Fed or the suspension of gold convertibility. It was also a direct result 
of the first world war. In the UK, after the initial liquidity shock resulting 
from the outbreak of war had been weathered, the banking system became 
flooded with reserves. Seasonal fluctuations in reserves, therefore, had little 
impact on interest rates as long as the Bank of England stood ready to 
borrow reserve surpluses from the banking system. In the US, banks relied 
so heavily on the Fed’s discount window that seasonal variations in reserves 
also had little impact on interest rates. These liquidity disturbances, which 
left banks more or less permanently in a position of aggregate surplus or 
shortage, continued to plague many banking systems until after the second 
world war. By this time, however, central banks were better equipped for 
keeping market rates in line with official rates. Thus interest rate seasonals 
did not reappear to any significant extent.
2.1.2 T he m eaning o f interest rate sm oothing
The notion that it was the founding of the Fed rather than other factors which 
resulted in the disappearance of interest rate seasonality has also led to the 
view that interest rate management by central banks essentially amounts to 
the “smoothing” of seasonal variations in short-term interest rates. Mankiw 
and Miron (1991), for example, state that “since the Federal Reserve began 
operations in 1914, its policy has been to smooth nominal interest rates over 
the year”, which it achieves “by expanding the money supply during those
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times of the year when the demand for goods and services is high”. Conse­
quently, they refer to the policy of the Fed as “seasonal monetary policy” . 
This perception also appears elsewhere in the literature (see Walsh 1990, 
pp. 18-24) and, whilst it is not incorrect, is a somewhat ambiguous descrip­
tion of the interest rate instrument as it was (and still is) employed by the 
Fed and by other central banks. W hat is more, it is potentially misleading, 
as the following two examples indicate.
First, the emphasis on interest rate policy as smoothing has led at least 
one prominent researcher to develop a theory, based on otherwise plausible 
assumptions, which “implies that the Fed is concerned with the predictability 
of interest rates rather than with their level” (Cukierman 1991, p. 113). This is 
an unfortunate theoretical implication, since it is so obviously counterfactual: 
central banks and participants in financial markets are extremely concerned 
with the level of short-term nominal rates.
Secondly, it has led to the view that central banks were somehow behaving 
differently before 1914, as is exemplified by the following statement by Clark 
(1986, pp.89-90):
“Central banks existed in Great Britain, France, Germany, and other 
countries in the nineteenth century. Jevons ... claimed to have identified a 
dangerous association between the seasonal peaks of interest rates and the 
outbreak of financial panics, and, as early as the 1860s, he called on the Bank 
of England to take actions to eliminate interest rate seasonals. If interest rate 
seasonals were dangerous and central banks possessed the power to eliminate 
them, it is curious that all central banks waited until after world war one to 
exercise these powers.
The problem with the definition of interest rate smoothing as the elimina­
tion of seasonal fluctuations per se is that it ignores the role of the short-term 
interest rate as the monetary instrument, whose level is chosen to attain  some 
policy target. Interest rate smoothing, therefore, if it is to be used as a de­
scriptive term about central bank policy, should be defined as follows: it is 
the undertaking, by central banks, of transactions which keep (certain) mar­
ket interest rates at their desired level. This definition -  which will be the 
assumed definition from this point on -  is preferred because it stresses that it
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is not just seasonal fluctuations in market interest rates that concern central 
banks, but all fluctuations which would undermine the achievement of its 
extant policy target(s).
W hat is more, this definition does not preclude the possibility that the 
interest rate instrument may itself be employed in a seasonal fashion, and thus 
easily resolves Clark’s puzzle about the behaviour of central banks before 
1914. Far from wanting to eliminate interest rate seasonals, central banks 
relied upon them to counteract outflows of gold. That is, they raised their 
official rates when their reserves were threatened, since their policy target 
was a specified (minimum) level of reserves. This does not mean that central 
banks were not smoothing interest rates, or that they were not concerned 
with eliminating financial panics. They were, since without their discount 
facilities interest rates would have risen further and panics would have been 
more frequent, as is evidenced by the US before 1914. After 1914 and the 
suspension of the gold standard, central banks -  a group which now included 
the Fed -  no longer had to apply their instrument in a seasonal fashion: as 
their intermediate and final policy targets changed, so too did the manner in 
which they employed their interest rate instrument.
To sum up, interest rates have nearly always been the monetary instru­
ment of central banks. This was the central point of Hawtrey’s (1938) book 
A Century of Bank Rate:
When the gold standard is suspended or abandoned, th a t does not mean 
th a t monetary contraction or expansion need no longer be applied. The 
alternative dangers of inflation and deflation remain, and if the gold reserve 
is not employed as an indicator, other symptoms must be observed, such as 
the state of employment, the level of profits, or a rise or fall of the price level.
And when the threat of inflation or deflation is detected, it is in Bank rate 
th a t the essential corrective is found” (p.260).
Making the same point in modern terminology, one might say that central 
banks -  qua central banks -  have always engaged in interest rate smoothing, 
as it has been (re)defined above. Clearly central banks have improved their 
interest rate smoothing over time, in the sense that they are now much better 
at preventing undesirable fluctuations in short-term interest rates than they
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were a hundred years ago. Even today, though, interest rate smoothing is 
not perfect. The aim of Part I I  of this thesis is to examine in greater detail 
the techniques, or operating procedures, which the Bank of England employs 
to smooth interest rates.
The essays therein will be concerned with the operational aspects of these 
techniques, rather than with how policy is derived. The implicit assumption 
throughout will be that the Bank of England has a policy target, and that it 
attem pts to hit this target by appropriate choices of the short-term interest 
rate over time. In light of the discussion so far, this is hardly an unrealistic 
assumption:
The original adoption of Bank rate as an instrum ent of monetary regu­
lation was founded on theoretical reasoning. But the practical application 
of how it evolved in the nineteenth century was empirical. Starting from 
the postulate th a t a rise in the rate of discount must be a deterrent on the 
creation of credit, the Bank raised the rate whenever its  reserves seemed 
insufficient, and went on raising it step by step until the desired effect was 
produced. When the reserve began to increase, the Bank lowered the rate 
step by step... ” (Hawtrey 1946 p .274).
Most economists would agree that replacing the emphasised phrases in 
this description with the phrases “inflation seemed too high” and “inflation 
began to decrease” , respectively, would not be an inaccurate description of 
the Bank’s current mode of operation.
There are, however, those who have questioned the necessity for the Bank 
of England -  indeed, all central banks -  to operate in this way. It has fre­
quently been proposed, for example, that central banks should impose quan­
titative limits on the amount of the currency and bank reserves (otherwise 
referred to as the money ‘base’) which they are prepared to supply, and let 
money market interest rates vary according to market forces. Poole (1970), 
in a widely cited paper, has characterised this issue as one of “optimal instru­
ment choice” , implying that a choice really can be made about the central 
banks’ instrument. Central bankers, on the other hand, have usually denied 
that such a choice exists in practice. In addition, academics have been far 
more successful at making a case for some assumed (and often undefined)
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form of money base control than they have at deriving operationally feasible 
proposals for such a form of control. Or analysing how these would operate 
in practice. Thus, the next section briefly takes up this issue.
2.2 The M oney B ase as an Instrum ent
2.2.1 Settin g  quantitative limits: m oney base control
Poole (1970) has defined an instrument of monetary policy as “a policy- 
controlled variable which can be set exactly for all practical purposes” and 
adds that “it is, for example, a straightforward m atter to use the approach of 
this paper to treat the monetary base as an instrument” (p. 198). This reflects 
the attitude of many academics who acknowledge that central banks could not 
use as their instrument any measure of money which included bank deposits, 
since this would not be directly controllable, but who nonetheless believe 
that the monetary base could, and indeed should, constitute the monetary 
instrument.
The single most influential proponent of this view is Milton Friedman who, 
in a series of lectures in 1959 entitled A Program for Monetary Stability, called 
for US monetary policy to be implemented according to a system resembling 
money base control. It is crucial to bear in mind that Friedman’s proposal 
was motivated by the notion that a monetary aggregate, however defined, 
could be rendered subject to a rule, which could then be used to inhibit the 
discretion of the monetary authorities:
“There is little to be said in theory for the rule th a t the money supply 
should grow at a constant rate. The case for it is entirely that it would 
work in practice. There are persuasive theoretical grounds for desiring to 
vary the rate of growth to offset other factors. The difficulty is that, in 
practice, we do not know when to do so and by how much. In practice, 
therefore, deviations from the simple rule have been destabilizing rather than 
the reverse” (Friedman 1959, p.98).
This has remained the primary attraction of money base control, although 
its proponents have been less forthcoming both with specific rules and with
2 . 2 . THE M O N E Y  BASE A S  A N  INSTRU M ENT 53
operational suggestions of how these rules would actually be implemented. It 
is noteworthy that Friedman himself argued for the introduction of 100% re­
serve banking (although reserves would pay interest) as an im portant adjunct 
to his proposal, which probably decreased its overall acceptance significantly.
McCallum (1987, 1988 and 1989) thus seems to be a welcome exception. 
Not only does he suggest that the monetary base should be the instrument 
of policy, but also that this instrument should be set according to a rule 
which “specifies quarterly settings for the variable A w h e r e  bt = logBt and 
Bt denotes the average value during quarter t of the monetary base” (1989, 
p.340). After stating a concrete example of such a rule, McCallum then 
seeks “to determine how nominal GNP would behave in an actual economy 
... if its monetary authority were to conduct policy by setting the monetary 
base in accordance with the policy rule [just] proposed” (p.343). This is 
done by estimating a simple model of GNP determination, in which current 
GNP depends only on its past values and on the growth of the monetary 
base, and then using this estimated relationship to simulate the path which 
nominal GNP would have followed had the money base rule been applied. 
The conclusion is that “the rule would have worked quite well according to 
[the] model; the simulated models stay quite close to the target path [for 
nominal GNP]” (p.345). Having made what seems a plausible case for the 
adoption of a money base rule, McCallum then asks why such a rule has not 
been adopted in practice. The answer? “... [T]he feeling of self-importance 
of hundreds of [central bank] employees might be diminished substantially if 
policy were conducted in accordance with an automatic rule” (p.349).
It is useful, then, to evaluate McCallum’s specific proposal, not only to 
see whether it has the desirable properties he claims, but also for highlighting 
the problems associated with money base control more generally. Assume, 
therefore, that a central bank were to implement McCallum’s proposal. It is 
obvious that, by making the appropriate open-market operations, the central 
bank could always make the money base grow at exactly the rate required by 
the rule, say 1% per quarter. This part of the proposal is therefore trivial. 
The real problem, which is hardly ever addressed by the proponents of money 
base control, concerns the behaviour of the banking system when open-market
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operations aim to make the money base, which is the sum of currency and 
bank reserves, grow at a particular rate. This introduces a potential conflict 
between the actual growth in bank reserves, which is affected by the behaviour 
of currency holders, and the target level of reserves, which banks need in order 
to satisfy their reserve requirements.
All banking systems are subject to a reserve requirement, which demands 
that banks, by law, hold at least a specified average amount of reserves over 
a specified period known as a maintenance period. Of course, it must be 
the case that the amount of reserves which would satisfy the requirement 
is determinate, otherwise it becomes impossible to establish whether banks 
have in fact satisfied them1. Note that the requirement could easily be zero, 
as it is in the UK2. More normally the reserve requirement is positive, and 
derived as a proportion of banks’ average liabilities over a specified period 
known as a computation period. There are clearly many different types of 
reserve requirements which may be imposed and these vary considerably in 
practice. For illustrative purposes, however, assume that the central bank 
(which will implement the money base rule above) specifies that banks must 
hold reserves whose average over any quarter is some positive fraction of 
their average deposit liabilities over the previous quarter. This means that 
banks must manage their reserve holdings in the present quarter to meet a
JThis means th a t the maintenance period cannot be infinite, and also th a t reserve 
carry-over provisions cannot be so loose as to render the maintenance period effectively 
infinite. See the discussion on reserve requirements in chapter 3.
2It may seem puzzling how a bank’s reserves could ever become negative, and thus why 
a reserve requirement of zero should be called a requirement at all. Payment arrangements 
in most banking systems, however, do not impose a reserve-in-advance constraint on banks, 
with the result th a t banks can, and do, make payments without knowing their exact reserve 
levels over time. This reserve level is only revealed when payments are settled, usually at 
the end of the day. Therefore, if a bank has borrowed less than it has lent during the day, 
it may well be the case th a t it ends the day with negative reserves, i.e. is receiving an 
implicit loan from the central bank. In order to satisfy a zero reserve requirement, the 
bank may then have to borrow reserves from another bank which has a surplus (this is 
what happens in the UK), or the implicit loan by the central bank may be converted into 
an explicit loan, in which case the bank may be asked to pledge collateral to  the central 
bank as security for the loan.
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predetermined requirement3.
It is easily demonstrated that the ability of banks to meet their reserve 
requirements under the money base rule is contingent upon the behaviour of 
currency holders. The average value of the money base per quarter is defined 
as the sum of the average value of the currency stock and the average value 
of bank reserves per quarter, i.e.
Bt =  Ct - f  Rt.
Satisfaction of a money base rule implies that the central bank uses open- 
market operations to make B t =  B. In order to satisfy their reserve require­
ments, banks must ensure that their actual reserves meet some target level, 
R t =  R. Thus banks’ reserves relative to their target is given by
Rt — R = B  — R  — Ct 5
which clearly depends upon the preferences of currency holders. If, for ex­
ample, currency in circulation were to increase by more than B  — R  during 
the quarter, banks would become unable to meet their reserve targets, i.e. 
R t < R. Anticipating this violation of their requirement, banks will at­
tempt to raise their reserve holdings by, in the first instance, borrowing on 
the money market. Of course, additional reserves cannot be obtained in this 
manner for banks in aggregate, and some banks will always remain below 
their reserve target. For banks to achieve their reserve targets, interest rates 
must be driven so high that one of two things will happen. Either currency 
holders are induced, directly, to deposit currency with the banking system, 
or nominal activity (or the price level) falls sufficiently to lower the trans­
actions demand for currency, thus inducing this outcome indirectly. These,
3The argument which follows could just as easily be made by assuming th a t banks 
must hold reserves which average over any quarter a t least some positive fraction of their 
average deposit liabilities over the forthcoming quarter. This arrangement would simply 
mean th a t banks would have to manage their deposit liabilities in the present quarter to 
meet a predetermined reserve holding. Since it is easier for banks to adjust their reserves 
than their deposits, which are largely demand-determined, this form of reserve requirement 
has never been imposed (this has not prevented academics from proposing them, however; 
see Laurent 1979).
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then, are the implicit forces through which money base control will influence 
the economy. Before discussing the more plausible scenario, which is that the 
central bank’s concern with the stability of the banking system will not allow 
interest rates to attain the level which is necessary for these forces to work, 
a less likely scenario is first examined. Namely, that these forces do actually 
work within the relevant time frame.
Although it is extremely unlikely, it may be that interest rates do actually 
set off the forces just described, and economic agents begin to reduce their 
currency holdings. Now the opposite problem may occur. Banks may find 
that they are accumulating reserves too fast, which will cause them to exceed 
their reserve requirements. Given that reserves are unremunerated, banks 
will seek to lend these, in the first instance, on the money market. As before, 
however, currency holdings need to adjust via the above forces. Even if these 
forces worked quickly enough, therefore, which is a priori doubtful, it would 
leave the problem of potentially dramatic swings in nominal interest rates4.
Such interest rate behaviour, or indeed any interest rate behaviour, is 
totally ignored in the simple model adopted by McCallum to “test” the per­
formance of money base control. As noted above, this model takes current 
nominal GNP to be a function of lagged nominal GNP and current growth 
in the money base on the grounds that both of these variables are statisti­
cally significant in an OLS regression estimated on actual US data over the 
period 1954-85. It hardly needs pointing out that the coefficients obtained 
in this regression will reflect the fact that the Federal Reserve did not imple­
ment money base control over this period. Instead, it was using short-term 
nominal interest rates as its instrument, and was accommodating any and 
all changes in the demand for the money base. McCallum’s procedure thus 
falls squarely into the category of policy evaluation procedures criticised by 
Lucas (1976), since the coefficients in the estimated relationship are clearly 
not invariant under the change to a money base policy. Using these coeffi­
cients to simulate how nominal GNP would have behaved under a different 
policy does not therefore constitute a valid test of the performance of such
4This has been the primary criticism of money base control; see, for example, Foot, 
Goodhart and Hotson (1980) or Goodhart (1989a).
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an alternative policy.
Instead, to test this performance, proponents of money base control will 
have to use models of the economy which are explicit, firstly, about the 
channels whereby the money base will influence prices (or nominal GNP) 
and, secondly, about the constraints placed on money base control by the 
presence of reserve requirements. These constraints were shown to imply 
potentially large fluctuations in short-term interest rates, which poses an 
even more compelling argument against money base control.
2.2.2 W hy th e m oney base has not b een  controllable  
in practice
Solvency constraints on the banking system clearly impose limits on the levels 
to which interest rates can rise without the stability of the banking system 
being drawn into question. When rates start to approach this level, therefore, 
as they might under the example presented above, the central bank will be 
faced with a dilemma: should it violate its money base rule by making reserves 
available? Doing so will avert a potential banking crisis in the current quarter, 
but it will also increase the expectation on the part of banks that it will again 
violate its money base rule in future quarters. This reduces the resolve of 
banks to hit their reserve targets in the future, however, and so too the 
extent to which they will bid up the interest rate to obtain reserves. It also 
lowers the chances that the equilibrating forces, inducing agents to redeposit 
currency, will actually work.
The problem with a money base rule, then, is the following. Either the 
central bank never reneges on the rule, in which case the rule is credible 
but causes interest rates to fluctuate considerably: this may or may not be 
consistent with stability in prices or nominal GNP, and will almost certainly 
cause occasional banking crises. Or, the central bank sometimes reneges on 
the rule, in which case the rule begins to lose credibility and causes interest 
rates to fluctuate less over time. Even Poole (1991), some twenty years after 
his paper on optimal instrument choice, now takes this view:
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“Central banks have not been successful ... in defining a credible policy 
based on short-run control of a monetary aggregate and possessed of an 
emergency escape clause th a t permits a  quick response to a liquidity crisis.
A liquidity crisis is inherently cumulative and is best nipped in the bud. How 
can a m onetary quantity rule be defined th a t provides extra liquidity when 
necessary? ” (p.39)
This was precisely the difficulty which faced the Bank of England in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which has faced all other central 
banks subsequently. There is a striking parallel between proposals for money 
base control which, due to the presence of reserve requirements, are seen as a 
means of constraining excessive deposit (money) creation by banks, and the 
minimum specie ratios imposed upon central banks under the gold standard, 
which were seen as providing a limit on the fiduciary issue of these banks. 
Whilst periodic wars, and the attendant need for governments to increase 
their expenditure, obviously caused this fiduciary limit to be exceeded from 
time to time, it was the development of banking, and in particular the de­
velopment of money markets, which was ultimately responsible for central 
banks’ inability to use the quantity rather than price of reserves as their 
monetary instrument.
Originally, banks resembled cash warehouses, holding most of the specie 
deposited with them in the form of vault cash. As the opportunity costs 
of these reserve holdings became apparent, and the nature of their deposit 
and withdrawal flows became understood, banks gradually increased their 
interest-earning assets relative to their non-interest bearing currency reserves. 
Moreover, as economic agents found it increasingly convenient to use bank 
deposits as a means of saving and making payments, so banks began to find 
that an increasing part of their reserve needs were for purposes of settlement 
with other banks. This led to several innovations, whose impact was to 
reduce the reserves needed by banks to meet their obligations. Instead of 
holding physical stocks of reserves, banks began to use reserve accounts at a 
common, or central, bank, since this decreased the costs and risks associated 
with actual transfers of physical reserves. The fact that payments by one 
bank were often payments to another bank not only made cancellation (or 
netting) possible, but also created the incentive to establish interbank funds
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markets since a (temporary) reserve deficit in one bank would correspond 
with a (temporary) reserve surplus in another bank. The ability to borrow 
reserves in the event of a reserve drain, therefore, meant that banks could 
reduce their reserve inventories and yet remain confident of meeting their 
obligations (see chapter 3).
Whilst the development of interbank markets may have been perceived 
by banks individually as a form of insurance against the random daily fluctu­
ations in their reserves, this was not true for banks in aggregate. Indeed, the 
opposite was true: by causing banks to reduce their reliance upon reserves as 
a buffer against random cash fluctuations, interbank markets caused banking 
systems to become less liquid overall, i.e. less able to cope with fluctuations 
in the aggregate level of reserves. As noted by Bhattacharya and Gale (1988), 
interbank markets are associated with a “free-rider” problem:
“individual intermediaries will rely on the ex-post market to provide them  
with liquidity, and will underinvest in the liquid asset [i.e. reserves]. In the 
aggregate, however, the liquidity of the market is limited by the investments 
of individual intermediaries in the liquid asset. For this reason we should not 
expect an interbank market to perform very well” (p. 74).
Banking history amply demonstrates this: liquidity crises were a regular 
feature in the development of banking systems during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, periods in which interbank markets had made it increas­
ingly attractive for banks to invest their surplus reserves with other (deficit) 
banks. That such markets were associated with a free-rider problem -  i.e. 
that banks did not take into account the aggregate availability of reserves 
when making their own reserve decisions -  was exemplified by the fact that 
even highly predictable, seasonal fluctuations in the aggregate demand for 
reserves were a frequent source of distress.
One measure of this distress was the short-term interest rate. Faced 
with the prospects of being unable to satisfy their creditors, banks obviously 
became willing to pay extremely high interest rates in order to obtain reserves 
and avert this outcome. Constraints on the aggregate supply of reserves, 
however, meant that these reserves would not be forthcoming, no matter how
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much some banks were prepared to pay for them , i.e. no m atter how high 
the interest rate. The last thing currency holders would do in a crisis was 
part with their currency, with the result that ordinarily liquid assets became, 
suddenly, extraordinarily illiquid.
Central banks (or, more correctly, those institutions which would become 
central banks) were well aware that by extending loans (rediscounting bills 
and other paper) during a crisis they would eventually threaten their own 
reserve positions and so too the convertibility of their obligations. Some­
times, therefore, they chose not to lend, or to curtail their lending after some 
critical point, which invariably meant that banks failed. Consequently, trade, 
which was heavily dependent on the credit provided by bills of exchange, was 
disrupted. Consider this description, by Baring (1797), of a banking crisis in 
England in 1793:
“At first the Bank accommodated themselves to the circumstances and 
furnished large supplies [of specie]; but unfortunately the Directors caught 
the panic; their nerves could not support the daily and constant demand for 
guineas; and for the purpose of checking th a t demand, they curtailed their 
discounts to a point never before experienced, and which placed every part 
of the commerce of the country in a considerable degree of danger” (p.21).
This reluctance on the part of the Bank was repeated again in 1825, with 
similar consequences:
“By every means [the Bank] tried to restrict its advances. The reserve 
being very small, it endeavoured to protect that reserve by lending as little as 
possible. The result was a period of frantic and almost inconceivable violence 
.... The country was ... within twenty four hours of barter” (Bagehot 1876, 
p .190).
On some other occasions, however, the Bank was prepared to lend, and it 
became apparent that the crisis sometimes subsided without any significant 
loans actually having to be made. In other words, the confidence generated 
by the Bank’s willingness to lend was itself sufficient to prevent a crisis from 
degenerating into a widespread panic. Whilst this feature of currency “runs” 
is well understood now, it took some time before the Bank began to un­
derstand it during the nineteenth century. Walter Bagehot, writing during
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the 1860’s and 1870s, was one of the first to articulate clearly the nature 
of such panics and how the Bank should deal with them. His prescription 
has become well known: the Bank should raise its discount rate, but should 
discount freely at this rate. The latter, however, was the key. Subsequent 
commentators have often misinterpreted Bagehot’s advice as stating that the 
Bank should lend to illiquid but not to insolvent institutions (e.g. Summers 
1991). This is not the case, and there is nothing in Lombard Street dealing 
with the “bailout” of individual banks, solvent or insolvent. Instead, Bagehot 
was concerned that the Bank should not limit its advances to any comers, 
and thus should not place too many restrictions over the type of security it 
would purchase in a crisis:
The amount of the advance is the main consideration for the Bank of 
England, and not the nature of the security on which the advance is made, 
always assuming the security to be good. An idea prevails ... a t the Bank 
of England th a t they ought not to advance during a panic on any kind of 
security on which they do not commonly advance. But if bankers for the 
most part do advance on such security in common times, and if th a t security 
is indisputably good, the ordinary practice of the Bank is immaterial. In 
ordinary times the Bank is only one of many lenders, whereas in a panic it 
is the only lender (Bagehot 1876, p .196).
This advice -  not to place limits on the provision of reserves -  was taken 
by the Bank of England, and in turn by all other central banks. Indeed, 
it is an integral part of how these banks came to be recognised as central 
banks in the first place. Their willingness to provide reserves (or currency), 
especially to avert a panic, is widely recognised as one of the fundamental 
functions of a central bank. Yet this is precisely what (some) proponents of 
money base control suggest central banks should refrain from doing. They 
argue that, by withholding reserves, central banks will encourage banks to 
hold greater reserves as insurance against liquidity problems. This change in 
behaviour is in turn supposed to reduce the possibility that fluctuations in 
reserves threaten banks’ liquidity and cause money market interest rates to 
vary so dramatically. Thus, for example, Artis and Lewis (1981) argue,
“Once banks are forced to make up reserve shortages by borrowing in­
terbank a t a ‘penalty cost’ or by selling securities a t a loss, they are likely to
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exercise much greater care in future when granting facilities and open-credit 
lines. Unused facilities are a valuable source of liquidity to customers, and 
banks might, in different circumstances, be expected to  vary the ‘price’ for 
this service. There would also be an incentive for banks to  refrain from lend­
ing and build up reserves when reserve shortages are anticipated” (p.124).
This completely ignores the fact that variations in demand deposits, over 
which banks have virtually no control, are also a major source of fluctuation 
in banks’ reserves. It also flies in the face of historical experience, because it 
ignores the free-rider problem raised above. In the presence of a money mar­
ket, banks face a constant incentive to lower their own reserve holdings on 
the assumption that they can obtain reserves, when necessary, in the money 
market. This problem does not diminish over time: on the contrary, higher 
precautionary reserve holdings, by reducing the incidence of liquidity crises, 
will in turn validate the reductions in reserves that tend to raise the prob­
ability of another liquidity crisis. The historical record shows that periodic 
liquidity crises did persist, even when central banks could credibly withhold 
reserves from the banking system. Early central banks tended to act in their 
oWn interest during a banking crisis, which meant that they could credibly 
uphold their minimum reserve ratios even when interest rates rose to astro­
nomical levels and banks failed. Indeed, their credibility could hardly have 
been higher, and yet this was not sufficient to induce banks to hold larger 
reserves to avoid these periodic crises.
The resolve of central banks not to supply reserves during a crisis was 
undoubtedly made weaker over time by the increasing economic cost of bank 
failures. As economic agents became more reliant upon the banking system 
for making payments, and held a greater share of their monetary wealth with 
the banking system, bank failures became more disruptive and less tolera­
ble. Furthermore, banking crises became better understood as being, in the 
main, temporary phenomena, deriving from a lack of confidence on the part 
of an imperfectly informed public, rather than from any deep problems of 
widespread bank insolvency due to imprudent lending. Thus the notion of 
lending freely became more palatable to central banks. Especially since they 
could always counter any longer-term problems associated with this surge in
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bank reserves by raising the rate at which these were provided. As Hawtrey 
(1938) notes:
Bagehot’s prescription for a panic is really ju s t a restatem ent of 
the policy of relying on a high Bank ra te  in place of a refusal to lend or a 
rationing of discounts. It takes for granted th a t the high Bank rate will have 
a sufficiently deterrent effect ” (pp.226-7).
And herein lies the rub. On occasion, central banks will be called upon 
to discharge their obligation as lenders of last resort, and will be expected 
to provide reserves in excess of whatever money base rule they may have 
adopted. At this point, however, their instrument ceases to be the money 
base, and they are forced instead to choose the rate at which they will provide 
reserves. At least some of the time, therefore, their instrument must be an 
interest rate. Unfortunately for the proponents of money base control, as 
could be seen from McCallum’s example above, this will be rather frequent, 
given the difficulties of banks actually satisfying their reserve requirements 
under such as system.
Even Milton Friedman has recognised this difficulty:
“If rediscounting were eliminated, one minor function now performed 
by the discount rate would need to be provided for in some other way ....
[S]ome discrepancies between required and actual reserves are unavoidable, 
yet some penalty must be imposed on such discrepancies to enforce the reserve 
requirements .... The simplest alternative would be a fixed rate of ‘fine’. To 
avoid discrepancies becoming an indirect form of discounting, the ‘fine’ should 
be large enough to make it well above likely market rates of interest. The fine 
would then become the equivalent of a truly ‘penalty’ discount rate ... except 
th a t no collateral, or eligibility requirements, or the like would be involved”
(1959, p.44-5).
Friedman unfortunately neglects to take this “minor function” to its log­
ical conclusion. If the banking system were indeed below its required reserve 
target, money market rates would be bid up to the supposed penalty rate, 
which would then cease to be a penalty. Indeed, the rate at which the cen­
tral bank made reserves available would act only as penalty if banks did not 
anticipate this shortage of aggregate reserves (see section 2 in the following
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chapter). In practice, of course, banks would have expectations about the 
likely evolution of aggregate reserves over the maintenance period, and would 
choose their reserve strategies accordingly. If a reserve shortfall was expected, 
the cost of reserves (i.e. short-term interest rates) would be bid up to the 
central bank’s lending rate. If a reserve surplus was expected, the cost of 
reserves would be driven towards zero.
Such a system, unfortunately, would be a far cry from one in which the 
money base was the monetary instrument as defined above. Every period 
in which there occurred a shortfall in actual reserves relative to required 
reserves, the central bank would be forced to provide this difference. Its 
choice variable, over which it would have complete discretion, would be the 
rate at which it supplied these reserves. Far from providing a system of 
monetary ease or restraint via choices of the money base, the central bank 
would, instead, have to resort to appropriate choices o f this interest rate if  it 
wished to influence macroeconomic variables in the direction dictated by its 
policy goals . This system, however, would come unerringly close to central 
bank operating procedures as they looked before 1914 (i.e. interest rate 
smoothing in a rather primitive form). As such, it could easily be improved 
by using open-market operations to reduce unwanted variations in money 
market interest rates. In sum, therefore, short-term interest rates would 
remain the monetary instrument.
C hapter 3
The D eterm ination  o f  
M oney M arket Interest R ates
The previous two chapters have consistently emphasised the connection 
between the reserves of the banking system and money market interest rates. 
They have argued that it is the potential for this connection to disrupt the 
banking system and, in turn, economic activity, which provides a plausible 
account of why central banks operate as they do. But what, exactly, are the 
connections between banks, the money market and the central bank? More 
specifically, how can the supply and demand for bank reserves -  and hence 
the central bank as the supplier of reserves -  play such an important role 
in determining money market interest rates, when it would seem that the 
supply and demand for credit is a far more obvious candidate1?
This chapter draws out the relationship between banks, reserves and 
money market interest rates in more detail, showing how this relationship 
permits central banks to influence, fairly precisely, the level of money market 
interest rates. To fix ideas, the discussion starts by outlining, in section 1, 
the functional relationship between money markets and banks, drawing par­
ticularly on the sterling money market as an example. Thereafter, in section
xDow and Saville (1988), for instance, stress the importance of the latter in determining 
the level of short-term  interest rates.
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2, a more analytical approach is taken to develop these ideas. In particular, 
a model of bank reserve management is presented, which then serves as the 
basis for an aggregate model of bank money market borrowing wherein it is 
shown how the central bank can determine the money market interest rate. 
Since the model is somewhat stylised and incorporates actual institutional 
features only in a minimal fashion, a final section addresses the relevance of 
two such features -  reserve requirements and the discount window -  for the 
determination of interest rates in practice.
3.1 Banks and the m oney market
3.1.1 Credit allocation
By most accounts, bills of exchange were the first money market instruments 
(see chapter 6). Although bills became legal in England in 1697, three years 
after the formation of the Bank of England, they had been extensively used 
before this to finance trade in England and throughout Western Europe. The 
primary function of a bill was to enable a seller (or exporter) to obtain cash as 
soon as possible after the dispatch of goods. At the same it enabled the buyer 
(or importer), who would typically only receive the goods after some time, 
to delay payment. By creating a negotiable instrument, i.e. a bill which was 
payable to the bearer, a third party could finance the trade deal, becoming 
a lender by buying the bill and holding it to m aturity2.-
Negotiability was an important characteristic, since it meant that the 
initial lender (i.e the buyer of the bill) had the flexibility of selling the bill 
before maturity, thus transferring the loan to another creditor, who in turn 
also had this flexibility. The creation of a negotiable instrument was thus 
a convenient mechanism for resolving the different maturity preferences of 
borrowers and lenders, since its tradability on a secondary market implied
2The lender would receive a return on the bill by buying it at a price below its face 
value, i.e. a t a discount.
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that lenders could liquidate their loans without disrupting borrowers3.
The fact that bills were negotiable, however, did not make them readily 
tradable. Information about the credit-worthiness of borrowers was clearly 
important to the buyers of bills, since it would determine whether these 
bills would be honoured at maturity. In order to enhance the tradability of 
bills, it became common practice for local financiers or banks, whose credit­
worthiness was more widely known, to “accept” these bills, i.e. agree to 
honour them at m aturity4. Since bank bills were rated more highly than 
ordinary trade bills, they could be traded more easily on a secondary market.
Bills of exchange (acceptances) provide an early example of how the pres­
ence of banks assisted and reinforced the development and liquidity of money 
market instruments. This relationship is still very relevant today, as has been 
argued recently by Garber and Weisbrod (1992): bank credit lines underpin 
the liquidity of many money market securities, a primary example being 
commercial paper. The relationship, however, also runs in the other direc­
tion, since the presence of money market instruments in turn assisted and 
reinforced the development of a banks.
Early banks were much more localised than their modern counterparts, 
and evolved only slowly into an integrated banking “system”. This evolu­
tion was often inhibited by banking regulations, such as the restrictions on 
joint stock banking in the UK and on interstate banking in the US, which 
effectively prevented banks from developing branch networks. Consequently, 
banks in one area (e.g. country banks) will have found they had a surplus 
of investible funds, whilst those in another area (e.g. city banks) found they 
had a shortage of funds. The development of negotiable instruments proved 
to be an important means whereby funds could be redistributed from surplus 
to deficit banks. For example, in the UK, banks with lending opportunities 
could accept bills and then sell them into the London bill market, where 
they were purchased by banks which had funds to invest. Later (after 1825),
3This benefit of secondary markets has been formally examined recently by Bencivenga, 
Smith and S tarr (1992).
4Hence they also became known as bankers acceptances, which is what bills are called in 
the US. Banks naturally charged an acceptance fee for the credit risk which they assumed.
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surplus funds were primarily lent to discount houses (bill brokers) on a call 
basis, in which case it was the houses that purchased bills (King 1936). In 
the US the pattern was similar: banks could lend to borrowers in other states 
by purchasing commercial paper. Alternatively, they could lend funds on a 
call basis to the so-called “money center” banks.
The development of money markets, then, was an integral part of the 
process whereby individual banks became linked into a wider banking system  
or network which could allocate credit on a national level. This establishment 
of a network of banks, linked through a money market, was also crucial to 
another important function undertaken by banks, namely the provision of 
payment services.
3.1.2 Paym ents
The widespread use of physical currency in the exchange process came about 
because it reduced the resource costs of matching individuals with their pre­
ferred consumption bundles (Kiyotaki and Wright 1989). Consequently, cur­
rency became the most liquid asset in a monetary economy, with the liquidity 
of all other assets being defined in terms of the time taken (or cost incurred) 
to exchange them for currency (Lippman and McCall 1986). The use of 
currency, however, was not the final step in the development of payment me­
dia. The most prevalent means of payment in most (advanced) monetary 
economies today is not physical currency but bank deposits5. This is be­
cause organising payments through bank deposits could reduce the costs of 
monetised exchange even further.
This cost reduction was the result of two innovations: the centralisation of 
bank reserves and the development of money markets. Transfers of physical 
currency involved transportation costs and risks of theft, which could be 
eliminated by utilising a centralised system of book entries across a set of 
reserve accounts at a clearinghouse or central bank. Furthermore, the use of 
such a set of reserve accounts allowed mutual obligations to be offset (netted),
5As the next section argues, this does not mean th a t currency is eliminated as a settle­
ment asset.
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reducing the amount of reserves needed to settle a given volume of payments 
(Goodfriend 1990). This reduction was desirable because reserves were non­
interest bearing, which meant that reserve inventories held for settlement 
purposes incurred an opportunity cost. This cost will have become more 
apparent to banks once a market had emerged on which they could borrow 
and lend reserves, such as the early bill market in the UK. This market also 
provided an avenue for reducing these costs even further than was permitted 
by netting.
In the absence of either a sustained increase or decrease in deposits, a 
bank’s reserves will fluctuate randomly over time, being either temporarily 
high or temporarily low due to the payments made by customers. By purchas­
ing negotiable instruments, such as bank bills, temporary reserve surpluses 
could be invested in interest bearing assets without comprising a bank’s liq­
uidity. This was because bills had a short m aturity and could be sold before 
maturity if reserves were needed even sooner. W hat is more, reserve fluc­
tuations were not independent across banks. The operation of a payment 
network meant that reserve outflows from some banks would inevitably re­
sult in reserve inflows at other banks. This made it more likely that a bank 
could easily sell bills when its reserves became temporarily low, since this 
would usually mean that surplus reserves would be accumulating at some 
other banks, who would be wanting to invest these in bills. The provision of 
payment services, therefore, could be achieved more cheaply when banks had 
access to a money market as interbank settlement obligations resulting from 
payment flows could be offset by the appropriate money market transactions, 
obviating the need for costly reserve inventories.
In addition to permitting a wider allocation of credit through the bank­
ing system, early money markets facilitated the redistribution of reserves 
amongst banks, and became vital to their provision of payment services. 
Indeed, this function of money markets, more than any other, is probably 
what has spurred their development over time, evidenced by the fact that 
banks have always been the most active participants within money markets. 
It is the redistribution of reserves, moreover, which plays a key role in the 
determination of money market interest rates.
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3.1.3 M ovem ents in bank reserves
The widespread use of bank deposits as a means of payment did not eliminate 
the role of currency as the ultimate settlement asset. Rather, it meant that 
a much smaller amount of currency supported a larger volume of payments. 
The impetus for this development was that currency did not bear interest 
and hence involved an opportunity cost. Banks, using a set of reserve ac­
counts, and having access to a money market, significantly reduced this cost. 
Nevertheless, banks still use currency to settle their obligations, albeit in 
the form of reserves (book entries) rather than physical currency (notes and 
coin). Except for their location, reserves are the same as vault cash: they 
comprise currency held at the central bank rather than in the bank’s own 
vaults6. Reserves are held because of the associated reduction in the costs of 
transferring currency to other banks for settlement purposes.
Note that the common practice of counting vault cash as part of bank 
reserves is not pursued here, since this becomes confusing in the analysis 
which follows. Throughout this and subsequent chapters, therefore, the term 
“reserves” is distinct from, and does not include, banks’ vault cash.
The dem and for reserves
Whilst it is obvious that banks must always hold enough vault cash to 
satisfy the expected demands of their customers for currency, it is less clear 
what level of reserves they need to hold in order to satisfy their interbank 
obligations. This will depend, in general, upon three factors: the settlement 
arrangements between banks, the extent of development of the money market, 
and the level of reserve requirements.
Historically, settlement arrangements between banks have meant that 
payments are settled at discrete intervals (e.g. weekly, daily), with the time 
between successive settlements gradually becoming shorter as clearing m eth­
6This statem ent is strictly true only for fiat currency. During the gold standard, for 
example, the ability of banks to  obtain gold (rather than central bank notes) in exchange 
for their reserves (book entries) was contingent upon the central bank actually upholding 
its convertibility pledge. Once central bank notes became fiat currency, however, reserves 
could always be exchanged at par for physical currency.
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ods became more streamlined. Discrete settlement meant that a number 
of payment instructions (e.g. cheques) were accumulated before they were 
netted by a clearinghouse and the net obligations then settled via the trans­
fer of reserves. This sort of arrangement, known as net settlement, is still 
widespread today, and implies that payment instructions are made (and re­
ceived) before they are settled, i.e. before reserves are actually transferred7. 
Whilst this settlement lag exposes banks to risks8 -  since they make outgo­
ing payments on the basis of assumed incoming payments -  it also means 
that banks do not actually have to hold many reserves in order to meet their 
settlement obligations. Instead, they simply need to anticipate their net set­
tlement obligation, and then try to offset this via the appropriate money 
market transactions.
Consider, for example, a bank whose customers have made a larger than 
average number of payments, and assume that the bank receives this infor­
mation before settlement. Although the bank will be expecting to pay out 
reserves when these payments are settled (at the end of the day), it does 
not need a reserve inventory to meet this obligation. Instead, it can bor­
row reserves in the money market by, for instance, selling some bank bills. 
This increases the settlement obligation of other banks and, correspondingly, 
reduces the borrowing banks’ net obligation. The borrowing bank can be 
reasonably sure to find banks which are willing to lend reserves since its own 
expected reserve need will be matched, elsewhere, by expected reserve sur­
pluses. Since these surpluses are costly in terms of foregone interest, banks 
will have an incentive to reduce these by attempting to lend funds in the
7Prominent examples of such net settlement systems are SAGITTAIRE in France, EAF 
in Germany, CHAPS in the UK and CHIPS in the US, although these are now all electronic 
rather than paper based. For a comprehensive survey of these and other payment systems 
see BIS (1993).
8These risks have grown with payment traffic, which is now enormous. Currently, 
therefore, reforms are underway in many industrialised countries to  reduce and manage 
these risks, including a move to alternative settlement arrangement known as gross, or 
continuous, settlem ent (see Borio and Van den Bergh 1993). The latter would mean that 
banks would need reserves before they could make payments, and would thus only really 
alter the timing  of their money market borrowing for this purpose.
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money market (for instance by buying bank bills).
In practice, therefore, the net demands by banks for reserves for settle­
ment purposes will be virtually zero, given appropriate interbank settlement 
arrangements and well-functioning money markets. Although banks have 
no direct control over the reserve flows resulting from the activities of their 
customers, they can offset these flows indirectly through transacting in the 
money market. The fact that banks are often observed to hold fairly sub­
stantial reserves, even in the presence of well developed money markets, is 
thus largely due to reserve requirements.
The power to impose and vary the reserve requirements of banks is written 
into the statute of virtually every central bank. This power has been exer­
cised by most of them either periodically or continuously since it was acquired 
(see Capie, Goodhart and Schnadt 1994). Reserve requirements are usually 
calculated as a fraction of some measure of banks’ average deposit liabilities 
over a specified computation period. To satisfy the requirement, banks must 
ensure that their average reserve balances over a specified maintenance period 
equal or exceed the computed level. Since the failure to satisfy the require­
ment will attract a penalty9, banks will ensure that they do not violate their 
requirements. Essentially, reserve requirements increase the overall demand 
for reserves to exactly the level which is implied by the requirement. Banks 
will not, however, seek to hold reserves in excess of this requirement: the de­
mand for reserves by banks for other purposes, such as interbank settlement, 
remains virtually zero when there is a well developed money market.
This is clearly illustrated by table 3.1. Whilst total bank reserves differ 
widely between countries, this difference vanishes once reserve requirements 
are taken into account. Excess reserves -  the level of reserves banks choose to 
hold -  are extremely low everywhere, especially when measured in relation to 
the size of banks’ call deposits. In the UK, for example, reserves represented 
less than one thousandth of banks’ aggregate sight deposits to the UK private 
sector during the last six months of 199210.
9The exact nature of this penalty is discussed below, in section 3.2.5.
10See Bank o f England Quarterly Bulletin , February 1993, Table 3, p .124.
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The supply of reserves
The argument in the preceding discussion was based on the fact that 
interbank settlement obligations, when aggregated across all banks, cancel 
to zero. In other words, interbank transactions do not alter the aggregate 
supply of reserves. This is why a money market is sufficient for reducing the 
aggregate demand for reserves for interbank settlement purposes (virtually) 
to zero, causing the aggregate demand for reserves to be determined, for 
the most part, by reserve requirements. But what determines the aggregate 
supply of reserves? And, more importantly, what equilibrates the aggregate 
supply of reserves with the aggregate demand for reserves?
The aggregate supply of reserves at any point in time is simply the sum of 
the amounts of currency which are held by individual banks with the central 
bank. Consequently, there are two, and only two, sources of variation in the 
aggregate supply of reserves: (i) net currency withdrawals from the banking 
system and (ii) transactions by the central bank.
When a customer withdraws currency from (deposits currency with) a 
bank, its vault cash falls (rises). Banks pay close attention to these with­
drawals and deposits, and ensure that their vault cash is maintained at fairly 
constant levels so that they do not fall short of cash or hold unnecessarily high 
stocks of cash. Variations in vault cash, therefore, will directly affect banks’ 
reserves11 as they will, in the first instance, replenish unduly low vault cash 
by reducing reserves (i.e. obtaining cash from the central bank), or reduce 
unduly high vault cash by increasing reserves (i.e. depositing cash with the 
central bank). Since there are no corresponding effects of these transactions 
on other banks’ reserve accounts, the aggregate level (supply) of reserves is 
altered by these changes in banks’ vault cash.
Similarly, transactions by the central bank also alter the aggregate sup­
ply of bank reserves. When the central bank acquires assets (or, for example, 
pays the salaries of its employees) the transactions are settled by a trans­
fer of reserves to the payees’ bank(s), thereby increasing aggregate reserves. 
Conversely, when the central bank sells an asset (or when a private sector
11 Recall th a t vault cash is not assumed to be part of reserves here.
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obligation held by the central bank matures) the transaction is settled by a 
transfer of reserves to the central bank, thereby reducing the aggregate stock 
of reserves. Often, these transactions by the central bank will reflect its role 
as the government’s bank, since this usually means that some of the accounts 
of the government are held with the central bank. Thus tax payments to the 
government (or debt issues by the government) will reduce aggregate reserves, 
whilst any government expenditures will increase aggregate reserves12.
Consider the effect of a decrease in the supply of bank reserves due (say) 
to increased withdrawals of currency into circulation. The banks experiencing 
this withdrawal will attem pt to replenish their lower reserves by borrowing on 
the money market. Since the aggregate supply (stock) of reserves has fallen, 
however, at least one bank will have a lower than desired13 level of reserves 
after settlement. Whilst this reserve shortfall may be passed to other banks 
on successive days through interbank borrowing and lending, it cannot be 
eliminated without a subsequent increase in the supply of reserves, either due 
to currency being redeposited with banks, or due to central bank transactions. 
W ithout this increase, at least one bank would violate its reserve requirement 
by the end of the maintenance period, thereby incurring a penalty. Over the 
remainder of the maintenance period, therefore, banks in aggregate would 
persistently be trying to borrow more reserves than they were willing to lend. 
This behaviour would tend to drive up money market interest rates, at least 
on those instruments which banks regularly used to adjust their reserves. Had 
the initial disturbance in the supply of reserves been an increase rather than 
a decrease, the opposite forces would pertain, with money market interest 
rates tending to fall.
For any given demand for reserves, therefore, changes in the aggregate
12Note th a t these factors are not perfectly predictable on a daily basis, making their net 
impact on the supply of reserves uncertain.
13In a modern banking system, and with ready access to a money market, this is likely 
to be determined by the level of reserve requirements. In the more distant past, before 
statutory reserve requirements, banks will still have had their own “target” level of reserves, 
based on their previous withdrawal and clearing needs. For a discussion of the UK case, 
where reserve requirements are zero, see Howard (1982).
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supply of reserves will produce movements in money market interest rates, 
because banks will attem pt to correct these changes by borrowing or lending 
in the money market. Crucially, however, this does not give rise to any sig­
nificant forces which would act to reduce the excess demand for, or supply of, 
reserves. Offsetting changes in the demand for currency would be one such 
channel, but currency demand is driven primarily by transaction needs and is 
virtually unresponsive to temporary movements in short-term interest rates. 
Indeed, it is because of changes in net currency withdrawals for transactions 
purposes that money market rates change in the first place. This leaves off­
setting central bank transactions as the only other means whereby aggregate 
reserve fluctuations, and hence movements in money market interest rates, 
could be damped.
3.1.4 T he central bank
Previous chapters have indicated that seasonal movements in currency use 
often had dramatic effects on the banking system, particularly currency with­
drawals. As banks attempted to borrow reserves, money market interest rates 
rose sharply, and ordinarily liquid assets suddenly became very illiquid. This 
caused considerable disruption to trade and other economic activity which 
was dependent upon short-term finance. Even worse, if seasonal currency de­
mands persisted, these forces would cumulate, thus introducing the possibility 
of a widespread increase in currency demand, this time due to waning confi­
dence in banks’ ability to redeem their obligations. This would threaten to 
disrupt the entire banking system, and its by-product, the payment system.
Given this potential for adverse movements in bank reserves to disrupt 
the normal operation of money markets and the banking system, the re­
vealed preference of all central banks over time was to offset such reserve 
movements. This was done passively at first and in a unidirectional manner. 
That is, variations in aggregate reserves were allowed to “reveal” themselves 
through variations in money market interest rates. When rates rose, indi­
cating reserve stringency, central banks accommodated this reserve need by 
discounting eligible securities, preventing rates from rising further. When
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rates fell because banks had excess reserves, central banks initially did noth­
ing. This meant that money market rates often fell to extremely low levels 
for prolonged periods. Over time, central banks devised methods whereby 
they could reduce the reserves of the banking system, thus keeping money 
market rates at levels which they felt were more consistent with their policy 
targets. As noted in chapter 1, these included open-market operations, which 
acted on the aggregate supply of reserves, and reserve requirements, which 
acted on the aggregate demand for reserves.
In sum, central banks have developed increasingly sophisticated ways in 
which to “manage” the aggregate level of reserves, improving their ability 
to prevent any unwanted fluctuations in money market interest rates. They 
now devote considerable resources to predicting disturbances in aggregate 
reserves before these are allowed to reveal themselves through movements in 
money market rates, and have thus become proactive rather than reactive 
in their influence over rates. Consequently, by anticipating the impact of 
factors such as net currency withdrawals or tax payments to the government, 
and undertaking more frequent open-market operations, central banks now 
rely less on facilities such as a discount window. Given that these factors 
are not perfectly predictable, however, central banks have retained their dis­
count windows as a safeguard against unexpected reserve stringency and the 
attendant upward movement in interest rates.
The next section now develops these ideas in an analytical framework, 
based upon a model of bank reserve management. This model is then ag­
gregated to explain the determination of money market interest rates by the 
central bank.
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3.2 A n analytical approach
3.2.1 A  m odel o f bank reserve m anagem ent
According to an early theorist of banking:
“Probability is the foundation of banking. The solvency and the profits 
of the banker depend on the probability that he will not be called upon to 
meet a t once more than a certain amount of his liabilities” (Edgeworth 1888, 
p .133).
This characterisation forms the basis of a classic choice problem for the 
bank manager. Holding reserves is costly, since they are non-interest bearing, 
and implies that it would be sub-optimal to ensure a bank’s liquidity by 
holding assets in the form of reserves only. Conversely, holding some illiquid 
assets exposes the bank to the risk that it is unable to meet its obligations. 
A recent textbook on the management of financial institutions describes the 
problem thus:
The management of a financial institu tion’s [reserve] position is some­
thing of a knife-edge situation because holding too many [reserves] penalises 
a bank’s earnings and, thus, its stockholders. A ... manager who holds exces­
sive amounts of [reserves] is unlikely to survive for long. Similarly, a manger 
who excessively undershoots the reserve target faces enhanced risks of liquid­
ity crises and regulatory intervention. Again, such a m anger’s tenure ... may 
be relatively short-lived ” (Saunders, 1994, p.578).
Clearly, therefore, the “optimal” level of reserves which a bank will wish 
to hold will fall somewhere between 0% and 100% of the bank’s liabilities. 
But how should this level be chosen?
The most common approach to this situation is to treat it as a static 
inventory problem in which the bank manager must choose the optimal in­
ventory of reserves, denoted by r*, under some assumed uncertainty about 
the demand for reserves14. To simplify matters, the uncertainty facing the
14The first presentation of such a model in this context was by Morrison (1966), who 
cites Arrow, Harris and Marshak (1951) and Dvoretsky, Kiefer and Wolfovitz (1952) as
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bank is summarised by a single random variable, 6, which represents the net 
obligation of the bank at settlement (i.e. S <  0 represents an expected pay­
ment of reserves). This settlement obligation is assumed to follow a known 
distribution, described by the distribution function F(S) (density f(S )). Thus 
the situation being modelled is not unrealistic, and can be thought of as the 
determination of the reserve demand of a bank which faces a (random) daily 
settlement obligation under a net settlement arrangement15.
To capture the tradeoff facing the bank, assume that when it holds re­
serves r  which exceed its obligations, i.e. r  > —S, it incurs a proportional 
surplus cost c5, representing, for example, the foregone interest on its sur­
plus reserves. Alternatively, if the bank holds insufficient reserves to meet its 
obligations, i.e. r < —6, assume that a proportional deficiency cost Cd is in­
curred, representing the cost of an emergency loan from the other settlement 
members (or, in the extreme, bankruptcy). Under this characterisation, the 
optimal inventory of reserves per time period is chosen to minimise these ex­
post costs, and it is easily recognised that this choice is subject to a trade-off. 
Choosing a higher inventory of reserves reduces the probability of incurring 
Cd, but increases the probability of incurring cs.
Formally, the solution to the bank’s choice problem described in this sim­
ple scenario is found by the bank by solving the following cost minimising 
program:
/ + oo  r - T(r +  £) f(6 ) d8 -|- cd /  —(r + 6 )f(6 )d 6 ,
■r J — o o
where the first integral gives the expected value of a reserve surplus, and the 
second integral the expected value of a reserve deficiency, for each choice of
the inventory-theoretic forerunners of this approach. Subsequent papers using essentially 
the same static model, although with slightly different features, are Poole (1968) and Frost 
(1971). Others, such as Knobel (1977) and Chen and Mazumdar (1992) have extended the 
model into a dynamic context. Baltensperger (1980), Santomero (1984) and more recently 
Pulli (1992) provide useful discussion and bibliographies of these and related models.
15Adjustment costs are assumed to  be zero, although they need not be zero (see Frost 
1971).
3.2. A N  AN ALYTICAL APPROACH 79
reserves r. This has the first order condition
•+oo/  r - Tf ( S)  dS = Cd  / f ( S ) d S ,
■r J — o o
which suggests that the bank chooses the optimal inventory of reserves so as 
to equate the expected marginal cost of a reserve surplus with the expected 
marginal cost of a reserve deficiency. This condition can be rearranged to 
derive the optimal inventory of reserves, r*, as
F(-r"> = rrr-  t3-1)
From (3.1) it can be seen that the optimal inventory of reserves depends 
upon the level of Cd relative to the level of cs and on the properties of the 
distribution of 616. More specifically, the optimal reserve inventory is chosen 
to equate the probability of avoiding a reserve deficit (or surplus) with the 
relative cost of such an outcome. This accords with the intuition that, if a 
reserve deficit is costly relative to a reserve surplus, a bank would rationally 
choose to hold a higher reserve inventory to reduce the probability of the 
relatively more costly outcome.
3.2.2 A n exam ple
It is illustrative to examine some of the properties of this simple model of 
reserve management by considering the plausible case where S has a symmet­
ric distribution. Since the settlement obligations of a bank will, in reality, 
fall within a finite interval, the continuous uniform distribution provides a 
reasonable and tractable17 example. Assume, then, that 6 is distributed uni­
formly over the closed interval [m — e, m  +  c]. The mean and variance of 8 
are therefore jis =  m  and as = |e 2 respectively, and —6 has the following
16Note th a t the reserve inventory enters this distribution function with a negative sign, 
which implies th a t (1) traces the mirror image of the distribution function.
17A truncated distribution would also be reasonable, but is generally less tractable. Pulli 
(1992), for example, uses a truncated normal distribution, which he later approximates 
using an exponential distribution.
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distribution function (see Johnson and Kotz 1970):
F ( - S )  = ^
1 if S < (m — e)
(2e)-1(m +  e — £) if (m — e) < S < (m +  e) 
0 if S >  (m +  e) .
Using this distribution function, (3) can then be used to derive the optimal 
reserve inventory of the representative bank
r* < (m — e) if cd = 0
r* = (m + e) — 2e if cd, cs > 0 (3.2)
r* > (m + e) if cs =  0 ,
This linear (but discontinuous) function, which is depicted in figure 3.1, 
traces out the optimal reserve inventory for each combination of costs •
It has several noteworthy features.
First, (3.2) is horizontal when either q  =  0 or ca =  0. This implies that 
the bank is then indifferent over the inventory of reserves that it holds, as long 
as this is at most m — t (when c& — 0) or at least m +  e (when cs =  0). When 
both costs are positive, (3.2) indicates that the optimal reserve inventory is 
unique and increasing in the cost ratio • In general, however, the
reserve inventory does not equal the bank’s expected reserve need m: only 
when the respective costs are exactly equal, i.e. when c<f =  c3, will the bank 
choose to hold reserves equal to its expected reserve need.
Secondly, due to the symmetry assumption, the variance of the random 
disturbance 6 has a predictable impact on the optimal level of reserves, al­
though this impact will depend on the cost ratio. A change in the variance 
of S in this example of a uniform distribution is represented by a change in 
the parameter e, and its impact on r* is given by:
dr* c
ir = 1- 2(—I-)-0 6  Cs +  Cd
This indicates that, if cs > q ,  the optimal level of reserves varies inversely 
with changes in the variance of 6, whilst the converse obtains if cd > cs.
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When cs = Cd, the optimal level of reserves is invariant with respect to the 
variance of S. The impact of an increase in the variance of S is, therefore, a 
“flattening” of the optimal reserve inventory, as is shown in figure 3.1.
3.2.3 M oney market borrowing
Whilst the above model provides an intuitive analysis of how an individual 
bank will choose its optimal reserve inventory in the presence of various 
costs18, it is clearly unsatisfactory insofar as it has left out several essential 
elements of the environment in which all banks now find themselves. First, 
banks have access to a money market, which implies that they will not hold 
a reserve inventory to meet their random settlement obligations, but will 
borrow (or lend) reserves on the money market instead. Secondly, banks face 
a reserve requirement, which determines the reserve inventories which banks 
actually carry. Finally, central banks typically supply reserves to the banking 
system by means of a discount window.
These three features have been incorporated into a model of the type pre­
sented above by Poole (1968). As before, the bank faces an uncertain net 
settlement obligation S, but knows the distribution F(S). Instead of the opti­
mal reserve inventory, r, however, the choice variable is now the optimal level 
of money market borrowing, denoted in what follows by b. Not surprisingly, 
this does not change the bank’s choice problem in any fundamental way. As­
suming the bank has some opening reserve balance (ro > 0), the bank can' 
borrow too much, i.e. b > —(6 +  ro), in which case it will emerge from the 
end-of-day settlement with positive reserves. In the absence of an ex-post 
money market, these reserves must be held overnight, and incur a propor­
tional opportunity cost equal to the interest rate i at which these reserves 
could have been lent in the money market, i.e. ca =  i. If, on the other hand,
18One obvious way in which this simple static model may be extended is through the 
introduction of reserve adjustm ent costs, which then imply th a t the bank could no longer 
costlessly adjust its reserves to the desired optimal level (see Frost 1971). This would 
not change the properties of the basic model, however, except th a t it would no longer be 
optimal for the bank always to adjust its reserves to some desired level.
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the bank borrows too little, i.e. b < — (6 +  ro), its net settlement obligation 
cannot be met. In this case, the bank must approach the central bank’s dis­
count window to borrow its reserve shortfall, incurring a proportional cost d 
equal to the discount rate. The cost of a reserve deficiency, therefore, is the 
additional cost which is incurred by borrowing at the discount window, i.e. 
Cd =  d — i.
Reserve requirements (and the bank’s opening reserve balance) play no 
fundamental role in the model. They do have to be defined, however, other­
wise the bank can trivially meet its settlement obligations. The role of reserve 
requirements is simply to determine the reserve level around which the bank 
makes its borrowing decision and can, without loss of generality, be assumed 
to be zero. Similarly, the bank’s opening reserve balance only serves to alter 
the level of borrowing, but does not change the bank’s choice problem, which 
is to borrow just enough reserves to meet its settlement obligations.
Poole’s (1968) model, then, is one in which a representative bank chooses 
the optimal amount of money market borrowing b* to meet a random settle­
ment obligation, subject to known costs of over- or under-borrowing. It is 
worth noting that the timing convention adopted in this model is, for analyt­
ical reasons, a significant departure from reality. Banks are assumed to base 
their desired borrowing on a money market interest rate which is the same for 
all banks (i.e. no credit risk). Banks then each trade once, after which time 
the money market is closed, and no further trading takes place. Thus money 
market trading is assumed to be centralised and simultaneous. In practice, of 
course, money markets tend to be decentralised, with prices being established 
and bargains being struck between two counterparties. Furthermore, trading 
takes place over an entire day, and banks will incrementally approach their 
desired borrowing level through a succession of different trades. Clearly such 
behaviour is exceedingly difficult to model in a simple fashion, which is why 
a more stylised approach to trading is usually adopted. This is not without 
its drawbacks, however, which are discussed below.
From the first order condition (3.1) the optimal level of money market
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borrowing under this richer institutional structure can be written as
F ( - b •) =  -d . (3.3)
As in (3.1) the decision -  in this case the decision to borrow -  depends on 
only two factors: the cost of a reserve surplus relative to the cost of a reserve 
deficiency, and the properties of the distribution F(S). These costs now have a 
well-defined interpretation, and it is clear that the level of the market interest 
rate i relative to the central bank’s discount rate is the key determinant 
of the bank’s borrowing decision. Clearly, there are many different money 
market interest rates, which makes the interpretation of “the” money market 
rate i somewhat difficult. In practice, however, banks tend to use some 
instruments far more than others for reserve management purposes, with the 
preferred instrument nearly everywhere being unsecured loans of very short 
maturity, typically overnight. Thus i is simply the overnight rate19. Before 
the development of a money market in unsecured funds in the UK, banks 
would use the bill market for reserve adjustment purposes, in which case i 
could be thought of as the interest rate on short-term bills.
Although Poole assumes that the 8 is a normally distributed random vari­
able, it is hardly plausible that the bank should experience reserve outflows 
which exceed its own deposits, or inflows which exceed the deposit of other 
banks. Continuing, therefore, with the simple example developed above, 
which took the distribution of 8 to be uniform over the interval [m — e, m-\- e], 
the optimal level of borrowing may now be written, using (3.3), as
b* < (m — e) if i = d
b* =  (m +  e) — 2e (J) if 0 < i < d (3-4)
b* > (m +  e) if i =  0.
Instead of an optimal reserve inventory, (3.4) traces out the optimal borrowing
(lending) decision of a representative bank. As before, this is a linear (but 
discontinuous) function, which in this case depends on the cost ratio J.
19In the US the overnight funds market is known as the federal funds market, and thus 
i may be thought of as the federal funds rate.
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When either i =  d or i =  0, this function is horizontal, implying that the 
bank becomes indifferent over the amount of borrowing, as long as this is 
below m  — e or above m +  e, respectively20. When 0 < i < d, however, the 
borrowing decision is uniquely determined by If the money market interest 
rate i is “high” (i.e. close to d), the opportunity cost of a reserve surplus 
is high and the bank chooses to borrow less than its expected settlement 
obligation (i.e. b* < m), preferring to make up its expected reserve deficiency 
by borrowing at the central bank. Conversely, if the money market interest 
rate i is “low” (i.e. close to zero), the bank chooses to borrow more than 
its expected settlement obligation (i.e. b* > m) because the cost of surplus 
reserves is low as compared to the cost of a reserve deficit.
Graphically, then, (3.4) exactly resembles the function shown in figure 3.1. 
The interpretation of (3.4) as a money market borrowing function, however, 
obviously implies that the horizontal axis now measures borrowing (rather 
than reserve inventory), whilst the vertical axis measures the level of the 
money market rate relative to the central bank’s discount rate J (which is 
now the relevant cost ratio).
3.2.4 T he m oney market interest rate
How appropriate is the above model as a basis for explaining the deter­
mination of money market interest rates, which clearly depends on banks’ 
aggregate borrowing behaviour? Poole (1968) has noted that “it is not pos­
sible to jump easily from the analysis of the individual bank to the banking 
system as a whole since reserve flows into or out of a particular bank are not 
likely to be independent of the reserve flows of other banks” (p.781). In other 
instances, however, he argues that the money market interest rate will reflect 
the reserve position of the banking system as a whole. Thus, for example, “a
20This is plausible, since (for example) i = d implies th a t there is no additional cost to 
borrowing funds from the central bank. To ensure that it must borrow from the discount 
window, a bank will borrow less than its minimum  expected settlem ent obligation in the 
money market. Conversely, i =  0 implies no cost of borrowing reserves in the market, 
causing the bank to borrow more than its maximum  expected obligation.
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relatively high [money market] rate suggests that banks in general are short 
of reserves [and] .... may indicate that reserves are flowing out of the banks 
...” (p.776-7; emphasis added). How, then, can this model be used to derive 
the money market rate?
Following the discussion in section 1, the expected settlement obligation 
8 anticipated by an individual bank arises from two distinct sources: (i) 
interbank payments and, (ii) changes in net currency use and central bank 
transactions. It is the second of these which is relevant to the determination 
of the money market interest rate.
Recall that obligations arising from interbank payments (e.g. customers 
writing cheques) create equal and offsetting obligations in other banks, and 
are thus not independent across banks. Indeed, they are totally interdepen­
dent, and leave the aggregate supply of reserves unaffected. For this reason 
such obligations, even though they are uncertain ex-ante, could easily be ac­
commodated without recourse to a central bank. By establishing an ex-post 
money market, i.e. an opportunity for borrowing and lending funds after 
settlement obligations have been revealed, banks could easily offset the re­
serve surpluses or deficits which resulted from periodic settlement. Indeed, 
they face incentives to do this. By lending their excess reserves in the ex­
post market at some rate i' > 0, surplus banks can reduce their opportunity 
costs to cs = (i — i') < i (recall that i is the interest rate in the ex-ante 
money market). Similarly, by borrowing reserves in the ex-post market at 
some rate i' < d, deficit banks can reduce their cost of obtaining reserves to 
Cd =  (i' — i) < (d — i) (recall that d is the central bank’s discount rate).
Whilst the determination of the interest rates i and i ' will not be pursued 
any further here, two important points emerge from the discussion. First, if 
reserve flows are generated purely by interbank payments, then the central 
bank plays no essential role in the determination of the market interest rate, 
since the ex-post money market can always clear without banks having to 
borrow from the central bank. Second, this would imply that considerations 
other than those pertaining to bank reserve management as detailed so far 
were necessary to obtain a determinate money market interest rate: the ex- 
ante and ex-post money markets could clear at any rate i — i ', and a model
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of reserve management does not suggest which one.
The settlement obligations which are relevant to the determination of the 
money market rate, therefore, are those of the second type, namely net cur­
rency withdrawals and central bank transactions, which affect the aggregate 
stock of reserves. This second category of obligations makes a central bank 
necessary, since these obligations will not, in general, cancel out across banks. 
W hat is more, these obligations are likely to be much less interdependent than 
those resulting from interbank payments.
3.2.5 A n aggregate m odel
To examine the impact of these factors on the money market interest rate, an 
aggregate version of the reserve management model above can be developed 
with j  = 1 , . . . ,  n more or less identical banks.
Uncertainty, as before, is summarised by a single variable Sj, which rep­
resents the random daily settlement obligation of each bank. It is assumed 
that these settlement obligations do not, in general, cancel out across banks 
in aggregate. Specifically, it is assumed -  not unrealistically -  that these obli­
gations arise because the government maintains its accounts with the central 
bank. Each period, tax payments are made into this account via cheques writ­
ten on banks, who then seek to offset their expected (negative) settlement 
obligations by borrowing in the money market. Similarly, the government 
also makes daily disbursements out of this account via cheques drawn on the 
central bank. When these are deposited with banks, they seek to offset their 
expected (positive) obligations by lending in the money market.
Thus, as before, each bank faces a uniformly distributed settlement obli­
gation 6j on the interval [rrij — e^rrtj -f c], which here is the net outcome 
of payments to and from the government, and differs across banks21. Since 
banks are identical except for their expected settlement obligation, the bor-
21It is assumed, for simplicity, that the variance of each banks’ obligation is the same,
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rowing function of each bank j  =  1, . . .  , n  can be written, from (3.4), as
bj <  (rrij — e) if i = d
bj =  (rrij — e) — 2e (J) if 0 < i < d (3.5)
bj >  (rrij +  e) if i =  0.
Each bank, individually, takes the money market interest rate as given when 
making its optimal borrowing decision. However, aggregate borrowing de­
mand, denoted by B d = bj , determines the market clearing interest
rate. It can be seen from (3.5) that this will depend on -  amongst other things 
-  the aggregate expected settlement obligation, denoted by M  =  Y lTj= irnj ’ 
This aggregate net obligation M  may usefully be referred to as the expected 
money market shortage (M  > 0) or surplus (M  < 0), and arises in this sim­
plified setting from net disbursements from the government’s account held at 
the central bank. In reality a number of other factors, most notably currency 
withdrawals and central bank transactions, will also contribute to the money 
market shortage or surplus. These are ignored here to keep the exposition 
simple.
Aggregating (3.5) gives
B d < (M  -  ne) if i = d
B d =  (M  — ne) — 2ne (J) if 0 < i < d > (3-6)
B d > (M  +  ne) if i =  0
which defines the aggregate demand for money market borrowing, and is de­
picted in figure 3.2. As expected, this looks similar to the individual borrow­
ing function (3.4), and is again a linear, discontinuous function of J. Notice, 
however, that changes in M  cause a one-for-one change in aggregate borrow­
ing demand in the money market. As M  rises above zero the money market 
shortage increases, and hence aggregate money market borrowing increases 
proportionately at any given market interest rate. Similarly when M  falls 
below zero the money market surplus increases, and hence aggregate money 
market lending increases proportionately. In short, M  is a shift parameter in 
the aggregate money market borrowing function.
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Whilst M  (and some other factors) determines the aggregate demand to 
borrow in the money market, the aggregate supply of funds is, by definition, 
constrained by the condition
B s = 0.
This is depicted as a vertical line at B =  0 in figure 3.2. Thus the money 
market interest rate i must adjust to clear the money market, i.e. achieve 
B d =  B s. By imposing this condition upon the borrowing function in (3.6) 
it is possible to solve for the market clearing rate i* as
i* — d if M  >  ne
i* = d(2ne)~1(M  +  ne) if —ne < M  < ne (3-7)
t* = 0 if M  < —ne ,
which clearly depends on the money market shortage (surplus) M . When 
M  rises above zero (shortage), banks in aggregate will want to borrow more 
than they can, i.e. B d > B s. Thus the money market rate must rise, since 
a higher interest rate is consistent with a lower borrowing demand for each 
individual bank. To clear the money market i must rise by enough to reduce 
aggregate borrowing demand to B d =  0. For large enough M  (large short­
ages), the money market rate becomes equal to the central bank’s discount 
rate (see figure 3.2). This clears the money market because banks then be­
come indifferent as to whether they borrow reserves from the central bank 
or in the money market, and also prevents the market rate from rising above 
the discount rate.
Conversely, when M  falls below zero (surplus), banks in aggregate want 
to lend more than they can, i.e. B d < B a. Thus the money market rate must 
fall to encourage institutions, individually, to borrow more (i.e. to the point 
where B d =  0). When the surplus becomes sufficiently large, however, the 
money market rate falls to zero, which is consistent with market clearing since 
banks then become indifferent between holding excess reserves and lending 
these on the money market (see figure 3.2).
In this model, then, the aggregate expected settlement obligation -  the 
money market shortage or surplus -  is the key variable that determines the
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money market interest rate. Given that reserve requirements are zero, the 
shortage (surplus) corresponds to the expected aggregate supply of reserves, 
and so the money market interest rate responds to the expected aggregate 
availability of reserves. This is consistent with the discussion in section 1, 
where it was asserted that the behaviour of the money market interest rate 
was the outcome of profit-maximising decisions of individual banks, each 
attempting to manage their reserves around some target level in the face of 
random fluctuations22.
3.2.6 Can th e  discount rate be a “pen alty” rate?
It is often asserted that the discount rate is, or could be, a “penalty” interest 
rate, levied by the central bank on those banks who commit reserve manage­
ment “errors” and who have to make good their shortfall by borrowing from 
the discount window. In this model, and indeed in any model which incorpo­
rates reserve management, it cannot be the case that the discount rate is a 
penalty rate. While it is true that, ex-post, some banks may have to borrow 
from the discount window, possibly at a higher rate than they could have 
borrowed funds in the money market, this simply reflects the fact that, un­
der uncertainty, it is unlikely that expected costs coincide with actual costs. 
Ex-ante, however, banks have full information about the discount rate, and 
are free to choose their money market borrowing accordingly. Whilst they 
could choose to borrow in the money market so as to be (virtually) certain 
that they would not have to approach the central bank discount window, this 
is generally sub-optimal since they will then typically end up holding excess 
reserves, which is also costly. Instead of a penalty, then, the discount rate 
(and the non-payment of interest on reserves) should be seen as cost param­
eters given by the institutional framework in which banks operate. Reserve
22Models of money market interest rate determination, also based on bank reserve m an­
agement, have been proposed by Ho and Saunders (1985) -  who use a mean-variance 
framework -  and by Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988). In each case the basic result is the 
same: the money market rate depends on the aggregate reserve position of the banking 
system. See equation [18] in Ho and Saunders (p.983) and equation [24] in Spindt and 
Hoffmeister (p.411).
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management represents the attem pt, by banks, to minimise these costs.
A clearer indication that the discount rate could not be a penalty rate in
this framework is that banks’ optimal money market borrowing choices are
invariant to the absolute level of the discount rate. It would not be possible
for the central bank, even if it wanted to do so, to somehow penalise banks by
raising the discount rate. Consider the effect of an increase in the discount
rate from dQ to d\. Given M , and the existing market clearing interest rate
i* i*z‘5, this lowers the relative cost of funds in the money market from ^  to ^-), 
thereby raising the optimal borrowing demand of all banks. Of course, the 
aggregate supply of funds is given, with the result that the money market 
rate will rise to clear the market. Specifically, the money market rate will rise 
to the point where the relative cost of funds between the discount window
i *  t *and the money market is restored to its original level, i.e.
The outcome of an increase in the central bank’s discount rate is, ceteris 
paribus, a rise in the money market rate. This is hardly surprising, and 
illustrates the fundamental point that a money market shortage is sufficient 
for the central bank to influence, fairly precisely, the money market rate. By 
the appropriate choices of the discount rate, the central bank can then raise or 
lower the level of money market interest rates in such a way as to achieve its 
intermediate and ultimate policy objectives. A higher discount rate, however, 
does not penalise banks in the sense that a reserve shortfall is now somehow 
more costly than before23
This result obtains because the relative cost of funds £  in (3*7) is, for 
any given discount rate, uniquely determined by the magnitude of the money 
market shortage M . It is in this respect, however, that the aggregate model is 
also somewhat misleading, and reflects the overly simplified manner in which 
uncertainty and money market trading are incorporated into the model.
230 f  course, a higher discount rate, by raising money market rates, would penalise those 
banks which are exposed to interest-rate risk, e.g. those banks who had borrowed funds 
on a floating rate basis to fund fixed ra te loans.
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3.2.7 Should th e size o f th e shortage m atter?
The fact that the size of the money market shortage plays a role in this model 
is problematic for the following reason. When there is a money market sur­
plus, for example, banks in aggregate already have more than enough reserves 
to meet their settlement obligations. Whilst this makes it unavoidable that 
some banks must end the day with excess reserves, these reserve holdings will 
be higher than they need to be, since those banks which have a reserve deficit 
after settlement will borrow from the discount window. Similarly, although a 
money market shortage makes it unavoidable that some banks must borrow 
from the central bank to meet their settlement obligations, this borrowing 
will be higher than it need be, since some banks will be left holding surplus 
reserves after settlement.
These outcomes are clearly counterfactual, since one would, not expect 
some banks to be holding surplus reserves whilst others were borrowing from 
the central bank. The function of the money market, after all, is to redis­
tribute reserves, which would tend to mitigate such an outcome. In practice, 
therefore, one would expect the sign of M  (i.e. a shortage M  > 0 versus a 
surplus M  < 0) to play a role in the determination of money market rates, 
but not the size of M . In other words, the slope of the aggregate money mar­
ket borrowing function would be much steeper in practice than that derived 
in the model, since it would quickly become apparent, through banks bor­
rowing behaviour in the money market, whether there was a money market 
surplus or shortage. This would lead, in the case of an aggregate surplus, 
to the money market rate falling towards zero, since there would be banks 
who, based on their expected settlement obligations, would still be willing to 
lend when all other banks had met their borrowing targets. Similarly, in the 
case of an aggregate shortage, the money market rate would rise to equal the 
discount rate, since some banks would always remain unable to meet their 
borrowing targets by borrowing funds in the money market.
This information revelation function, which is an integral part of all fi­
nancial markets, is basically assumed away in the model as a consequence of 
invoking the extreme trading assumption that banks only have a single oppor­
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tunity to trade in the money market before all uncertainty is revealed. Thus 
although trading in the money market reveals the sign of M  (i.e. whether 
there is an expected surplus or shortage) through the level of i -  from (3.7) 
i > |  implies an expected shortage, and vice versa -  this information is 
no longer of any use to banks without another opportunity to trade in the 
money market. It is then hardly surprising that some banks will end up with 
a reserve surplus even when there is a money market shortage, and also that 
some banks will end up with a reserve deficit even when there is a money 
market surplus.
But what if banks could trade in an ex-post market before they bor­
rowed from the central bank? Then, banks with surplus reserves could lend 
these to banks which still needed reserves. If, however, i* < | ,  revealing 
an expected aggregate surplus, competition between lenders would drive the 
ex-post money market rate close to zero, since this is the return they would 
receive if they didn’t manage to lend their excess reserves. If, on the other 
hand, i* > - , revealing an expected aggregate shortage, competition between 
borrowers would immediately drive the ex-post money market rate very close 
to the discount rate, since this is the cost of funds if banks didn’t manage to 
cover their reserve deficit.
Relaxing the trading assumption, therefore, would permit the money mar­
ket to redistribute reserves more effectively than in the existing model, and 
would also make the money market rate (at least in the ex-post market) much 
more sensitive to the aggregate reserve position of the banking system. At 
the same time, however, the simple model of reserve management assumed 
above would become potentially more complicated, since the expected money 
market shortage would also presumably become relevant to the representa­
tive bank’s ex-ante borrowing decision. Such a more complicated model will 
not be pursued here. In any event, the existing model can provide a good 
first approximation if it is assumed that banks expect their individual ran­
dom settlement obligations 6 to be distributed on a narrow interval, i.e. t is 
“small”. If this is the case, the aggregate money market borrowing function 
becomes steep, and only a very small shortage (surplus) is necessary to drive 
the market clearing interest rate up to the central bank’s discount rate (down
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to zero).
It is then also much more obvious that the discount rate cannot, in any 
sense, be considered as a penalty rate. A money market shortage would 
(almost) always drive the market rate to equality with the discount rate, 
eradicating even the ex-post cost of those banks which had to borrow from 
the discount window on account of the shortage. A money market surplus, 
on the other hand, would (almost) always mean that the discount rate was 
irrelevant, since market interest rates would fall to zero and banks would not 
have to borrow from the discount window on account of the surplus.
3.3 R efinem ents
In the model just described, the money market interest rate is prevented 
from rising above the discount rate in the event of a money market shortage 
because the central bank is prepared to lend reserves through its discount 
window24. Should the money market move into surplus, however, the money 
market rate will fall below the discount rate and, in exceptional circum­
stances, may fall to zero. Simply maintaining an open discount window -  
as was done by central banks during the nineteenth century -  cannot pre­
vent money market rates from falling. To achieve this, one of two actions is 
necessary by the central bank.
The central bank could undertake open-market operations (such as the 
sale of financial securities, for example) to reduce aggregate reserves (i.e. 
increase M ). This would increase aggregate borrowing demand and cause the 
market rate to rise. Alternatively, the central bank could extend a borrowing 
facility that was analogous to the discount window except that banks could 
buy securities from, rather than sell securities to, the central bank at some 
announced rate, say d '. This would mean, in the above model, that the cost 
of a reserve surplus would become cs =  i — d', with the result that (3.3), the
24This assumes, of course, that there are no limits on, or non-pecuniary costs attached 
to, borrowing a t the window; these features are addressed below.
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borrowing function of the individual bank, could be rewritten as
i — d!
The effect of d! is thus to impose a floor on the money market interest 
rate since, when the rate reaches this level, banks become indifferent between 
lending reserves in the money market and lending them to the central bank. 
In the analysis above it was assumed that such a facility did not exist, i.e. that 
d' =  0, which meant that the market rate could fall to zero in the event of a 
(large) money market surplus. With d' > 0, however, the central bank could 
prevent this fall in money market rates. Although there are several examples 
of central banks employing such a facility25 for this purpose, central banks 
have generally preferred to utilise the first channel, namely open market 
operations.
Through open-market operations, central banks can always make their 
discount rates effective, since the effect of such operations is to change Af, the 
money market shortage. Through the appropriate choices of M , therefore, 
central banks can always cause the money market interest rate to remain 
at or near their discount rates. As noted earlier, this amounts to central 
banks engaging in reserve management at the aggregate level to “control” 
the level of some money market interest rate. The view of many academics 
notwithstanding, this is also what central banks perceive themselves to be 
doing. Thus:
“Open market operations allow the Trading Desk a t the New York Re­
serve Bank to adjust the volume of reserves in the [banking] system  before 
depository institutions borrow at the Federal Reserve - th a t is, to manage 
nonborrowed reserves. In this way the Fed can offset the reserve swings 
caused by the public’s demand for cash and by other factors. By managing 
non-borrowed reserves in relation to estimated reserve requirements, the Fed 
can ... affect the interest rate institutions pay each other when borrowing 
overnight - the federal funds rate.” (Meek 1982, p. 10; emphasis added)
25The Bank of England offered such a  facility to deal with the enormous money market 
surpluses generated by government spending during the first world war (see chapter one). 
The Bundesbank currently operates such a facility, under which banks are invited to buy 
very short-term  securities a t a stated rate (see Deutsche Bundesbank 1989).
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In order to influence money market interest rates with a reasonable degree 
of precision, however, central banks have to take into account several features 
of the money market environment and of their own operating procedures 
which were only partially taken into account in the model above. These are 
the structure of reserve requirements and the discount window, each of which 
is discussed in turn.
3.3.1 R eserve requirem ents
In the model derived in the preceding section it was assumed that the level 
of reserve requirements which banks had to meet was zero, and that this 
requirement had to be met on a daily basis (i.e. the maintenance period 
was a single day). Whilst this is an accurate description of actual reserve 
requirements in force in the UK, it is less accurate when applied to the US 
or several European countries, where reserve requirements are positive and 
met over a longer maintenance period. Thus, whilst banks remain concerned 
about the level of aggregate reserves over the entire maintenance period, day- 
to-day fluctuations will be of somewhat less concern, since on all but the last 
day of the maintenance period banks face an average reserve target.
This means that banks face a different reserve management problem on 
all but the last day of the maintenance period. In particular, holding re­
serves in excess of the reserve target carries a lower opportunity cost than 
otherwise, since these reserves contribute towards the bank’s average reserve 
holdings and thus potentially compensate the bank against reserve drains on 
subsequent days. Similarly, when reserves fall below target, the bank can 
delay borrowing from the discount window because it might receive reserve 
inflows on subsequent days. In short, before the last day of the maintenance 
period banks will not necessarily respond to reserve flows by borrowing or 
lending in the money market, since these flows might be temporary. Only 
when they expect reserve flows to persist, will they react in the manner sug­
gested by the model in section 2. The ability by banks to undertake reserve 
averaging, therefore, implies that the relationship between aggregate reserve 
movements and the money market interest rate is not likely to be constant
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over the maintenance period: specifically, this relationship is likely to become 
more sensitive as the end of the maintenance period approaches. Several au­
thors have noted this phenomenon, notably Poole (1968) himself who argued 
(and found evidence) that the reserve averaging caused the variance of the 
money market interest rate to increase over the maintenance period26.
The ability for reserve accounting to affect banks’ reserve management 
behaviour means that it is clearly important to central banks, who attem pt to 
influence money market interest rates through the management of aggregate 
reserves. The nature of this concern is perhaps best illustrated by a debate 
which occurred during the 1960s between the Federal Reserve and several 
critics, notably Brunner and Meltzer (1964) and Cox and Leach (1964a), 
who argued that the structure of reserve requirements was problematic:
“The present system of reserve settlement periods was adopted in the 
early years of the Federal Reserve as a compromise of widely varying prac­
tices among the district Reserve Banks .... These regulations are particularly 
objectionable in that they require a huge volume of ‘defensive’ open market 
operations, interfering unnecessarily with private security markets. Further­
more, the settlement procedures at times pose operating difficulties for banks.
In addition to the fact th a t they magnify the impact of random deposit fluc­
tuations, the current regulations ... destabilise trading in federal funds” (Cox 
and Leach 1964a, p .93).
To correct these perceived deficiencies, it was proposed that the Fed 
should lengthen the reserve maintenance period (from one week to one month) 
and, more important, should stagger these maintenance periods so that they 
overlapped with one another (i.e. a new maintenance period would begin 
before the existing one elapsed). These changes, it was argued, would per­
mit banks to engage in reserve averaging to a greater extent, thus stabilising 
money market rates and requiring fewer offsetting operations by the Fed.
26Twenty years later, Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) rediscovered this result, presenting 
virtually the same argument (and evidence) as Poole did in 1968. Campbell (1987) presents 
a more intriguing explanation as to why changes in money market rates may be predictable 
over the maintenance period, based on imperfectly observable shifts in banks’ desired 
reserve holdings over the maintenance period.
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The Fed’s response, put forward by Sternlight (1964), was that greater 
reserve averaging on the part of banks would have two undesirable conse­
quences. First, it was far from obvious that banks, given longer maintenance 
periods, would, or even could, redistribute current reserve disturbances in 
a smooth fashion throughout the remainder of the maintenance period. In­
stead, given uncertainty about future reserve disturbances, these could cumu­
late, eventually disrupting money markets to an even greater extent, and re­
quiring even greater offsetting operations by the Fed. Second, and of greater 
concern to the Fed, was that staggered maintenance periods would leave 
banks with too much flexibility over their reserve positions, thereby reducing 
the ability of the Fed to influence money market interest rates in keeping 
with its policy objectives:
“... it must be noted that what for the individual member bank is the 
burden of meeting reserve requirements or the incentive of putting  excess 
reserve to work is, for the banking system as a whole, the backbone of central 
bank regulation of the credit base .... under the proposed plan, the [Fed] 
would not have nearly as good an idea as it does now of where the banking 
system stood at any particular time with respect to reserve availability in 
relation to requirements” (Sternlight 1964, p .94).
In other words, the Fed’s influence on money market interest rates was 
premised, to a significant extent, on a predictable relationship between banks’ 
borrowing behaviour in the money market and aggregate reserves. Staggered 
reserve maintenance periods would clearly loosen this relationship, interfering 
with the Fed’s ability to use aggregate reserves to produce a desired money 
market interest rate27.
When the Fed subsequently revised the structure of member banks’ re­
serve requirements, it went some way towards satisfying the proposals for 
staggered settlement by introducing a carry-over provision. This permitted 
banks to deviate (within a specified margin) from their reserve targets dur-
27This concern was never properly addressed by the Fed’s critics, who argued, somewhat 
paradoxically, th a t the Fed could always increase the magnitude of its offsetting operations 
if it felt th a t the banking system was too unresponsive in reflecting a desired policy stance 
(see Cox and Leach 1964b, p.535).
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mg the current maintenance period, making up this deviation in the subse­
quent maintenance period. Furthermore, the Fed also eased the calculational 
aspects of its reserve requirements by moving from the existing system of 
contemporaneous reserve accounting (i.e. one in which the computation pe­
riod coincided with the maintenance period) to a system of lagged reserve 
accounting (i.e. one in which the computation period preceded the main­
tenance period). This structure has been retained by the Fed, with some 
revisions28, and there have been several examinations of the properties of 
these alternative arrangements29.
The upshot is that different regimes of reserve requirements clearly have 
different implications for bank reserve management, and hence for central 
bank control of money market interest rates. As long as they are consistent 
with a determinate demand for reserves on the part of banks, however, they 
do not change the conclusions of the basic model presented in section 2 in 
any way. They may, however, be usefully included in such a model to provide 
greater insights about the precise relationship between aggregate reserves and 
money market rates.
3.3.2 T he discount window
Although central banks have increasingly come to rely upon open-market 
operations as their primary means of influencing bank reserves and money 
market interest rates, the structure of their discount facilities is sometimes 
an important component of the manner in which they achieve this influence. 
Again, this is less true of the UK than it is of other countries, the primary ex­
ample being the US. Nonetheless, it is useful to briefly examine the relevance 
of the restrictions imposed by central banks over their discount facility, and 
its impact on the relationship between aggregate reserves and money market
28In 1984 the computation period was adjusted to overlap with all but the last two 
days of the maintenance period, whilst in 1990 the level of requirements was dropped (see 
Feinman 1993b).
29See Cosimano (1987), Saunders and Urich (1988), Evanoff (1990) and Brunner and 
Lown (1993).
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interest rates.
W ithout restrictions over the discount facility, the cost of funds from the 
facility is fully captured by the single parameter d. Under this condition, 
the model in section 2 indicates that the money market interest rate never 
exceeds the central bank’s discount rate, since an institution would never 
prefer to borrow in the money market at a higher rate than the cost of funds 
at the discount window. This behaviour is certainly borne out in practice. In 
France or Germany, for example, where funds are available at a preannounced 
discount rate to any bank with the appropriate securities, very short-term 
money market rates never rise above the official discount rate30.
Once restrictions are imposed on the discount facility, however, the dis­
count rate ceases to capture the full cost of funds. Depending on the nature 
of the restrictions, the cost of funds will usually be above the discount rate 
and may increase with the amount of borrowing, the frequency of borrow­
ing, etc. Naturally, banks will take these additional cost factors, which may 
be pecuniary or non-pecuniary, into consideration when making their money 
market borrowing decisions. And, whilst money market rates will never rise 
above the point at which banks become indifferent between the cost of funds 
at the discount facility and in the money market, this level may now be above 
the discount rate, since this no longer captures the full cost of discount win­
dow funds. Note, however, that the observed money market rate remains an 
outcome of the particular cost structure imposed on the discount facility by 
the central bank, which has two implications.
First, when the money market rate rises above the discount rate, it does 
not mean that there is then an arbitrage opportunity between the window 
and the market, or that those banks which are borrowing from the window 
are receiving a “subsidy” rate. Waller (1990), for example, believes this is 
the case:
“ ... a problem arises in that, whenever the market interest rate is above 
the central bank’s lending rate, there is an arbitrage opportunity to  exploit 
by borrowing from the central bank and relending at the higher market rate
30For evidence see Schnadt (1994a and 1994b).
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of interest. If all borrowing requests were granted, the market rate of interest 
would be driven down to the central bank’s lending rate, which, in turn, may 
hinder the achievement of other monetary objectives. In order to prevent this, 
the central bank must engage in non-price rationing to allocate its credit”
(p.273).
It is disturbing to find such a blatant confusion of cause and effect. Why 
would profit-maximising banks be prepared to pay more for funds in the 
money market than they would at the discount window? The answer is that 
they would not. Clearly, therefore, it is because of non-price rationing at the 
discount facility that the money market rate is above the discount rate in the 
first place31.
Secondly, and more crucially, the central bank must take into account the 
manner in which its restrictions affect banks’ behaviour, since this will affect 
the nature of the relationship between the aggregate reserves of the banking 
system and money market interest rates. To illustrate this, two types of 
restrictions -  pecuniary and non-pecuniary -  will briefly be contrasted, since 
these have a considerably different impact on bank behaviour.
The discount facility of the Riksbank of Sweden provides a good example 
of the first type of restriction, and represents what has been referred to as an 
“interest rate scale” (see Englund, Horngren and Viotti 1989 and Martensson 
1992 for details). Basically, banks each face a set of interest rates at which 
they can borrow from the central bank, which is increasing in the amount 
borrowed in a manner which depends upon their capital. Furthermore, banks 
each face a similar set of rates at which they can deposit reserves at the central 
bank, which is decreasing in the amount deposited, and also depends upon 
their capital. This arrangement differs from that defined in the basic model of 
section 2 only in that a bank’s costs of a reserve deficit or surplus are no longer 
constant, but comprise a number of “steps” depending on the amount of the 
deficit or surplus (i.e. the amount borrowed or lent at the discount facility).
31Waller also raises a “non-problem” when he maintains th a t equality between the dis­
count rate and the money market rate could somehow “hinder the achievement of m onetary 
objectives” . The discount rate is a choice variable of the central bank, and thus can always 
be adjusted, along with money market rates, to reflect the objectives of the central bank.
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This is then true for the aggregate money market borrowing function as well, 
with the result that the Riksbank can, by altering aggregate reserves (M), 
put the banking system at a particular point on the aggregate interest rate 
scale, which then determines the money market interest rate. By withdrawing 
reserves via open-market operations, for example, the Riksbank causes some 
banks to increase their borrowing at the discount facility. This pushes them, 
and thereby money market rates, to a higher point on the interest rate scale32.
The discount window of the Federal Reserve (or Fed) is the most 
well known example of the second type of restriction, which involves non- 
pecuniary costs of borrowing. According to Mengle (1986):
Nonprice rationing of Fed credit became firmly established as a m atter 
of practice during the late 1920s .... For example, in 1926 the Board adopted 
a policy of discouraging continuous borrowing from the discount window. In 
1928, it specifically stated that banks should not borrow from the window 
for profit. Since then, the Fed has emphasised nonprice measures along with 
the discount rate to control borrowing” (p.31).
Although the impact of such nonprice rationing on the relationship be­
tween aggregate reserves and money market interest rates is now well un­
derstood, it took some time before officials at the nascent Fed realised the 
impact of these restrictions. As explained by Burgess (1946) and Riefler 
(1930), if banks were discouraged from continuous borrowing at the window, 
they would attem pt to borrow in the money market instead, thus driving 
money market rates above the discount rate. Furthermore, open market op­
erations by the Fed to increase reserves would, under these circumstances, 
be employed by banks to repay their discount window borrowing, and would 
thus have no impact on the aggregate availability of reserves. They would, 
however, cause money market rates to fall, which in its turn might increase 
the availability of credit33.
32Banks still have an incentive to use the money market since their marginal cost of 
funds from the discount facility is not the same. Banks with more capital face a somewhat 
flatter interest rate scale, which provides an incentive for banks with less capital to borrow 
from them, via the money market, before borrowing from the central bank.
33Wicker (1965, 1966 and 1992) gives an excellent account of the early development and
102 CHAPTER 3 .
Subsequent events made the discount window, and its attendant costs, 
largely irrelevant until the 1950s (see chapter 1), when discount window reg­
ulations (Regulation A) were revised. At the same time, the development of 
the federal funds market meant that banks began to rely increasingly upon 
the money market for reserve management purposes (see Boughton 1972). 
Thus the federal funds rate began to reflect the aggregate scarcity of re­
serves to a much greater extent than previously, periodically rising above the 
discount rate when reserves were scarce (see Minsky 1965 and Mengle 1986). 
This spread between the fed funds rate and the discount rate became more or 
less permanent during the 1970s. Numerous econometric studies attem pted 
to describe the relationship between the spread and borrowing, usually based 
on the implicit assumption that it was the incentive provided by this spread 
which caused borrowing to increase (see Goldfeld and Kane 1966 or Frost 
and Sargent 1970). As has been pointed out above, the causality runs in the 
other direction: it is because banks are reluctant to borrow from the window 
that the spread appears.
To some extent the issue of causality is irrelevant, since it is clear that the 
Fed determines -  through its open market operations -  the aggregate volume 
of borrowing from the discount window. What matters to the Fed, therefore, 
is the stability of banks’ discount window borrowing behaviour, since the 
determination of any particular fed funds rate by the Fed is premised on 
some assumed reluctance on the part of banks to borrow from the window. 
Goodfriend (1983) has argued that the structure of the nonprice rationing 
employed by the Fed is itself a source of instability in this relationship since 
“borrowing demand depends in a potentially complicated way on lagged levels 
of borrowing and on expected future spreads” (p.354). Indeed, there is ample 
evidence from the Fed itself that such instability has made determination of 
its desired fed funds rate extremely difficult at times34.
significance of these ideas regarding the relationships between open-market operations, 
discount window borrowing and money market rates.
34Each year, in the spring issue of its Quarterly Review , the New York Federal Reserve 
publishes a detailed summary of its money market operations in the previous year. In­
creasing bank reluctance to borrow, attributed to increased worries th a t such borrowing
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Why, then, does the Fed choose to impose non-pecuniary costs over its 
discount facility in this manner? Although difficult to establish conclusively, 
the most plausible reason is probably a desire by the Fed to maintain the 
perception that it is not directly responsible for determining the level of the 
federal funds rate, thereby reducing the influence of political forces on its 
policy instrument. Indeed, several commentators (see, for example, Greider 
1987) have presented a convincing case that the Fed’s adoption of suppos­
edly “new” operating procedures in October 1979 were motivated by the 
same concerns. By engineering large increases in member bank borrowing 
at the discount window under the guise of a supposed change in operating 
procedures, the Fed succeeded in raising the fed funds rate to unprecedented 
levels (which it needed to do to control inflation). These increases in the 
fed funds rate were a direct consequence of banks’ reluctance to borrow from 
the window, which was thus usefully exploited by the Fed to cloak its own 
responsibility for such high interest rates. Raising its discount rate to this 
level would have achieved the same result, but would have attracted enor­
mous political opposition. By arguing, instead, that the fed funds rate was 
rising as a result of market forces, it successfully shrugged off this pressure, 
and succeeded in bringing inflation down. Nonprice rationing, therefore, was 
not without its advantages.
In sum, the structure of the discount window, like the structure of re­
serve requirements, is an important determinant of the specific relationship 
between aggregate reserves and money market interest rates which will hold 
in practice (see Pearce 1993). They do not, however, alter the basic insight 
of the model developed in this chapter: central banks are -  albeit through a 
variety of means -  directly responsible for the observed level of money market 
interest rates.
might be perceived as a sign of liquidity problems, was reported in 1988, 1990 and 1991 
(see Garfinkel 1990). Substantiating this, Persitiani (1991) notes the response by the Fed 
chairman to a proposal to open discount window borrowing to greater public scrutiny: 
this, according to the chairman, “ could be expected to have a chilling effect on the use of 
the discount window” (p.29).
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CHAPTER 3.
Table 3.1 
Bank R eserves in Five Countries
C o u n try B a n k  R eserv es  in  1992 (£ b n )
Total Reserves 
(incl. requirements)
Excess Reserves 
(excl. requirements)
France 2.17 0.06
Germany 35.41 0.49
Japan 14.89 0.02
U.K. 1.50 0.18
U.S. 20.30 0.57
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1993).
C hapter 4
T he Sterling M oney M arket and  
B ank o f England O perations
The purpose of this chapter is primarily descriptive, and it is split into 
four sections, each of which details a different aspect of the sterling money 
market 1. Section 1 describes the financial instruments which are traded 
in the sterling money market, briefly covering their history as well as their 
associated issue and trading conventions. Section 2 then describes the trans­
actions technology whereby trades in the sterling money market are settled, 
and also outlines some of the risks inherent in the settlement process. Sec­
tion 3 describes the daily operations of the Bank of England in the sterling 
money market, focusing on the assets, counterparties and timing of these op­
erations, and the impact of these operations on money market interest rates. 
Finally, section 4 describes two recent developments which have changed the 
longstanding role of the discount houses as the Bank’s counterparties.
1This chapter is a shortened and revised version of two published papers by the author 
on the sterling money market. See Schnadt (1994a, 1994b).
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4.1 The Sterling M oney Market
The sterling money market is defined here as the market for the issue and 
trading of sterling denominated wholesale debt claims with an original matu­
rity o f one year or less and covers a class of assets which includes Treasury 
and commercial bills, certificates of deposit, unsecured and secured wholesale 
deposits and commercial paper2. Gross daily turnover in this market may 
easily approach £40 billion, which is second only to turnover in the London 
foreign exchange market3. The outstanding amount of borrowing in this mar­
ket is much larger and is estimated, according to table 4.1, to approach £300 
billion. As trading in the sterling money market is relatively unregulated, 
the role of conventions is particularly important in maintaining the integrity 
of the market and its participants. While these conventions are, to some 
extent self-imposed, the Bank of England has published a London Code of 
Conduct (May 1992) for principals and brokers in the sterling money market, 
which details the general standards for dealing in this market and contains a 
statement of best practice.
The transactions technology of the sterling money market has, for many 
years, been such that physical contact between participants is unnecessary. 
Closed circuit television services (e.g. Reuters) convey price information to 
a dispersed set of buyers and sellers, comprised of banks and other financial 
institutions, corporations and specialist broker and dealer firms. These prices 
are negotiated, and deals made, by telephone, and the transfers of money 
and securities which finally settle these deals are then achieved via electronic 
settlement systems.
The discussion which follows will divide the sterling money market into
2Several texts and articles contain good descriptions of the sterling money market (al­
though at very different levels of generality), detailing aspects such as history, instru­
ments, participants, market conventions and Bank of England operations. See, for exam­
ple, MacKinnon and Dowding (1989), Wilson (1989), Harrington (1991), Walmsley (1992) 
or, more recently, Llewellyn and Tew (1993).
3Activity in the London equity market, for example, is small by comparison, being only 
about £1 billion daily.
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three sub-markets: the discount market, the deposit market, and the commer­
cial paper market. This subdivision is artificial, and is made for descriptive 
purposes only. In practice these sub-markets are totally integrated, in the 
sense that participants in the sterling money market are not restricted in any 
way from participating in any of these sub-markets4. Thus a corporation can 
raise short-term funds by drawing commercial bills, by issuing commercial 
paper, or by borrowing in the deposit market, and will pursue whichever op­
tion provides the cheapest cost of funds. Similarly, banks can, and do, invest 
their short-term funds by purchasing bills or certificates of deposit, or mak­
ing secured or unsecured loans in the deposit market. Again, the instrument 
which promises the highest return will be chosen.
Since money market instruments are close substitutes, and because access 
to these instruments is unrestricted, arbitrage ensures that their yields, for 
any given maturity, will be driven to equality once characteristics such as 
liquidity, credit-risk and tax have been taken into consideration. If this were 
not the case, riskless profit opportunities would exist, which would be incon­
sistent with a market populated by competitive, profit-seeking institutions. 
This simple equality condition does not hold, however, for money market 
interest rates at different maturities. Instead, rates at longer maturities will 
reflect market participants’ expectations about future short-term rates which, 
as the previous chapter has shown, will be dependent on the current and fu­
ture decisions of the central bank about its monetary instrument. This issue, 
the determination of the term structure of money market interest rates, is 
taken up in detail in chapter 5 and will thus not be discussed further in the 
current chapter.
4This is not necessarily the case in other domestic money markets. Participation in the 
federal funds market in the US, for example, is limited to the member banks of the Federal 
Reserve System. See Schnadt (1994a).
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4.1.1 T he discount m arket
H istory
The discount market, as previous chapters have shown, is the earliest 
example of a money market in England and dates back to the eighteenth 
century. The central instrument in this market was, and still is, the commer­
cial bill, which became legal in 1697 and whose issue continues to be governed 
by the Bill of Exchange Act of 18825. This Act defines the bill of exchange as 
an unconditional order in writing requiring the drawee (the borrower) to pay 
a fixed sum of money to the bearer (the lender) at a specified future date. It 
was common practice, however, for banks to accept bills, i.e. assume liability 
for payment at maturity, thereby creating a more marketable instrument, 
known as a bank bill (or banker’s acceptance), which bore two names.
The early discount market in London was one in which bill brokers brought 
together the buyers (lenders) and sellers (borrowers) of bills and, as already 
noted elsewhere (chapter 3), this market soon played an active role in redis­
tributing funds between banks. Furthermore, the Bank of England considered 
certain bills as “eligible” for discount, which also meant that bills were sold 
to the Bank when the banking system needed reserves. A banking crisis in 
1825 caused this arrangement to change, and created both a new set of fi­
nancial institutions and a new financial instrument. Instead of holding bills 
for liquidity purposes, banks voluntarily began to place funds with the bill 
brokers on a secured but “callable” basis. The bill brokers in turn became 
principals, known as discount houses, holding bills (and government paper) 
as security against these call deposits.
These changes meant that the discount market became synonymous with 
a group of institutions, the discount houses, who were market makers in bills. 
Banks, therefore, did not borrow and lend short-term funds directly amongst 
themselves. Rather, they did so through the discount houses, selling bills 
to, or withdrawing call funds from, the houses when they needed funds and
5Holden (1955) traces the origins and development of negotiable instrum ent law in 
the UK, whilst Gillett Brothers (1956) contains valuable introductory material on bills of 
exchange.
4. 1. THE STERLING M O NEY M A R K E T 111
buying bills from, or placing call funds with, the houses when they needed to 
lend funds. Banks also did not deal directly with the Bank of England when 
they needed reserves. Instead, the discount houses sold bills to the Bank and 
became the official counterparties of the Bank in its money market operations. 
This arrangement remained virtually unchanged until the early 1960s, with 
a single innovation occurring in 1877, when the government began to issue 
Treasury bills for the first time. Given the increased funding demands of the 
government during world war one and the attendant decrease in international 
trade, the issue of Treasury bills soon outstripped the issue of bank bills. 
This situation persisted throughout the interwar period6 until 1965, when 
bank bills outstanding again became larger than the Treasury bill issue (see 
chapter 6).
Issue and trading conventions
Following the development of the wholesale deposit market in the 1960s, 
which is detailed below, the discount market has become a relatively small 
component of the sterling money market. Bank bills and secured loans rep­
resent less than 7.4% and 2.5% respectively of the total market and Treasury 
bills only 1.7% (table 4.1). Nevertheless, the discount market still occupies 
a pivotal position in the sterling money market and will continue to do so 
until the Bank changes the manner in which it supplies reserves to the bank­
ing system. This will become clear from section 2 below, which describes 
the Bank’s operations, and indeed from chapter 6, which examines the bill 
market in detail.
(
Bills do not bear explicit interest and are consequently known as discount 
instruments since the lender purchases the bill at a discount to its face value. 
Since almost all bills are accepted before being sold into the market or to the 
Bank of England, the initial price of a (bank) bill is calculated on the basis of 
a discount rate, which is market determined, plus an acceptance fee, which is 
determined by the acceptor based upon the credit-standing of the borrower.
6Since trade was again disrupted by the Great Depression and government borrowing 
remained high throughout the interwar period and into the second world war.
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This price (per £100 of bills) is calculated as follows7:
«=('-=iSri). <“>
where a is the acceptance fee (in percent), dt is the (annualised) discount 
rate (in percent), and m t is the unexpired maturity (in days) of the bill. 
Naturally, when the bill is resold (rediscounted) in the secondary market, the 
price formula is exactly as in (4.1), but with a =  0. The evolution of the 
price of a bill between issue and maturity is shown (for two different discount 
rates) in figure 4.1, and can be seen to rise monotonically over the life of 
the instrument when the discount rate is held constant. A change in the 
discount rate, however, causes the current value (price) of a bill to change 
discontinuously, since the future payoff (the face value) is fixed.
The return, or yield, on such a bill when it is purchased and held to 
maturity is given by8
(4.2)
which implies that the yield to maturity on a bill always exceeds the discount 
rate, by an amount which increases with the unexpired maturity m.
Currently, sterling bills are typically drawn in amounts (lots) of £5 mil­
lion, although smaller sizes are issued depending on the specific needs of the 
customer. Acceptance fees average about |% , but will be as low as |%  for the 
best borrowers and as high as 2% for the worst customers. Bid-ask spreads 
in the secondary market are usually |% .
It is conventional practice for the acceptor of a bill to insert a clause on 
the face of the bill, indicating the nature of the transaction for which the 
funds are being borrowed (e.g. a distributor of motor vehicles would issue 
bills claused as “current purchases of motor vehicles”). Since bills are often
7Note th a t the calculation of interest rates for sterling deals is done on a 365-day basis.
8For the derivation of this formula consult Stigum (1990) or Walmsley (1992).
dt
i  ___  m t  d t  ’
1 365
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issued to finance goods in transit, or inventories, they have a short maturity 
(or tenor), usually of one month or three months, although shorter and longer 
m aturity bills are issued. For the same reason, the extension of bill finance is 
often said to take place against self- liquidating transactions, as the borrower 
can meet the liability of the bill (when it matures) from the proceeds of the 
subsequent resale of these goods. Not all bills, however, are drawn against an 
underlying transaction of this sort. Finance bills may be drawn by companies 
against a general charge over goods in transit (without reference to a specific 
shipment or set of invoices). Finance bills may also be issued to raise working 
capital or to finance goods which are sold on a hire-purchase basis.
In addition to their role as an instrument of finance, bills play an impor­
tant part in the liquidity of banks in the UK. Since bills may be readily sold 
in the secondary market, they are a means whereby a financial institution 
can obtain cash quickly and at low cost. For this reason, bills are defined 
as primary liquid assets, and may be held by banks operating in the UK to 
satisfy the statutory liquidity requirements which are imposed by the Bank 
of England. Furthermore, bills are purchased by the Bank in its daily money 
market operations9. However, only specific bills, known as eligible bills, may 
be used by institutions to meet their liquidity requirements or offered to the 
Bank in its money market operations. In order to qualify as eligible, bills 
should10:
(i) identify (i.e. clause) the underlying transaction for which this form of 
financing is being arranged, which should be short-term, self-liquidating 
and not for capital purposes11;
(ii) be drawn in sterling for an original maturity of no more than 187 days;
(iii) not be payable outside the UK;
9 Note th a t while a bank may hold its own bills for purposes of rediscounting them  with 
the Bank, only those bills accepted by another bank may serve as primary liquid assets.
10These eligibility criteria are specified in Bank of England (1988).
n In practice, however, this criterion is not strictly applied (see chapter 6).
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(iv) not be drawn on, or accepted by, a bank which has a shareholding link 
with the drawer; and
(v) be accepted by an institution named on a list of eligible acceptors pub­
lished by the Bank of England.
Before an institution can become an eligible acceptor, the Bank specifies 
that it must have a substantial and broadly based sterling acceptance busi­
ness in the United Kingdom and that its bills must command the finest rates 
in the market. Of course, eligibility immediately confers extra utility upon a 
bill, i.e. it becomes a so-called primary liquid asset since it may be used to 
satisfy liquidity requirements and can be sold to the Bank of England. This 
means that bill rates will be tiered, with eligible bills carrying a finer rate of 
discount than non-eligible bills12. It also means that bills yields will be lower 
than the yields on equivalent assets which do not have this property, i.e. un­
secured sterling deposits, reflecting a liquidity premium. Figure 4.2 depicts 
the yield of a one month bill as against the yield on a one month unsecured 
deposit and indicates, somewhat surprisingly, that this premium has fluctu­
ated considerably. Chapter 6 therefore examines the recent behaviour of this 
premium in more detail and traces its effects on other short-term interest 
rates.
4.1.2 T he deposit market
H istory
Up until the 1950s, the sterling money market retained its traditional 
form as a discount market. A long-standing cartel arrangement between the 
clearing banks prescribed common bases for the interest rates at which they 
accepted deposits and made advances. It also prescribed that they maintain 
a specified fraction of their assets in the form of cash and call money with 
the discount market. Consequently, there was little wholesale borrowing and
12Further rate differentiation, or tiering, between bills in each class may also occur, based 
on the perceived credit risks associated with each particular issuer/acceptor.
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lending amongst banks and virtually no competition by banks for funds from 
corporate and other lenders.
In 1955, however, a decision by the Treasury that local authorities should 
raise some of their funding in the open market instead of from the central 
government (through the Public Works Loan Board) created a demand for 
short-term wholesale sterling funds. This was met, at the time, by foreign 
banks (see Bank of England 1966). It was not long before corporate lenders 
and non-clearing banks realised that funds could be lent and borrowed on a 
wholesale basis at more attractive rates than had previously been available 
from the clearing banks, thus providing the impetus for a so-called “parallel” 
money market. Hence another instrument was introduced to the sterling 
money market, namely unsecured, wholesale deposits of short maturity. A 
new group of institutions, money brokers, then arose to facilitate trade in 
this instrument.
The wholesale deposit market expanded rapidly throughout the 1960s and 
a further development occurred in 1968, when sterling negotiable certificates 
of deposit (CDs) were issued for the first time (see Bank of England 1972). 
A CD is a negotiable instrument issued by a bank (or building society), 
certifying that a deposit has been made with that bank which is repayable 
to the bearer, with interest, at maturity. Compared with an ordinary term 
deposit a CD has the advantage, from the borrowing bank’s point of view, 
that funds will not be withdrawn before maturity. This can, and frequently 
does, occur with term deposits, when a customer unexpectedly needs their 
funds: by issuing a CD, on the other hand, a customer can simply sell the 
security in the secondary market if funds are needed.
Although the clearing banks and the discount houses were initially ex­
cluded from this new market, partly due to banking regulations and partly 
due to their own restrictive cartel agreements, this exclusion did not last 
very long. In 1971, following the introduction of new banking regulations 
(which became known as Competition and Credit Control; see Goodhart 
1989), clearing banks became major issuers of CDs. At the same time, dis­
count houses began to make markets in these instruments, thereby effectively 
integrating the discount and deposit markets. Over a period of fifteen years,
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therefore, between 1955 and 1970, the sterling money market was radically 
transformed from a relatively small discount market, with few participants, 
to a much larger market. It spanned a wide array of instruments and discount 
houses, clearing banks, non-clearing banks, corporations and other financial 
institutions competed alongside one another to borrow and lend short-term, 
wholesale sterling funds. Not surprisingly, this had a profound effect on the 
traditional business of banking. Instead of gathering retail deposits and then 
attempting to find a profitable outlet for these funds, banks could now prac­
tice liability management: that is, they could enter into lending commitments, 
such as mortgage of hire-purchase finance, funded purely by borrowing in the 
wholesale money market. Access to a retail deposit base, therefore, was no 
longer necessary to compete as an intermediary.
There were also new risks associated with these changes, which were well 
illustrated in 1973-75 by the insolvency of a number of nascent secondary, 
or fringe, banks which had relied exclusively on the wholesale markets to 
finance their property loans. Following sharp increases in interest rates and 
steep falls in property values, these banks soon became unable to roll over 
their short-term funding, and several failed. Those that survived did so as the 
result of a forced recycling of deposits, coordinated by the Bank of England 
and consequently dubbed the “lifeboat” (see Reid 1982).
Issue and trading conventions
The sterling deposit market remains by far the largest component of the 
sterling money market. At the end of 1993, UK banks and building societies 
were borrowing some £60 billion via sterling CDs and held about £150 billon 
in wholesale short-term sterling loans to other banks and overseas borrowers 
(table 4.1). As noted above, trading in these instruments occurs on a bi­
lateral basis, thus the interest rates which are established will vary between 
individual deals, being influenced by factors such as the credit-standing of 
the borrower and the size of the transaction. As in the bill market, bid-ask 
spreads are narrow and are typically about |% .
Unlike bills, which are discount instruments, term deposits and CDs pay 
an explicit interest return, or yield to maturity, which is applied to the prin-
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cipal amount of the deposit and paid at maturity. The price of a CD (per 
£100 of principal) is thus given by
where io and mo are the initial yield to maturity (in percent) and the initial 
number of days to maturity respectively (which serve to determine the pay­
ment made by the issuer at maturity), and it and m t are the current yield 
and the current number of days to maturity respectively. Unlike bills, which 
are quoted on a discount basis, deposits and CDs are quoted on a yield (to 
maturity) basis. As with a bill, however, the price of a CD rises continuously 
as maturity approaches, unless the market yield changes, which then implies 
a discontinuous jump in the price of the CD in the secondary market (see fig­
ure 4.1). Since CDs have the advantage of being negotiable in the secondary 
market, their (credit-risk adjusted) yields will be marginally lower than those 
on unsecured deposits, reflecting a slight liquidity premium. As figure 4.3. 
shows, however, the yield spread between a one month CD and a one month 
deposit is extremely small, since they are otherwise perfect substitutes.
CDs may only be issued by institutions authorised under the Banking Act 
1987 (i.e. banks) or the Building Societies Act 1986 (i.e. building societies), 
whilst any institution can borrow in the wholesale deposit market13. Typical 
maturities for CDs and term deposits are 12 months, 6 months, 3 months and 
1 month, whilst term deposits are also commonly made for periods of seven 
days and 1 day (i.e. overnight). Activity in these so-called “short-dated” 
instruments is extremely large, mainly because they are used extensively by 
financial and other institutions for reserve (cash) management purposes as 
described in chapter 3. These rates -  particularly overnight rates -  will thus 
vary considerably throughout the day, reflecting the aggregate availability of 
very short term funds (reserves). This aggregate availability is influenced 
by, amongst other things, the daily money market operations of the Bank 
of England, which seek to offset underlying movements in aggregate reserves
13A detailed outline of the issue and trading conventions in the CD market may be found 
in the British Bankers’ Association booklet Certificates o f Deposit on the London Market: 
Market Guidelines (November 1990).
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due to changes in the note circulation and other factors (see section 3). Since 
these operations occur at discrete intervals and do not necessarily imply that 
reserves immediately reach the wider market, overnight interest rates tend to 
be extremely volatile as compared with rates at longer maturities (e.g. 1 or 
3 months). A number of other factors also contribute towards this volatility, 
which are examined in greater detail in chapter 7.
It is noteworthy that the interest rates on a number of sterling financial in­
struments are based upon interest rates determined in the unsecured sterling 
deposit market. All financial instruments with variable, or floating, interest 
rates, for example, require a commonly agreed reference rate, as do many 
derivative securities, such as interest rate swaps, forward rate agreements, 
and interest rate futures and options. In order to standardise the determi­
nation of these reference rates and provide a set of “generic” money market 
borrowing (and lending) rates, the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) have 
designated twelve prime London banks whose quotations are used to calcu­
late these rates. Known as LIBOR14, these rates are calculated and published 
daily for each monthly deposit maturity between one and twelve months, and 
are fixed at llhOO in the following way: the quotations of eight (of the twelve) 
reference banks are collected, the two highest and two lowest quotations are 
eliminated, and the middle four quotations are then averaged.
4.1.3 T he com m ercial paper market
H istory
A more recent innovation in the sterling money market has  been the de­
velopment of sterling commercial paper (SCP), which could only be issued 
for the first time in 1986 (see Bank of England 1987a). Essentially, commer­
cial paper is not unlike a bill of exchange or a CD, in that it is a short-term 
negotiable instrument. Unlike a bill, however, which is normally accepted by 
a bank and thus becomes the liability of the acceptor and the drawer (i.e.
14London Interbank Offered Rate, being the rate at which a first-class bank offers to lend 
unsecured funds to another first class bank in London. Conversely, L1BID is a borrowing 
rate.
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two-name paper), SCP remains the liability of the borrower only (i.e. one 
name paper). This is attractive to borrowers whose credit-standing is well 
known by lenders, since they do not have to incur an acceptance fee when 
borrowing, which reduces their cost of funds. As with bills, it is normal mar­
ket practice for SCP to be issued on a discount basis, although provision has 
been made for such paper to bear a stated rate of interest.
Issue and trading conventions
SCP is generally issued via an uncommitted, continuously offered pro­
gramme to which the issuer appoints one or more banks or securities houses 
to act as dealers15. These dealers, usually acting as principals, buy SCP from 
the issuer for distribution to end investors. Alternatively, the issuer may is­
sue SCP directly to investors, or through a tender panel comprising banks 
and securities houses, who then bid competitively for the paper. However, 
activity in the SCP market is largely investor driven and issues are generally 
initiated in response to specific investor demand identified by dealers.
Since SCP is single name paper (i.e. the liability of the issuer only) infor­
mation about the credit-worthiness of issuers is of considerable importance to 
the wide acceptability of such paper. In order to facilitate adequate disclosure 
of such information, therefore, SCP issuers must meet certain requirements. 
Specifically, in order to be eligible to issue SCP, the issuer must be:
(i) a company with net assets of not less than £25 million and either:
(a) have shares or debt listed on the International Stock Exchange or 
on the Unlisted Securities market or
(b) be incorporated in the UK or have shares or debt listed on a recog­
nised overseas exchange, or
(ii) an overseas government or public authority with debt listed in London 
or on a recognised overseas exchange, or
15A detailed outline of the issue and trading conventions for SCP may be found in 
the British Bankers’ Association booklet Commercial Paper: London Market Guidelines 
(September 1992).
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(iii) in any other case, the issuer must have the SCP guaranteed by either
(a) a guarantor with net assets of not less than £25 million, or
(b) an institution authorised under the Banking Act 1987.
For reasons which will become clear in chapter 6, growth in SCP has 
remained slow, with the outstanding volume of such paper averaging only 
about £3 billion between 1987 and 1992. Furthermore, SCP tends to be 
purchased and held until maturity and an active secondary market has yet 
to develop for this instrument.
4.2 Transactions technology
Lenders, having contracted to lend cash in the sterling money market, need 
to be able to transfer this cash from their account to the account of the 
borrower. Where this loan takes the form of a purchase of a negotiable sterling 
security, borrowers must then also be able to transfer the security to the 
lender. In order to settle the deals which are struck between counterparties 
in the sterling money market, therefore, a number of sophisticated funds and 
securities transfer systems have been developed.
4.2.1 Funds Transfer
There are currently two large-value funds transfer systems in operation in the 
UK: an older, paper-based system known as the Town Clearing and a newer, 
electronic system known as CHAPS (Clearing House Automated Payments 
System). Both are administered by an umbrella organisation known as the 
Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACs)16.
The Town Clearing
The Town Clearing is a paper-based system for the same-day clearing 
and settlement of large-value sterling debit instruments (i.e. cheques) within
16The information below was obtained from BIS (1993), and the document APACs: A  
Description, published by APACs in December 1993.
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London. Operating in its present form since 1946, the Town Clearing is the 
modern descendant of the original clearing system which has existed in Lon­
don for over two centuries. The system has fourteen settlement members, 
including the Bank of England, and settlement occurs across members’ op­
erational (reserve) accounts held at the Bank of England. The cut-off time 
for normal business for same day value is 15h00, although items may be 
presented to paying banks at the settlement centre until 15h50.
C H A PS
CHAPS was introduced in 1984 and constitutes a nationwide electronic 
system for sending irrevocable sterling credit transfers. CHAPS has the same 
settlement members as the Town Clearing and payments are likewise settled 
across settlement members’ operational accounts at the Bank of England17. 
Being electronic, however, CHAPS payments are sent directly from one set­
tlement member to another and there is no clearing house. Each settlement 
member, moreover, has many branches throughout the UK, which are all ca­
pable of initiating and receiving CHAPS payments. Furthermore, there are 
over 400 financial institutions which, through agency agreements with settle­
ment members, can initiate and receive CHAPS payments18. From November 
1993, the cut-off for normal business for same day value has been 15hl0, al­
though the system remains open for a further twenty minutes for payments 
between settlement members to settle transactions entered into for the pur­
pose of achieving the minimum required closing balance in their operational 
accounts (see section 2.3).
The average daily clearing volume and value handled by these two systems 
is substantial, and in the twelve months before October 1993, totalled 42,000 
items and £96 billion respectively (table 4.2). In order to encourage the use
17Settlement members are required to join both payment systems. Two further banks 
have recently been accepted as settlement members on CHAPS, which will bring the total 
number of settlement members to sixteen. Applicants must meet a minimum clearing value 
criterion and must agree to pay an entry fee and a share of the operating costs based upon 
the proportion of payment volume handled.
18These are naturally subject to  the terms of the agency agreement, which will typically 
include limits, imposed by the settlement bank, on incoming/outgoing payments.
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of CHAPS, APACS has progressively raised the minimum transaction value 
on the Town Clearing, which now stands at £0.5 million, whilst there is no 
minimum limit on CHAPS. This has brought the proportion of the total 
average daily clearings handled by the Town Clearing to less than 5%.
4.2.2 Securities Transfer
Another comparatively recent development in the sterling money market has 
been the introduction of an electronic securities transfer system by the Bank 
of England. Following its successful introduction of a computerised settle­
ment system for gilt-edged securities in 1986, known as the Central Gilts 
Office, or CGO, the Bank introduced a similar system for money market se­
curities in 1990, known as the Central Moneymarkets Office, or CMO. By 
lodging securities such as bills, CDs and commercial paper with the Bank of 
England, and logging them onto CMO, they can then be transferred electroni­
cally between settlement members until they mature. This has the advantage 
of avoiding the expenses and risks associated with the physical transfer of se­
curities between counterparties 19. A further advantage is that negotiable 
securities can be dematerialised (i.e. rendered paperless), thus reducing the 
costs of printing and issuing such securities20. Most sterling money market 
securities, therefore, are now logged onto CMO and in 1992 some 247,000 
transactions were made through CMO, representing a nominal value of over 
£3000 billion.
There are currently about fifty financial institutions which are settlement 
members on CMO, comprising mainly the discount houses, clearing banks, 
merchant banks and other specialist institutions like Stock Exchange Money 
Brokers (SEMBs). These members have a book-entry account in their own 
name and, if they are not a settlement bank on CHAPS, must make arrange­
19These risks were well illustrated by the theft of nearly £300 million CDs from a City 
messenger in 1989.
20The Bill of Exchange Act, which governs the issue of bills, states th a t these m ust be 
in writing, which has prevented them from being dematerialised. Provision was made in 
the 1992 Finance Act 1992 to dematerialise CDs and commercial paper.
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ments with such a settlement bank to make and receive payments on their 
behalf for instruments transferred from and to other CMO members. Over 
two hundred additional firms then participate indirectly in CMO through 
agency arrangements with CMO members. When a security is purchased, 
the seller initiates its transfer to the purchaser and this transfer is then ac­
companied by a corresponding payment instruction to transfer funds from the 
purchaser to the seller. It is noteworthy that this payment instruction is not 
“assured”, and payment may thus be refused by the purchaser’s settlement 
bank (although this has not, as yet, happened in practice).
4.2.3 Settlem ent
In chapter 3 it was argued that, in the presence of a money market, banks do 
not have to hold many reserves for settlement purposes. Instead, they must 
estimate their expected settlement obligations and then borrow or lend funds 
in the money market so as to offset this obligation. This is precisely what 
settlement banks in the UK attem pt to do.
Recall that, in the UK, settlement banks face a daily reserve requirement, 
under which the Bank of England requires settlement members (i.e. clearing 
banks) to achieve at least a zero balance in their operational account by the 
end of each working day. In fact, clearing banks attem pt to meet a small, 
positive target reserve balance each day. The level of these target balances is 
negotiated on a bilateral basis between each clearing bank and the Bank of 
England. But it is extremely small when compared with the typical forecast 
errors made by a settlement bank in estimating its daily expected settlement 
obligation. A large clearing bank, for example, will only have to achieve a 
target balance of about £30 million, but may easily experience an error in 
its forecast settlement obligation of £150 million. This would imply that 
clearing banks regularly sustain either a negative closing reserve balance, 
thus violating their reserve requirement, or are left holding excess reserves 
at the end of the day, thus incurring an opportunity cost, neither of which 
is observed in practice. How, then, is it possible for settlement banks to 
ensure that they achieve their target closing reserve balance each day, given
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that their true reserve balance becomes known with certainty only after their 
settlement obligations are revealed (i.e. after markets are closed)?
The answer is that CHAPS settlement members have access to an ex-post 
money market of the type described in chapter 3. Upon being notified of their 
net CHAPS obligation at about 15hl5, settlement banks become virtually 
certain of their final reserve positions, since the only outstanding obligations 
are those of the Town Clearing, which only closes at 15h50. Since the Town 
Clearing now accounts for less than 5% of large-value payments, however, 
these obligations are relatively small as compared with those over CHAPS. 
Once they are informed of their reserve positions, those banks which find that 
their CHAPS obligations would leave them with a negative closing reserve 
balance will want to borrow from those banks which find that they would be 
left with excess reserves. The money market, however, is already closed and 
thus some other avenue for redistributing reserves must be available. This 
redistribution is thus achieved via the following informal agreement between 
the eight largest settlement banks.
Each week one settlement bank is designated as the “first lender” (other­
wise referred to as having “the chair”)21. This status entitles the bank to lend 
any excess reserves it may have to those banks whose operational accounts 
would be left in deficit at the end of the day. If, after the bank which is “first 
lender” has lent all its excess reserves, there remain banks which still need 
to borrow reserves, then the settlement bank with the largest excess reserve 
balance is designated as the next lender. This lending process continues until 
no bank will end the day with a negative reserve balance.
The rate of interest applied to these ex-post loans, which are extended 
on an overnight basis, is calculated as the highest rate at which at least two 
banks lent overnight funds during trading in the market that day. These 
ex-post transactions then constitute the final payment instructions over the 
Town Clearing, which still remains open until 15h50. In this way, therefore, 
all settlement members will typically be able to achieve their target balances.
21This privilege rotates amongst settlement banks on an alphabetical basis, i.e. Barclays, 
then Citibank, then Lloyds, etc.
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Of course, it may sometimes occur that aggregate reserves are insufficient, in 
aggregate, for these target balances to be achieved, in which case settlement 
banks must approach the Bank of England for overnight funds (see section
3).
4.2.4 Risks
The large daily payment values over CHAPS and the Town Clearing imply 
that settlement members incur substantial intraday exposures to one an­
other. This comes about because both the Town Clearing and CHAPS are 
net settlement systems, which means that payment instructions are made 
before funds are actually transferred. It is possible, therefore, that some 
settlement member may not be able to settle their obligation as a result of 
having insufficient reserves -  after borrowing -  in their operational account. 
This eventuality would expose the recipients of these (non)payments to losses, 
since these banks will themselves have made outgoing payments -  which they 
must honour since these are irrevocable -  on the assumption that their in­
coming payments would be settled. In the extreme case, non-settlement by 
one member may culminate in systemic settlement failure, as other members 
in turn become unable to settle their obligations.
To decrease the risk of such a systemic settlement failure, and to limit 
settlement exposures, CHAPS has introduced a number of short-term mea­
sures which include the imposition of bilateral net receiver limits and an 
agreement between settlement members that the settlement exposures in the 
system are equal to the net bilateral obligations (rather than gross bilateral 
obligations, which are significantly larger). In addition, settlement members 
observe self-imposed sender limits. To reduce settlement risks in the longer 
term, however, APACs has agreed to place CHAPS on to a real-time gross 
settlement (R tg s )  basis by the end of 199 522. This will mean that payment 
instructions over CHAPS will be settled continuously or, rather, as soon 
as they are made, i.e. funds will be transferred into a recipient’s operational
22The architecture of this proposed system is explained in detail in Bank of England 
(1994) and will not be presented here.
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account at virtually the same time that notice of payment is received. In con­
trast to existing settlement arrangements, where payments are made without 
reference to the existing reserve balance of the sender, R,TGS will mean that 
settlement members are subjected to a reserve-in-advance constraint, since 
they will not be able to make outgoing payments until they actually have 
sufficient reserves in their operational account to cover this payment.
The Bank of England, anticipating the possibility that R t g s  may slow 
payment traffic when aggregate reserves become too low (possibly even to the 
point where payment traffic ceases altogether, i.e. “gridlock”), has agreed to 
provide reserves to settlement members on an intraday basis. The reserves 
provided in this way will not attract an explicit cost, but will only be provided 
against approved collateral23 such as bills and government securities. Effec­
tively, then, payment arrangements on CHAPS will remain much the same 
under RTGS, except that receiving banks will no longer face any settlement 
exposures. The intraday availability of reserves will become more important, 
however, and there has been some speculation that R t g s  might lead to the 
emergence of an intraday market for reserves, e.g. a money market for loans 
with a maturity of several hours.
4.3 Bank o f England O perations
Until 1980 the Bank of England’s money market operations were, as detailed 
in chapter 1, primarily confined to open market bill transactions and lending 
via its discount facility. The Bank’s sole counterparties were the discount 
houses, who regularly approached the Bank for funds, usually by selling eli­
gible bills -  which then comprised mainly Treasury and local authority bills, 
but also included bank bills -  to the Bank, or by borrowing on a secured 
basis with bills as collateral. These funds were obtained, until 1972, either 
at existing market discount rates or at Bank rate, which was the Bank’s an­
nounced discount (lending) rate. The amount of funds obtained by discount
23Pledging collateral may well involve an opportunity cost, although this is difficult to 
measure in practice.
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houses in these operations, however, was not revealed to the wider market.
In October 1972 Bank rate was replaced by Minimum Lending Rate 
(MLR), whose determination was supposedly “market-determined”, in that 
the official rate was linked, by a formula, to the average rate established at 
the most recent weekly tender for three month Treasury bills. This formula, 
which meant that MLR was typically about above the Treasury bill rate, 
gave interest-rate expectations an important -  but not necessarily dominant 
-  role in the determination of official rates and resulted, on occasion, in mar­
ket and official interest rates being “ratcheted” upwards. For this reason, 
provision to override the formula was made, under which the Bank could 
make special changes in MLR. These changes were generally announced at 
midday on Thursdays (before the Friday auction of Treasury bills), with the 
new official rate established in this way becoming effective immediately and 
the formula suspended until market rates had moved into line with official 
rates24. Dissatisfaction with this mechanism led, in May 1978, to this formula 
being abolished, with MLR again being determined, as Bank rate had, by 
administrative decision. Changes in this rate were normally announced at 
12h30 on Thursday, with the new rate becoming effective immediately.
The late 1970s also saw a period of intense debate over the monetary 
control arrangements of the Bank which culminated, in March 1980, with the 
publication of an official (joint Bank and Treasury) discussion paper (known 
as a Green Paper) on monetary control, which even considered the possibility 
of money base control (HMSO 1980). In the event, the latter was not seen as 
a strong alternative to the Bank’s existing interest rate instrum ent25 and was 
also vigorously countered by the Bank (see Foot, Goodhart and Hotson 1980), 
which pointed to the operational problems associated with such a system 
(these were discussed in chapter 2). The Bank did, however, announce in
24In March 1977 the operation of the formula was modified: in cases where market rates 
moved downwards, the Bank now reserved the right either (i) to leave MLR unchanged, 
or (ii) to move it downwards but by less than would normally have been implied by the 
formula.
25Consider paragraph 4.15 of the Green Paper: “These difficulties are such th a t we 
doubt whether a m onetary base control system ... would produce the desired results” .
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November 1980 that it was considering changes to its operating procedures 
in the money market. These changes were to
place greater emphasis on open market operations and less on dis­
count window lending. It has been decided th a t these operations should 
continue to be conducted in the bill markets ... and in large part through the 
existing intermediaries [i.e. discount houses] ... to whom discount window 
facilities would remain confined” (Bank of England, 1980, p.428).
The Bank also envisaged keeping short-term money market rates within an 
officially determined, but unpublished, band, thereby ceasing to announce an 
official rate in the form of MLR. This was to be achieved by inviting discount 
houses to offer bills and then choosing a minimum discount rate at which 
it would accept these offers. Two subsequent announcements by the Bank 
in 1981 (Bank of England 1981a, 1981b) spelled out these changes in more 
detail (these also included modifications to banks’ liquidity requirements and 
also to the bill market, which are discussed in chapter 6) and announced 
that these would be introduced in August that year. However, by March the 
Bank had ceased to quote an official discount rate for bills and had asked its 
counterparties, the discount houses, to approach the Bank with offers to sell 
bills in two maturity bands, namely two weeks and one month. Furthermore, 
by July the Bank had begun to circulate, via the main press agencies, details 
of its daily operations, including its forecast of the money market shortage 
(see below), the amount of its bill transactions with the houses and the rates 
applied to these transactions.
The following sections now examine these operations, as have they been 
implemented since 1982, in greater detail.
4.3.1 T he M oney M arket Shortage
Each working day, at 9h45, the Bank of England publishes on Reuters its 
forecast of the money market shortage (or surplus) and its estimates of the 
various factors which will give rise to this shortage. Recall, from chapter 3, 
that the money market shortage (M ) may be defined as the net expected 
deviation in aggregate reserves (R ) below its target value (R ). In the UK
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this aggregate target is simply the sum of banks’ required daily target reserve 
balances (referred to as bankers’ balances), which total about £180 million.
Basically, there are four main factors which reduce bank reserves, and 
thereby create a money market shortage; in particular, banks’ aggregate re­
serves are reduced:
(i) when banks’ closing reserve balances on the previous day were below 
target: i.e R  — R t-\ > 0,
(ii) when the amount of currency in circulation, Ct, increases: i.e. Ct > 0,
(iii) when net disbursements from the government’s account at the Bank of 
England, Gt, which reflect items like tax payments to the government 
and government expenditure, are negative: i.e. Gt <  0, and
(iv) when net receipts by the Bank of England, A t , due to previous trans­
actions (such as a sale of gilts or foreign exchange), or due to maturing 
private sector assets held by the Bank, are positive: i.e. A t >  0.
The actual deviation in aggregate bankers balances (reserves) from their 
target level is then determined by the cumulative effect of these factors, i.e.
M  = (R  - R t) = (R -  R t-i)  +  Ct -  Gt + A t ,  (4.4)
which, if the left hand side is positive, is labelled as a money market shortage. 
Over the last fifteen years, this magnitude has almost always been positive 
(i.e. a shortage) and has been fairly large (i.e. almost always in excess of £100 
million, often in excess of £1000 million), usually due to either the influence 
of factors (iii) or (iv)26. In the absence of offsetting operations by the Bank 
of England, therefore, settlement banks will not only have systematically 
violated their reserve targets, but would also have been unable to meet their 
settlement obligations, since aggregate reserves will have been consistently 
negative. To avert this state of affairs, the Bank has provided reserves via 
two channels, namely open market operations and its discount facility.
26The government’s policy of overfunding, which is described in chapter 6, played an 
im portant role in creating such large shortages.
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4.3.2 O pen M arket O perations
In order to offset the impact of the money market shortage on banker’s bal­
ances (i.e. “remove” the shortage), the Bank of England must purchase 
financial assets from the private sector in an amount very close to the esti­
mated shortage. At the same time as it publishes its forecast, therefore, the 
Bank will usually invite its counterparties -  primarily the discount houses, 
although this group now also includes Stock Exchange money brokers and 
gilt-edged market makers -  to offer eligible bills for outright sale and/or for 
subsequent repurchase against same day cash settlement.
In the case of a repurchase agreement (or repo) involving bills, the Bank 
specifies the rate which will apply to the transaction, as well as the terminal 
date (or dates), which is typically between 14 days and one month. In the 
case of an outright sale, however, the Bank does not specify a rate and will 
purchase only those bills with an unexpired maturity of between 3 and 33 
days27. In addition, the Bank specifies that it will not purchase bills which 
were issued less than seven days previously.
The minimum discount rate which the Bank applies to its outright bill 
purchases is known as the stop rate: only offers at or above this rate are 
accepted. If the amount of acceptable offers exceeds the amount of the short­
age, the Bank will scale these offers so as not to provide reserves in excess 
of the shortage. The total amount of offers accepted, which is referred to as 
the amount of money market assistance, is then immediately published on 
Reuters.
Since the money market shortage is not accurately predictable, in par­
ticular because net reserve flows into government accounts at the Bank of 
England are not perfectly known, the Bank will often revise its announced
27In fact, the Bank splits the m aturity of its bill purchases into four different m aturity 
“bands” : band 1 (3-14 days), band 2 (15-33 days) band 3 (34-63 days) and band 4 (64-91 
days). Although the Bank has regularly bought band 3 and 4 bills in the past, it has 
not done so from September 1992 onwards. This is possibly because small “technical” 
adjustments in its band 3 and 4 dealing rates, which were made from time to time, became 
seen as a signal of an impending change in the Bank’s official rate.
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shortage. Given this uncertainty surrounding its forecasts of the shortage, 
the Bank will repeat its morning bill operations (if they occurred28) at noon 
and again at 14h00, usually with the same menu of transactions.
In the rare event of a money market surplus, the Bank invites its official 
counterparties and the clearing banks to bid for Treasury bills of one or more 
maturities for same day settlement. The Bank then accepts bids at the lowest 
rate offered, and thus the stop rate in this instance represents an unpublished 
selling rate rather than a buying rate.
In order to gain a clearer impression of the magnitudes involved in the 
Banks’ open market operations, consider the period between January 1992 
and October 1993 as an example. During this period, the average forecast 
shortage was just over £1 billion. This was revised almost every working day, 
with these revisions (which normally occur in increments of £50 million) rang­
ing between +£450 million and —£550 million. Since upward revisions were 
more frequent than downward revisions, the average revision was marginally 
positive and was about +£50 million.
Although bill repos have become increasingly prominent in recent years, 
outright bill purchases still form the bulk of the Bank’s transactions. In the 
period under consideration, for instance, outright purchases comprised 50% 
or more of the Bank’s total daily transactions on more than 75% of the days 
on which the Bank undertook open market operations.
A breakdown of the timing of the Bank’s open-market transactions dur­
ing this year revealed that, on most occasions (over 90%), more than half 
of the published shortage would remain outstanding after the Bank’s 9h45 
operations29. Conversely, on most occasions (over 90%) less than half of the 
revised shortage would remain outstanding after the Bank’s 14h00 opera­
tions. Against this basic pattern, however, were instances when the entire 
shortage was'removed during the morning operations (approximately 12% of
28In the event of a  shortage below approximately £700 million, the Bank will not nor­
mally conduct operations at 9h45.
29This frequency will be biased upwards by the fact th a t the Bank does not always 
conduct morning operations.
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the time) and instances when the entire shortage still remained after the af­
ternoon operations (approximately 6% of the time). It is difficult, therefore, 
to define a normal, or expected, pattern of timing for the Bank’s open market 
operations (this issue is discussed again in chapter 7).
4.3.3 D iscount w indow operations
In addition to these open-market transactions, which are concluded at 14h00, 
the Bank also makes same-day funds available to its official counterparties via 
a standing facility, which may be accessed from 14h45. Under this facility the 
discount houses may borrow an amount of up to twice their capital against 
collateral of eligible bills and gilt-edged securities with a maturity of under 
five years. Gilt-edged market makers and stock-exchange money brokers 
may also borrow under this facility, but their borrowing is limited to a lower 
proportion of their capital than the houses. In total, therefore, the amount of 
borrowing under the 14h45 facility is limited to approximately £750 million.
Requests to borrow under this standing facility which are submitted at 
14h45 carry a unpublished charge, although this is known to be at -  or 
marginally above -  the Bank’s (band 1) stop rate. The amount of 14h45 
borrowing, known as late assistance, is then published. Further requests 
for late borrowing may be made after 14h45, but these transactions are no 
longer published and will attract increasing rates of interest the later they 
are submitted.
The breakdown of the timing of the Bank’s operations for the period 
between January 1992 and October 1993 indicated that late assistance is 
granted with considerable frequency. However, whilst late assistance is of­
ten positive, the average amount of such assistance was typically less than 
one quarter of the average forecast shortage (i.e. less than £250 million). 
Nonetheless, on some occasions, roughly 6% of the time, the entire shortage 
has to be taken out via late assistance. This may pose problems when the 
shortage is large (i.e. in excess of £1 billion), since the capacity of the Bank’s 
official counterparties to borrow using late assistance has an upper bound of 
about £700 million. Effectively, therefore, the Bank’s official counterparties
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will then be borrowing funds from the Bank in excess of the stop rate. This 
begs a question: why is it ever the case that there is still a large shortage 
outstanding at 14h00 when there have been three opportunities for financial 
institutions to sell bills to (obtain reserves from) the Bank of England? The 
answer, it seems, is that institutions may face an incentive to delay the sale 
of bills to the Bank, and the next three chapters will each present an element 
of this incentive.
4.3.4 M oney m arket interest rates
In chapter 3 it was shown how a money market shortage was sufficient to 
drive short-term money market interest rates to equality with the lending 
rate of the central bank. Does this happen in practice? Evidence presented in 
Llewellyn (1990) as well as in figure 4.5, suggest an answer in the affirmative.
Figure 4.4 shows the official discount rate of the Bank of England, which 
between 1972 and 1981 was known as MLR and was announced by the Bank. 
Since 1981, when the Bank’s operating procedures were modified, this rate 
has been known as the stop rate and is an unpublished minimum discount 
rate. Given that the Bank operates in 4 (latterly only 2) m aturity bands, it 
may apply a marginally different stop rate in each of these bands. Usually, 
however, the Bank chooses these rates so as to make the corresponding yields 
in each m aturity band the same30 and hence figure 4.4. shows only the band 
1 stop rate. The current level of this rate is common knowledge amongst 
market participants, since the Bank publishes the rate at which it conducts 
its open-market operations each day. It is apparent from figure 4.4 that the 
Bank’s official rate does not fluctuate on a daily basis and is held constant by 
the Bank until economic conditions warrant either a higher or a lower rate. 
These changes in the Bank’s official rate are typically made in steps of |% , 
although larger changes (1%) and smaller changes ( \%)  are also observed.
Figure 4.5 plots the spread between the Bank’s official discount rate (on 
a yield basis) and one month LIBOR, and indicates that the latter rate has,
30This can be seen, from equation (4.2), to be consistent with lower discount rates in 
the longer m aturity bands.
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between 1975 and 1993, usually remained within 1 percentage point or less 
of the stop rate. It is noteworthy that the spread between LIBOR and the 
stop rate becomes considerably narrower after 1981, when the Bank adopted 
its new operating procedures, suggesting that these permitted the Bank to 
“smooth” money market interest rates to a greater extent than before. Never­
theless, this smoothing is not perfect and, occasionally, sustained deviations 
of market rates from the Bank’s official rate did occur. The following chapter 
therefore examines the transmission of official rates to market rates in greater 
detail.
4.4 Two recent developm ents
Since 1825 the Bank has not normally dealt directly with the clearing banks, 
although these banks do have a general invitation to sell Treasury bills and 
local authority bills directly to the Bank when open-market operations are 
being conducted. Since the stock of Treasury bills held by the clearing banks 
has been small in recent decades, and the rate at which they can sell these 
bills to the Bank has been marginally above the stop rate, this has occurred 
relatively infrequently.
In addition to these bill purchases the Bank has occasionally been willing 
to purchase gilt-edged stocks directly from banks for resale to them at a
future date in the event of particularly large money market shortages31. On 
such occasions, the Bank has announced in advance that it was offering a 
temporary facility to banks and announced the terms of this facility.
Apart from these channels, then, the clearing banks would seem to have 
been excluded from any direct role in the operations of the Bank. This is not 
accidental, according to Coleby (1982):
“An alternative means of putting cash into the system ... would have 
been for the Bank to lend directly into the interbank market. T hat method 
did not seem, on examination, to offer a satisfactory means of determining
31 Recall, from chapter 1, that repurchase agreements against consols were also the Bank’s 
earliest open-market operations.
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interest rates, because the highly concentrated structure of sterling deposit 
banking would have confronted the Bank with only a handful of large takers 
of funds - the clearing banks. Rate determination in those circumstances 
would have come close to a bilateral haggle. So the decision was taken to 
continue to provide cash through bill operations, dealing largely with the 
discount houses” (p.214).
When adopting its new operating arrangement in 1982, therefore, the Bank 
made it clear that it did not wish to deal directly with the clearing banks. 
Choosing to operate in the manner that it does, however, has not been suf­
ficient to avoid this outcome, since the clearing banks now own most of the 
non-official stock of eligible bills. W hat is more, recent changes in the Bank’s 
operations -  namely the introduction of a permanent gilt repo facility -  in­
dicate that the clearing banks have begun to play an explicit role in these 
operations, which is likely to increase in the future.
4.4.1 W ho owns sterling bills?
During the 1970s the Bank of England imposed statutory liquid asset re­
quirements at a common level across all UK banks, requiring them to hold 
stipulated reserve assets in proportion to a particular measure of their ster­
ling liabilities32. The reserve assets which had to be held to satisfy these 
requirements included eligible bills, gilts with a m aturity of under one year 
and secured deposits with the discount houses. Designating the latter as re­
serve assets was naturally favourable to discount houses, since it ensured a 
sizable flow of short-term funds to the houses, for which they did not have 
to compete, and allowed them to maintain large portfolios of bills and other 
short-term assets. The position of the houses as the major holders of eligible 
bills was further reinforced by the structure of liquidity requirements, which 
imposed a ceiling on the amount of bills which banks could hold in order to 
satisfy their requirement.
32Prior to  this, banks had “voluntarily” held a stable, sizable proportion of their assets 
in the form of liquid assets; see Bank of England (1962).
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Amongst the changes in the Bank’s operations in 1981 was the aban­
donment of these common liquidity requirements and their replacement by 
liquidity requirements which were negotiated on a bilateral basis between in­
dividual institutions and the Bank of England (see Bank of England 1981c). 
Thus although the definition of reserve assets didn’t change, institutions now 
had greater scope for holding liquidity in a form which they preferred, i.e. 
bills rather than secured money. To minimise the effects of these changes on 
the position of the houses and to bolster their role as official counterparties, 
the Bank stipulated that all eligible accepting institutions had to maintain 
an average equivalent of 6% of their eligible sterling liabilities in the form 
of secured money with the discount houses (or with the Bank’s other coun­
terparties). This requirement, known as “club money”, again guaranteed 
a sizeable flow of funds to the houses and maintained their position as the 
largest non-official holders of bills.
This position reached a turning point in 1987, however, when the “club 
money” requirement was abolished, leaving banks free to choose the propor­
tion of their liquid assets which they wished to keep in the form of secured 
money with the discount houses. Although many banks chose to continue 
placing “callable” funds with the houses, the larger clearing banks chose, in­
stead, to hold a greater proportion of their short-term liquid assets in the form 
of eligible bank bills. In the last few years this trend has been maintained, so 
that the clearing banks, as a group, are now the largest non-official holders 
of bills and now regularly own over 90% of non-official holdings. W ithin this 
group, the “big four” clearing banks are the major holders and account for 
over 80% of the groups’ holdings. Note that this is a fairly recent devel­
opment, with the major increase in clearing bank holdings occurring during 
1990 (see chapter 6).
Discount houses have thus had to contend with a marked reduction in 
their traditional sources of funds, and a concomitant decrease in their assets, 
particularly eligible bills. This has not been without consequence for their role 
as the official counterparties in the Bank’s operations. Instead of being active 
principals in these operations, which they have done for many years, discount 
houses are now virtually passive as counterparties, passing bills through to
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the Bank of England on behalf of the larger clearing banks (for details see 
Schnadt 1994a). Thus it is the clearing banks who have now become the de 
facto counterparties to the Bank. And, although this has not resulted in the 
determination of short-term interest rates via a “bilateral haggle” , it has had 
adverse consequences for the behaviour of money market interest rates, in 
particular very short-term rates. This issue, however, is addressed further in 
chapters 6 and 7.
4.4.2 G ilt repo
Although originally intended as a temporary measure, to be used only in 
the event of large money market shortages, the Bank’s gilt repo facility has 
recently become a permanent feature of its open market operations. This 
development has its origins in the recent ERM crisis during which the Bank 
-  on September 16, 1992 -  purchased vast amounts of sterling in support 
of the currency. Naturally, this generated large money market shortages -  
so large, in fact, that a continuation of the Bank’s normal bill purchases 
would have resulted in the Bank buying, on a single day, almost all eligible 
bills outstanding33. Consequently, the Bank announced that it would use 
its temporary facility to deal with this temporarily large shortage. Under 
this facility, all banks with eligible liabilities over £1.5 billion and the five 
largest building societies, were invited to offer gilt-edged securities to the 
Bank for subsequent repurchase one month later. This facility was subse­
quently rolled-over, usually on a monthly basis, each time that it matured, 
until the Bank proposed, in December 1993, to make this a permanent feature 
of its operations (see Bank of England 1993).
In particular, the Bank proposed that the repo facility be offered on a 
regular bimonthly timetable -  on the Thursday following the first and third 
Monday of every month -  with funds being provided either for two weeks or 
for one month, at the discretion of the counterparty34. These funds could be
33For an account of this episode, see Bank o f England Quarterly Bulletin , November 
1992, p.395.
34As in a conventional repurchase agreement, counterparties have to put up a cash
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applied for on the relevant Wednesday between lOhOO and llh45 -  once the 
Bank had confirmed the periods for which funds would be available and had 
announced the rates of interest which would apply -  by stating the amount 
of funds applied for at each maturity. The Bank would, by 12h45, announce 
on Reuters the total amount of funds provided at each maturity, and, if 
applications had been scaled back, the proportion by which applications at 
each maturity had been scaled.
The key innovation ushered in by these gilt repos, however, was the fact 
that the counterparties in these transactions could now be any bank or build­
ing society operating in the UK. For the first time, therefore, since 1825, the 
Bank had again elected to deal directly with banks. Should these repo facili­
ties be extended in the future, as they might, to replace the Bank’s daily bill 
operations, then there will no longer be a unique role for the Bank’s official 
counterparties, the discount houses. Of course, the houses may retain their 
role as specialist financial institutions, and possibly even as market makers 
in money market securities. But their central role, as the conduit through 
which the wider banking system obtained reserves from the Bank of England, 
will have ceased, and with it one of the oldest traditions in the sterling money 
market.
margin, in this case 2.5% of the consideration, to guard against adverse movements in the 
price of the securities.
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Table 4.1
Sterling m oney market instrum ents outstanding (1993)
In s tru m e n t T o ta l (£bn) P ro p o r t io n  (%)
Treasury bills 4.85 1.7
Bank bills 20.84 7.4
Certificates of Deposit 60.15 21.4
Commercial Paper 4.00 1.4
Secured loans 7.08 2.5
Unsecured loans 183.84 65.5
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (February 1994), and CSO 
Financial Statistics (April 1994).
Table 4.2
Paym ent statistics - average daily clearings (1993)
S y s te m D aily  V alue (£bn) D aily  V olum e (000’s)
CHAPS 91.5 42.0
Town Clearing 4.5 0.3
Source: APACs (December 1993).
C hapter 5
T he Term Structure o f  
M oney M arket Interest R ates
In order to insulate money market interest rates from the fluctuations 
which would accompany variations in banks’ aggregate reserves, the Bank 
of England undertakes to offset these aggregate reserve variations on a daily 
basis. The previous chapter has shown that the Bank does this by typically 
standing ready to lend reserves at its chosen stop rate, which is then trans­
mitted to other sterling money market interest rates. The precise manner 
of this transmission, however, has rarely been studied, although Llewellyn 
(1990) and Flemming and Barr (1989) are notable exceptions. From the de­
scription in the previous section it was seen that the Bank typically lends 
across a range of maturities, operating as it does by inviting institutions to 
sell bills in a number of m aturity bands. At which maturity, then, does the 
Bank’s influence lie? And, more importantly, how does the term  structure of 
interest rates in the money market behave when it is expected that the stop 
rate will change?
This chapter seeks to explore the relationship between the Bank’s stop 
rate and money market interest rates under the specific operating procedures 
adopted by the Bank, taking as its point of departure the intuition that 
institutions are not indifferent as to the maturity of the bills which they sell 
to the Bank (i.e. the maturity of the funds which they obtain from the Bank).
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For example, it seems reasonable that institutions would prefer to sell longer 
dated bills to the Bank when they are expecting an increase in the stop rate. 
This is because there exists a chance that the funds so obtained can be relent 
subsequently at a higher rate. But this means that the cost of short-term 
funds will not, in general, be equal to the stop rate, and will certainly not 
be independent of these maturity choices. W hat is more, short-term interest 
rates may, temporarily, even move in the opposite direction to the Bank’s 
intended stop rate change. This may frustrate the Bank’s intentions, causing 
it to move its stop rate sooner than it otherwise might have.
In order to address these issues, a model of money market interest rates 
is presented in section 2, in which expectations about an impending stop rate 
are summarised by a single parameter in a recursive structure1. This sim­
plified framework allows an analytic expression for the term structure to be 
derived, from which it is possible to evaluate the impact of an expected stop 
rate change on money market interest rates2. In section 3, after considering 
the effects of relaxing some of the assumptions underpinning the model, daily 
money market interest rate data is examined for the behaviour predicted by 
the model. Section 4 then discusses some of the consequences of this rate 
behaviour and suggests how it may be eliminated. Finally, section 5 contains 
some concluding remarks.
1This chapter is a revised version of a paper written with John W hittaker, which is 
forthcoming in The Manchester School. See Schnadt and W hittaker (1994b).
2For a model of the term  structure which investigates this for the US case see Balduzzi 
et al (1993).
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5.1 A m odel o f m oney market interest rates
5.1.1 A ssum ptions
The common situation in the sterling money market on any working day is a 
money market shortage, which is typically of the order of £1 billion. To offset 
this shortage, the Bank of England invites its designated counterparties to 
sell eligible bills for subsequent repurchase (i.e. via a repurchase agreement) 
or on an outright basis. On most working days, therefore, institutions can 
offer bills to the Bank under repurchase agreement, with the m aturity of 
these deals typically chosen by the Bank to be somewhere between 14 and 33 
days. Simultaneously, institutions can offer bills to the Bank for outright sale, 
although their unexpired maturity is subject to a maximum which is typically 
set by the Bank at 33 days. On those days (currently rare) on which there is 
a cash surplus, the Bank invites offers to buy Treasury bills to enable banks 
to avoid carrying excess reserve balances which earn zero interest.
Since the Bank always meets demands for reserves (or absorbs surpluses 
of reserves) in these ways, it is the rates of interest at which it is prepared to 
undertake these deals which determine sterling money market interest rates 
(see chapter 3). However, the relationship between official lending rates and 
market rates is not straightforward, due to two characteristics of the Bank’s 
current operating procedures. First, the Bank always offers to make loans 
for maturities which exceed one day and, secondly, market participants can 
typically exercise discretion over this maturity.
In order to model the implications of this discretion, the following simpli­
fying assumptions are made (the effects of relaxing some of these assumptions 
is discussed in section 2). First, the aggregate net reserve position in the 
money market each day is always a shortage, which is relieved by the Bank 
buying bills (either for subsequent resale or an outright basis): that is, the 
Bank always lends reserves. The rate at which it lends this cash is known 
as the stop rate, denoted by st, which is an unannounced minimum lending 
rate. Second, the asset portfolios of the Bank’s dealing counterparties always 
contain sufficient bills of all relevant maturities, so that their choice of bills to
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sell at any permitted maturity is not restricted by a lack of available paper. 
Third, participants in the money market are competitive, immune to default 
risk and hold the same expectations at any time; this allows the existence 
of a unique market rate of interest for each type and m aturity of loan con­
tract. Finally, money market participants are risk neutral, implying that the 
expectations hypothesis of the term structure applies exactly3.
Under these simplifying assumptions, money market institutions collec­
tively may be treated as a single unit (i.e. a representative bank) whose only 
decision variable is the maturity at which to borrow from the Bank. Profit 
maximisation implies that this maturity is chosen so as to minimise the in­
terest cost of obtaining reserves each day from the Bank, given expectations 
of the future path of the stop rate and the assumption that optimisation 
will be conducted in the same way in the future. Individually, institutions 
price-take both the market cost of funds (represented by the money market 
term structure) and the cost of funds at the Bank (stop rate), and will ex­
ploit any arbitrage opportunities. This behaviour then implies that points 
on the term structure (or yield curve) reflect the cheapest expected cost of 
borrowing from the Bank, given current and expected future spot rates.
When news causes expectations of the future path of the spot rate to be 
revised, the term structure instantly assumes the shape which is consistent 
with the above optimising behaviour under the new information set. The 
behaviour of money market interest rates under these assumptions is now 
studied.
5.1.2 The general framework
In practice, money market loan contracts are always for an integral number 
of days, with one day being the shortest contractible maturity. It is therefore 
appropriate to discuss the determination of the market rate of interest for one 
day loans4, which is denoted by it . Under the assumptions of homogenous
3Cuthbertson (1992) and Hum, Moody and Muscatelli (1993) find empirical support 
for the expectations hypothesis in the term  structure of UK money m arket rates.
4These are referred to as overnight loans, and are discussed in detail in chapter 7.
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expectations and risk neutrality, the relationship between one day rates and 
longer rates is then given by the expectations hypothesis,
1 m —1
i?  = - T E t ( i t+j) ,  (5.1)
m z 'j - 0
where i™ is the m day rate on day t (with interest understood to be com­
pounded daily) and the Et operator denotes the mean of the probability 
distribution of its argument given information available at time t.
An institution seeking to borrow one day funds from the Bank of Eng­
land on day t can do so in number of ways. In particular, it can sell a bill 
whose unexpired maturity is n 6 {n , . . . ,  n}, where n and h are, respectively 
the shortest and the longest maturity which the Bank will accept, and then 
lending the borrowed funds in the money market from day t +  1 to day t +  n. 
Using (5.1), the expected cost of one-day funds via these alternative routes, 
denoted as c*(n), can be expressed as a function of the stop rate and future 
one day rates:
n — 1
ct(n) = nst ~ Y ^ E t ( it+j ) , n 6 {n , . . . ,  n}, (5.2)
- j =i
where st is the Bank’s official stop rate for lending (via outright purchase 
or repurchase of bills) at all acceptable maturities on day t. Thus, if the 
Bank bought bills which had only one day left to run, i.e. n =  1, institutions 
could obtain one day funds directly, at a cost equal to the stop rate st . If 
institutions chose to obtain one day funds by selling a longer dated bill to the 
Bank, i.e. n > 1, then their cost of one day money would depend not only 
on the current stop rate, but also on the rate(s) at which they could relend 
funds for the remaining n — 1 days.
As discussed in chapter 3, money market shortages, together with compe­
tition between market participants, will imply that the market one day rate 
is driven to equality with the cost of obtaining one day funds from the Bank:
?t(n) =  ct(n) , (5.3)
which will, in this case, be a function of the maturity of the paper which is 
sold to the Bank and over which market participants have discretion. Profit- 
maximisation on each day t  implies that market agents choose the maturity
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of their borrowing from the Bank so as to minimise C f ( n ) ,  with the result 
that the one day rate is determined by
i* =  min { c*(n) | n =  n , . . . ,  n} . (5.4)
The current one day rate i* thus depends, in general, upon expected one 
day rates Et(it+j), j  > 0, which depend, in turn, upon expected future stop 
rates. The next section thus derives a simplified version of the manner in 
which expectations of future stop rates are formed in practice.
5.1.3 E xpectations o f stop  rate changes
It is evident, from the discussion in chapter 4, that when the Bank changes 
its stop rate, this is always done in discrete steps, invariably of |  % or 1% up 
or down, with the stop rate being constant in between these changes. Whilst 
the Bank does not preannounce rate changes, it does provide signals as to the 
general direction of its future policy5. Moreover, money market participants 
are aware of how the Bank has responded in the past to the various economic 
data which it considers relevant. Based on this information, the likely form 
of expectations at any moment is that market participants expect, say, a |  % 
change in the stop rate but are unsure of the date of this change. Expectations 
of this date should, however, become firmer as the event approaches.
To simplify the problem at hand, therefore, it is assumed that on any day 
t market participants expect a change in the stop rate of a known magnitude 
with the rate staying constant thereafter6. They do not, however, know the 
timing of this change, so it is necessary to specify the probability of the change 
in the stop rate occurring on each day t +  h  J > o.
5Such signals may be explicit policy announcements, or more subtle messages transm it­
ted via the Bank’s dealing patterns in the market. Market participants are also aware of 
the general form of the Bank’s reaction function  and will thus come to expect an interest 
rate reaction depending on the behaviour of certain economic indicators.
6This is probably a poor representation of expectations when the stop ra te is changing 
frequently. An alternative representation, which yields qualitatively the same results, is 
th a t future rate changes are expected to follow a  Poisson process.
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One way to proceed would be to make the problem finite, by assuming 
that agents believe the change will definitely occur by some date t + j  =  r , 
and then assigning probabilities Pt(t+j)  as viewed from day t that the change 
will take place on each day in the interval. Working backwards in time from r , 
and assuming optimal choices of maturity n  on each day, it would be possible 
to solve for rt using dynamic programming techniques.
There are two drawbacks to this approach. In the first place, the general 
solution quickly becomes intractable as the number of days t — t on which 
the rise may occur increases. In the second place, it is not plausible that 
agents should assume the change in the stop rate must occur before some 
fixed date r. This would imply agents believe now that if, on the future day 
t — 1, the change has still not occurred, they will then believe it must occur 
on the following day.
To overcome these drawbacks, a model in which probabilities of a stop 
rate change have a recursive structure is proposed. This leaves undefined 
the time horizon for the occurrence of the rate change and admits a simple 
analytical formulation of the term structure of interest rates.
Let the current stop rate have the value so, and let p t (t  +  1) be the 
probability that this will change to Si  on the next day t  + 1. Now assume 
that this probability has the same value on all the following days t  +  j  on 
which the change has not occurred, i.e. pt+ j( t  +  j  + 1) =  Pt(t  -f 1) =  p , where 
0 < p < 1. In other words, if the stop rate change has not  occurred by day 
t  +  j ,  i.e. s t+j = s0, then
si with probability p 
So with probability 1 — p .
Alternatively, if the stop rate change has occurred by day t + j ,  i.e. st+j =  s1? 
then by assumption st+j+k =  $i, k =  1, . . . ,  oo.
With this structure, p is the only variable which measures the probability 
of a stop rate change on future days. Loosely expressed, a higher value of 
p signifies an increased probability that the change will occur sooner, rather 
than later: if p =  1 then market participants are certain that the stop rate 
will change on the following day.
s t+j+ i  —  <
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5.1.4 T he term  structure
Consider, first, the situation after the stop rate has changed. By assumption, 
market participants now know for certain that the stop rate will remain 
constant at Si7. Given continuing cash shortages, the cost of borrowing one- 
day funds from the Bank on the day of the stop rate change is, from (5.2), 
Ct =  s1? and is independent of the maturity of paper sold to the Bank. This 
is true for all future days as well, which implies that, in the absence of any 
expected change in the Bank’s stop rate, it =  si for all t. From (5.1) it is 
then clear that the term structure is flat, i.e. i™ =  $i, m > 1.
Now consider the situation before the stop rate change has occurred, i.e. 
p > 0. Given the above structure of probabilities the optimisation problem on 
each day t+ j  is the same as on day t for as long as the stop rate change has not 
occurred. Hence it+j = it if st+j =  s0, otherwise it+j = s\. The probability 
on day t that the stop rate rise will not occur during the following j  days is 
(1 — p ) \  and thus
E t ( it+j ) =  (1 -  p )3 it +  (1 -  (1 -  p Y )  s i . (5.5)
Substituting this into (5.2), with st =  s0, gives the expected cost of obtaining 
one day funds from the Bank of England, and hence the one day market rate, 
as
i,(n) = c,(n) =  a, -  (a, -  a0) L  _  pjnJ  > (5-6)
where n £ {n, . . . , n } .  Recall that the one day rate is then derived, from 
(5.4), by market participants choosing that maturity n of borrowing from the 
Bank which minimises (5.6).
Inspection of (5.6) indicates that it(n) is a monotonic function of n, which 
is increasing when si < So and decreasing when Si > So. This ensures that 
there will be unique, optimal choice of n, denoted by n*, which then depends
7Essentially, this assumes th a t p takes on a value of zero once the stop rate has changed. 
Although patently unrealistic, this assumption is of limited consequence to the analysis 
since it is the behaviour of market participants before an imminent change in the stop rate 
which is of prim ary interest.
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only upon the direction of the stop rate change, i.e. on the value of Si relative 
to 50.
Before investigating the optimal choice of maturity in more detail, note 
that the term structure can be expressed as a function of n*. Substituting 
(5.6) into (5.5) gives the expected one day rate as
£<(*<+>) = -  («i - * . )  (rll-pr) ’
which, from (5.1), gives an expression for the term structure:
The shape of this term structure depends on the unexpired m aturity of 
the bills which institutions will, at any time 1, choose to sell to the Bank 
of England. The term structure equation (5.7) indicates that, in general, 
market rates will not be equal to the Bank’s current stop rate. Indeed, the 
only market rate which will remain equal to the Bank’s stop rate is the m-day 
rate whose maturity m  corresponds to the maturity of the bills n* which are 
sold to the Bank, i.e.
* ? V )  = «o.
It will now be shown via some examples that the behaviour of all other 
market rates falls into one of two categories, depending on their maturity. 
Market rates for which m  > n* will correctly anticipate the new expected stop 
rate. Thus, if the stop rate is expected to rise these rates rise above the 
current stop rate and if the stop is expected to fall these rates fall below 
the current stop. Money market rates for which m  < n* will do just the 
reverse, i.e. they will move in the opposite direction to the expected stop rate 
change. In general, therefore, the expectation of a stop rate change causes 
the yield curve to “pivot” about the maturity m =  n*, with the direction of 
this pivoting being determined by the direction of the stop rate change (i.e. 
the sign of Si — s0) and the extent of the pivoting being determined by the 
strength of expectation (i.e. the magnitude of p).
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5.1.5 A  num erical exam ple
The behaviour of market rates in this model is now illustrated for the case in 
which agents expect a |  % change in the stop rate from so =  10%. Values for 
n and n are assumed, for the purposes of the example, to be 3 days and 14 
days respectively8. Using these parameters, figure 5.1 plots how the cost of 
one-day funds, given by equation (5.6), varies with the unexpired maturity n 
of bills sold to the Bank, given some assumed probability p of the stop rate 
change.
Consider, first, an expected fall in the stop rate, i.e. Si — So =  
Figure 5.1 verifies that the cost of one day funds (5.6) is then monotonically 
increasing9 in n. Given that institutions will always want to obtain the 
cheapest possible one day funds, they will obviously prefer to sell bills to the 
Bank which have the shortest permissible maturity, hence n* =  3. For this 
choice of maturity, the one day rate is
which is above the current stop rate for p > 0. Intuitively, this is because 
institutions are effectively being locked into borrowing at the existing stop 
rate when they expect this rate to fall in the near future. Thus they are 
borrowing funds at a higher rate than they expect, on average, to earn when 
they subsequently relend these funds10. From (5.7), the term  structure is 
then
=  9 . 5  + _L f 1 - ( 1 - r i m
1 2m  \  1 — (1 — p)3
This is plotted in figure 5.2 (for two values of p). The figure indicates 
that the term structure for m < 3 lies above the current stop rate, and very
8The choice of n =  3 days is in keeping with the Bank’s practice of never buying bills 
with an unexpired m aturity of less than three days. The choice of n =  14 days is made 
since this is the cut-off m aturity for band 1 bills.
9Higher values of p increase the slope of this cost function.
10This implicit penalty is clearly higher the longer the unexpired m aturity of the bills 
which are sold to the Bank, which is why the cost function is increasing in n, and also why 
institutions will choose to sell bills with the shortest permissible m aturity (n =  3).
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short-term interest rates thus move in the opposite direction to the expected 
stop rate change. Conversely, m-day rates for m  > 3 lie below the current 
stop rate, approaching the new stop rate asymptotically with higher values of 
m. Market interest rates at all maturities m >  3 thus anticipate the expected 
fall in the stop rate in a well behaved manner. Notice that, when p rises, 
indicating a shortening of the expected interval to the stop rate fall, the term 
structure “pivots” in a clockwise manner, with the pivotal maturity being at 
m  =  3.
In the case of a stop rate rise, i.e. Si — s0 =  | ,  figure 5.1 shows that 
the cost of one day funds, equation (5.6), is monotonically decreasing11 in n. 
The optimal strategy for money market institutions, who wish to minimise 
their cost of one day funds, is thus to borrow from the Bank of England for 
the longest possible period. Hence n* =  14 in this case. For this choice of 
unexpired m aturity the one day rate is
•' = 10-s - 7 ( h r 5) •
which is below the current stop rate for p > 0. Now, contrary to the case 
of the stop rate fall, institutions are faced with an opportunity to “lock in” 
funds at the existing stop rate which they expect, on average, will earn a 
higher return due to the impending stop rate rise. Their implied cost of one 
day funds is thus lower than the stop rate12. From (5.7), the term structure 
is then:
r* =  io.5 - 1  ( ' - ( ' - p r ' |
1 m \1  — (1 — p)14)
This is plotted in figure 5.3 (for two different values of p), which shows 
that the term structure for m  < 14 lies below the current stop rate. Longer 
term rates, for m  > 14, anticipate the change in the stop rate and lie above 
the current stop rate. Now, when p rises, indicating a strengthening of ex­
11 As with the case of the stop ra te rise, the slope of the cost function is steeper the 
higher is the probability p.
12This profitable opportunity naturally  increases with the unexpired m aturity of the
bills sold to  the Bank, which is why the cost of one day funds falls with n, and also why
institutions will want to sell bills with the longest permissible unexpired m aturity (h =  14).
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pectations about the stop rate increase, the term structure “pivots” in an 
anti-clockwise direction, with the pivotal maturity being at m  = 14.
5.1.6 A sym m etric pivoting
An asymmetry in the behaviour of the term structure of money market in­
terest rates between an expected fall and an expected rise in the stop rate 
is clearly evident from figures 5.2 and 5.3. In particular, the m aturity about 
which the term structure “pivots” in each scenario is different. This comes 
about because institutions can exercise discretion over the maturity at which 
they borrow from the Bank of England, i.e. because n < h .  This discretion is 
irrelevant when the stop rate is not expected to change, since the cost of one 
days funds from the Bank is the same regardless of the unexpired maturity 
of the bills sold to the Bank. When the stop rate is expected to change, how­
ever, the cost of one day funds is not the same under all choices of unexpired 
maturity. Institutions thus exercise their discretion, choosing to sell bills with 
the shortest (permitted) unexpired maturity when the expected change is a 
fall in the stop rate and the longest (permitted) unexpired m aturity when 
the expected change is a rise in the stop rate.
The source of institutions’ discretion over the unexpired maturity of the 
bills which they sell to the Bank -  and hence of the asymmetric behaviour 
of the term structure -  is the Bank’s chosen policy of buying bills with a 
range of unexpired maturities. The asymmetry would disappear if the Bank 
of England chose, instead, to supply cash by buying bills of a single unexpired 
maturity, say 14 days. This would leave institutions no choice but to borrow 
at this maturity, i.e. n =  h =  14 days, and would cause the asymmetry out­
lined in the example to disappear13. The term structure would thus continue 
to pivot14, but in a symmetric fashion about the maturity m =  14 days.
13This would hardly be a sensible m ethod of operating, given th a t the extant stock of 
bills with an unexpired m aturity  of exactly 14 days is unlikely to be very large. A much 
more practical alternative, which would eliminate term structure pivoting altogether, is 
suggested in section 3.
14Albeit in opposite directions, depending on the expected stop rate change.
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Given that the Bank does not operate this way in practice, the asymmetry 
observed in the example provides a convenient means of testing the above 
model: short-term sterling interest rates should show different behaviour 
ahead of an expected stop rate fall than ahead of an expected stop rate rise. 
Specifically, the term structure of money market interest rates should reflect 
the asymmetric behaviour outlined above. In cases where the stop rate is 
expected to rise, some short term rates should be below the stop rate, whilst 
longer rates should anticipate this rise (as in figure 5.3). In cases where the 
stop rate is expected to fall, almost all money market rates should anticipate 
this fall (as in figure 5.2). This is, however, not the only empirical implication 
of the model.
The actual time path in this model of the one day rate and hence all other 
longer term rates, naturally depends on how p changes over time. Although 
this has not been modelled explicitly, the likely pattern is that p fluctuates 
but generally rises towards unity (i.e. expectations become firmer) as the 
date of a change in the stop rate is approached. From figures 5.2 and 5.3 it 
is clear that changes in p imply more dramatic changes in very short term 
rates than in longer term rates. Thus another implication of the model is 
that shorter term rates should be more volatile than longer term  rates.
Again, however, the effects should be asymmetric. Specifically, instances 
when the stop rate is expected to rise should be associated with greater 
volatility in money market rates, over a wider range of maturities, than in­
stances when the stop rate is expected to fall.
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5.2 Em pirical evidence
5.2.1 R elaxing th e assum ptions
Before confronting the data, it is necessary to mention two possible ways 
in which the assumptions of section 1 may be infringed in practice, thereby 
reducing the clear asymmetry which is being sought.
First, there are ways in which the Bank of England might deliberately 
forestall the cheap borrowing opportunity ahead of a rate rise. It could do 
this, for example, by buying securities so as to bring about money market 
surpluses on the days immediately preceding the rise15. Alternatively, the 
Bank could, under its current operating procedures, purposely opt to buy 
only band 1 (3 to 14 day) bills on these days, or offer only a repurchase 
agreement with an even shorter maturity, which would reduce the opportu­
nity. In practice, however, the second of these actions would suffer from the 
disadvantage that they could be interpreted as confirmation of the Bank’s 
intention to raise rates. This would cause p to rise which, according to figure 
5.1, would in turn act to increase the spread between very short-term rates 
and the existing stop rate, thus potentially counteracting the effects of the 
Bank’s preemptive action.
Secondly, and more seriously, it is often the case that the size of the money 
market shortage represents a significant fraction of the total outstanding value 
of eligible bills. The assumption that institutions always have sufficient bills 
of the maturity which they would prefer to sell to the Bank is therefore 
unlikely to be satisfied at all times, a fact which is substantiated in the 
following chapter, which looks more closely at the sterling bill market16. As 
shown in figure 5.1, when a stop rate fall is expected institutions will choose
15In the event of a surplus, the Bank borrows rather than lends funds at the stop rate. 
As shown in chapter 3, by standing ready to borrow funds when the money m arket is in 
surplus the central bank places a floor on money market rates.
16 As evidence of this, note th a t 7-day LIBOR was often higher than the stop rate during 
the period of declining rates from October 1990 onwards (see figures 5.4 and 5.5), which 
would be consistent with a  shortage of short dated bills.
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to rediscount bills with the shortest possible unexpired maturity n =  3. If 
they can only rediscount longer dated bills, this would mean that the cost 
of short term  funds ahead of a stop rate fall would be higher than suggested 
by the figure, and the pivotal maturity would be at some longer maturity 
n > 3. In the case of rising stop rates, a shortage of bills with long unexpired 
maturity would work in this same direction and would tend to reduce the 
amount by which money market rates fell below the stop rate.
In summary, these violations of the assumptions, especially the second, 
imply that our predictions should be qualified; they imply that money market 
rates may in practice rise by somewhat more than suggested by the model 
before a fall in the stop rate, and fall by somewhat less than predicted before 
an expected rise in the stop rate.
W ith the above qualifications in mind, the remainder of this section seeks 
to verify the presence in sterling money market interest rates of the predicted 
behaviour. Given the difficulty of observing the magnitude of expectational 
variables, no attem pt is made to relate theory to fact quantitatively, although 
it is still necessary to identify points in time at which the stop rate was 
expected to change. Inspection of the time path of the stop rate (figure 5.4 
and 5.5) shows obvious autocorrelation in the movements of this rate. Over 
relatively long periods, therefore, the stop rate was either rising, constant, or 
falling, and these periods have been identified from figures 5.4 and 5.5 as:
S to p  R a te P e r io d D ays
Increasing 6 Jun  8 8 - 4  Oct 89 348
Constant 5 Oct 89 - 3 Oct 90 260
Decreasing 4 Oct 90 -4 Sept 91 240
It is assumed in what follows that during these periods of rising (falling) 
stop rates, there was a general expectation that the next stop rate change 
would be in the same direction. For these periods, then, three key statistics 
were examined, namely the level of money market rates relative to the stop 
rate, the volatility of money market rates, and market rate behaviour in the
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period immediately surrounding a stop rate change. Although the shortest 
maturity interest rate in the sterling money market is one day (i.e. overnight), 
there are several other important features of the overnight market which 
affect rates there (see chapter 7), making them a particularly poor variable 
for purposes of investigating the term structure behaviour outlined above. 
For this reason, the next section utilises daily data for seven day, one month 
and three month interest rates on unsecured sterling deposits, all of which 
are heavily traded each day17.
5.2.2 M arket rates relative to  th e stop  rate
The model which has been presented above proposes that market rates up 
to maturity m < h should lie below the stop rate ahead of an expected rise 
in the stop rate, whilst such pivoting behaviour of the term structure should 
be virtually undetectable in the case of a stop rate fall. The mean differ­
ences between various interbank rates and the stop rate (i™ — st) were thus 
calculated18 for each of the three periods identified above and are provided 
in table 5.1.
For the rising period, the mean differences for both the 7-day rate and the 
1 month rate are significantly less than zero, showing that, on average, i™ is 
less than st despite the qualifications discussed above. For the falling period, 
the positive differences for these maturities can be taken as a measure of the 
effect of the shortage of eligible bills discussed in the previous subsection. 
The fact that these signs are reversed for the 3 month rate indicates that the 
“normal” effect of expectations (i.e. market rates anticipating the direction 
of the stop rate change) is dominant at this maturity, which is consistent 
with the notion of “pivoting” presented in the model.
17These data  were obtained from Richard Pattinson (Barclays), and are LIBOR rates 
taken off Reuters a t approximately llhOO daily.
18Note th a t LIBOR rates are yields, whereas the stop rate is a discount rate. All data  
were thus converted to continuous compound yields to facilitate valid comparison.
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5.2.3 R ate  vo latility
In section 1 it was shown that variations in the probability of a future change 
in stop rate (a shift in expectations) are associated with greater variations 
in market rates when that change is a rise than when it is a fall. On the 
assumption that the pattern of changing expectations whilst rates are rising 
is similar to that during falling rates, the implication is that market rates for 
shorter maturities should exhibit more volatility when rates are rising than 
when they are falling. In the latter case, however, market rates at very short 
maturities should nonetheless be somewhat more volatile than those at longer 
maturities. To examine this behaviour, the standard deviation of day-to-day 
first differences of these and longer term rates was computed over each of the 
three designated periods and are provided in table 5.2.
The table indicates that volatility is similar across these different m atu­
rities when the stop rate is constant and it is greater in all cases when the 
stop rate is changing. Comparing the rising and falling periods, the volatility 
of shorter term  rates (7 day and 1 month) is higher when the stop rate is 
rising than when it is falling, but this difference is not apparent in the case of 
the longer term  rates (3 month). These findings are thus in accordance with 
the predictions. Note that in the case of the 1 month rate, this difference 
in volatility between the rising and falling periods is significant at the 95% 
confidence level.
5.2.4 R ate behaviour around a change in stop rate
The above tests have compared averages over the periods of rising and falling 
rates respectively. Whilst their results are conclusive, these tests are crude 
in that no attention is given to the behaviour of market rates just ahead of 
the rise (fall).
It has been asserted above that knowledge of the timing of an imminent 
change in the stop rate may become more precise as the date of the change 
approaches. This implies, in the case of a rise in the stop rate, that money 
market rates should first fall and then rise abruptly when the stop rate rises.
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Sharp increases should therefore be visible when comparing market rates on 
the day of the rise with those a few days preceding this. The symmetrically 
opposite effect preceding a rate fall should, however, be virtually absent, since 
the firming of expectations in this case rather implies a smooth transition of 
nearly all market rates to the new stop rate.
Following Dale (1992), the changes in the 1 month rate in the 3 days prior 
to changes in the stop rate (i.e. from day r  — 3 to day r )  were computed. 
These changes, expressed as a percentage of the change in the stop rate and 
averaged over increases and decreases respectively in the stop rate between 
June 1988 and September 1991, are shown in table 5.3.
As it turns out, the mean change for the rate increases is greater than 
the mean change at the decreases at the 99% confidence level, which again 
convincingly confirms the presence of the effect which is being sought. The 
1 month rate rises, on average, by nearly the amount of the stop rate during 
the 3 days before a rise in the stop rate, whilst the symmetrical effect at a 
rate fall is not significant.
5.3 A ssessm ent
5.3.1 Problem s
By standing ready to lend reserves on a daily basis, the Bank of England 
clearly reduces the fluctuations in money market interest which would oth­
erwise occur in response to movements in aggregate reserves. Using the ter­
minology of chapter 2, it is evident that the Bank of England engages in 
“smoothing” of money market interest rates. It has been shown above, how­
ever, that by choosing to operate in the manner that it does, the Bank does 
not smooth these rates perfectly. Indeed, the Bank’s operations may, through 
market expectations of changes in its official rates, actually impart fluctua­
tions to money market interest rates. Clearly these rate fluctuations -  which 
may be considerable -  are confined to very short-term interest rates, and are 
thus of limited macroeconomic significance. This does not mean, however,
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that they do not carry any negative consequences.
Volatile money market interest rates, even if these are very short-term 
rates, pose problems for financial institutions. Recall from chapters 3 and 4 
that markets in very short-term loans, such as overnight loans, are precisely 
those markets which are favoured by banks and other financial institutions 
for purposes of reserve (cash) management. Given the repetitive but random 
nature of day-to-day fluctuations in the reserve needs of financial institutions, 
they will rationally choose to manage these temporary fluctuations with in­
struments of a very short maturity. Borrowing or lending long-term funds 
to deal with temporary reserve needs would expose financial institutions to 
greater, and unnecessary, interest rate (price) risks, it would also typically 
require a larger -  and more costly given the existence of a spread -  volume of 
borrowing or lending for a given sequence of temporary reserve disturbances, 
since these disturbances tend to be distributed around zero. Of course, when 
very short-term interest rates are volatile and less predictable, reserve man­
agement using these short-term instrument is likely to become more difficult 
and more costly. Banks may then be induced to pursue more conservative 
reserve management strategies to avoid paying what they perceive as penal 
rates of interest, when these are temporarily high. They will also, in turn, 
pass on some of these costs to their customers. In sum, therefore, increased 
volatility in very short-term interest rates is likely to be consistent with a less 
efficient money market, at least as far as its role in redistributing reserves is 
concerned.
Interest rate volatility is not, however, the most problematic aspect of 
the Bank’s operations. More troubling is the fact that they may cause some 
money market interest rates to move in the opposite direction to an impending 
change in official rates. Clearly this change in the monetary instrument is only 
considered necessary by the Bank because a policy target, for example the 
price level or an exchange rate, is, or is expected to, diverge from its desired 
range and a higher or lower level of short-term interest rates is seen as the 
required step to correct this divergence. Of course, expectations on the part of 
market participants will, through adjustments in the term structure, initiate 
this process, thereby reinforcing the Bank’s intentions. Hawtrey (1938), in
162 CHAPTER 5.
his study of Bank rate, recognised this importance of expectations in what is 
now referred to as the transmission mechanism:
when the use of Bank rate to restrict credit became an established 
practice, traders, being aware of the intentions of the Bank, were inclined to 
anticipate them . When Bank rate went up ... a trader would reason th a t 
this was intended to have a restrictive effect on markets, and that, if the 
effect was not brought about, the rate would simply go higher and higher 
until it was .... [These] psychological reactions are in reality no more than a 
tendency which in any case exists. Were they absent, th a t would only mean 
that Bank ra te would have to be raised higher” (pp.249-250).
The model in this chapter has shown that, by operating in the manner 
that it does, the Bank of England provides less scope for these anticipatory 
forces to work since, until the Bank actually does change its official lending 
rate, some short-term rates will behave in a manner which clearly frustrates 
the Bank’s intentions. While this may be of limited relevance when the 
Bank is targeting the price level, which depends to a significant extent on 
longer-term nominal interest rates, it is of considerable relevance when the 
Bank is targeting an exchange rate, which is far more sensitive to the level of 
short-term interest rates. Until sterling was withdrawn from the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September 1992, the exchange rate was an im­
portant policy target. And, whilst the Bank’s operating procedures can on 
no account be held responsible for the inability of sterling to be kept within 
its designated ERM band, they consistently made it cheaper, rather than 
more expensive, to speculate against the currency. Repeated announcements 
by the monetary authorities and the government that they were prepared to 
raise official interest rates led, on several occasions during 1992, to short-term 
interest rates falling below the Bank’s official rates (see figure 5.6). Conse­
quently, adopting a short position in sterling by borrowing the currency on 
a short-term basis to purchase another currency (e.g. Deutschemarks) was 
therefore made cheaper at precisely the time that this behaviour should have 
been penalised, making the exchange rate target harder to maintain.
Whilst the significance of this errant interest rate behaviour should not be 
overemphasised, it remains true that it has on occasion -  by the Bank’s own 
admission -  led to official interest rates being moved sooner than intended:
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“ This development [ie. a cut in the US discount rate] immediately led to 
expectations of further reductions in interest rates in the United Kingdom ....
The Bank moved its dealing rates down by 0.5% in the early part of th a t week.
This move was made more quickly than in earlier episodes because it had 
proved difficult at times in the past to secure sufficient offers o f bills to meet 
the cash shortages during periods when the B ank’s dealing rates had entered 
a phase o f gradual reduction and when there were very confident expectations 
that they had further to fa l l” (Bank o f England Quarterly Bulletin , December 
1982, p.484; emphasis added).
This illustrates a recurring problem in the Bank’ operations. When the Bank 
is expected to lower its stop rate, institutions become reluctant to offer longer- 
dated bills for sale to the Bank, which means that the money market shortage 
is not removed during the Bank’s open market operations. Instead, institu­
tions rely increasingly upon the Bank’s discount facility for this purpose, 
where secured funds are available, usually at a short m aturity (overnight). 
This tends to cause very short-term (i.e. overnight) money market rates to 
“spike” upwards, since the wider market remains short of reserves until fairly 
late in the day and the funds which are borrowed from the Bank may attract 
a higher interest rate than normal.
5.3.2 A  sim ple reform
The rate behaviour described above arises from what appears to be a simple 
practice on the part of the Bank of England, namely the provision of reserves 
in the money market via the purchase of eligible bills in a range of maturities. 
This practice has a considerable history (see chapter 1), dating back to when 
bills were virtually the only short term security that was available in ample 
supply, thus making them an obvious candidate for this purpose (see Bank 
of England 1982a). Of course, many other avenues for providing reserves 
now exist, in particular repurchase agreements (or repo), which is now the 
preferred technique of most central banks (see Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh 
1989). Although the use of repurchase agreements was actually pioneered by 
the Bank of England during the 1870s, these were seen primarily as a means 
of withdrawing reserves rather than supplying them, and in any event was
164 CHAPTER 5.
not actively employed for either purpose after world war one. More recently, 
of course, the Bank has begun to use repo more -  both against bills and, 
recently, against gilts -  but outright bill purchases still form the cornerstone 
of its open market operations, comprising about half of the Bank’s total 
daily transactions nearly 75% of the time. But what is the advantage of 
using repo, when the source of the above problems lies in the maturity of the 
Bank’s operations?
By restricting its counterparties to offer securities for sale under a repo, 
instead of an outright, basis, the Bank would gain significantly more flexibility 
in the maturity dimension of its operations. The Bank cannot, at present, 
reduce the unexpired maturity of the bills which it is prepared to accept, 
since this would reduce the available supply of bills which were eligible for 
sale to the Bank to the point where these were insufficient to cover the large 
daily money market shortages. Under a repo, however, the m aturity of the 
underlying securities is irrelevant19 (as long as they exceed the maturity of 
the repo), so the Bank could then easily reduce the m aturity of its daily 
lending to as little as one day (i.e. overnight). This maturity would pose 
no additional operational problems, given that the Bank already operates 
in the money markets at least once a day. The advantage of lending over 
a shorter maturity is clear from figure 5.1, which indicates that, under the 
assumptions made at the outset of this chapter, the cost of one day funds 
is then driven, in the limiting case of one day, to equality with the Bank’s 
stop rate regardless of interest rate expectations. Whilst the term structure 
of money market interest rates would still exhibit “pivoting” behaviour, the 
pivotal maturity would then always be one day, eliminating the tendency for 
short-term market rates to move in the opposite direction to any expected 
interest rate changes, as well as reducing the volatility in short-term rates.
Experience in other countries provides some evidence for this claim. The 
Fed, for example, conducts very few outright open market purchases, pre­
ferring instead to use repo transactions whose maturity varies but is usually 
overnight (see Meulendyke 1992 and Feinman 1993a). Comparative evidence
19Except, of course, to the cash margin, which reflects the price risk of the securities 
offered as collateral to the lender.
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on the average day-to-day variability of overnight interest rates presented in 
Kasman (1992, p.21) shows that sterling overnight rates were about twice 
as volatile as the federal funds rate in the US. Similarly, the operations of 
the Banque de France comprise biweekly repos whose m aturity is 7 days. In 
addition, the Banque employs so-called “fine tuning” operations where this 
maturity is reduced to one day (see Banque de France 1990), which implies 
that French overnight interest rates show considerably less variation than 
sterling overnight rates.
As the next two chapters will illustrate, the maturity of the Bank’s money 
market operations are not the only source of volatility in short-term sterling 
interest rates. It will be shown, for example, that the Bank’s reliance upon 
bills as the primary intervention asset has been a further contributing factor. 
By moving to the exclusive use of repo as opposed to outright transactions, 
the Bank would also gain more flexibility over the assets which it routinely 
purchased. The entire stock of (fully paid-up) gilt-edged securities, for in­
stance, would become available for this purpose, relieving eligible bills of 
their exclusive status in the Bank’s operations. The recent adoption of the 
bimonthly gilt repo facility on a permanent basis by the Bank (see chapter 
4) is encouraging in this regard and suggests that this evolution may already 
be under way.
5.4 C oncluding remarks
It is widely believed that the major influence of interest rates on economic 
behaviour is through long-term rather than short-term interest rates. Perhaps 
the most famous proponent of this view was Maynard Keynes in the General 
Theory (1932), who was thus led to argue that:
"... [p]erhaps a  complex offer by the central bank to buy and sell at 
stated prices gilt-edged bonds of all m aturities, in place of the single bank 
rate for short-term  bills, is the most im portant practical improvement which 
can be made in the technique of monetary management” (pp.205-6).
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And whilst central banks in many industrial countries did seek to influence 
both short-term and long-term rates in precisely this manner during the in­
terwar period, they now conduct their operations -  without exception -  so 
as to influence short-term interest rates. Thus, although short-term inter­
est rates do have a direct effect on economic behaviour, central banks rely 
to a considerable extent upon market expectations to determine long-term 
interest rates. If they believe that long-term rates are a more potent chan­
nel for influencing economic activity, why then do they not, as Keynes has 
suggested, set long term interest rates directly, for example by operating via 
20-year gilt-edged securities rather than one month bills?
The analysis in this chapter provides one reason why this may not be 
feasible in practice. Quite simply, the interest rate instrument of central 
banks is such that they cannot avoid influencing all interest rates, since short­
term and long-term interest rates are not independently determined. To 
the contrary, the possibility of intertemporal arbitrage in financial markets 
imposes restrictions on the behaviour of short-term interest rates relative to 
long-term interest rates. These were summarised, under conditions of risk 
neutrality, by equation (5.1) at the outset of this chapter, which is referred 
to as the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. Thus, if a central 
bank chooses to influence the level of 30-day interest rates over time, this not 
only has implications for all long-term rates, but for all short-term rates as 
well. Of course, this remains equally true whether the central bank decides 
to influence 30-month or even 30-year interest rates. If the central bank did 
indeed try to operate its monetary policy through determination of the 30- 
year rate, however, it would then have to accept the resultant behaviour of all 
shorter-term rates which, by a simple extension of the analysis in this chapter 
has demonstrated, can be expected to be neither stable nor consistent with 
the achievement of the central bank’s policy targets. From this perspective, 
then, it is entirely appropriate that central banks restrict their influence over 
interest rates to shorter rather than longer maturities.
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Figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.3 
T he m oney m arket term  structure  
before an exp ected  rise in the stop  rate
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Figure 5.4 
The stop rate and 7-day LIBO R  
1988-1992
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Figure 5.5
The spread betw een th e stop  rate and 7-day LIBO R
1988-1992
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Figure 5.6  
The stop rate and 7-day LIBO R  
January — Septem ber 1992
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Table 5.1 
M ean difference (%) betw een  
market rate and stop rate
P e rio d M a tu r i ty
7 days 1 month 3 month
Rising -.348 -.350 .054
(.025) (.010) (.012)
Constant .041 .073 .033
(.007) (.006) (.009)
Falling .043 .133 -.230
(.016) (.0.12) (.014)
Standard errors in brackets.
Table 5.2 
V olatility of m oney market rates
P e rio d M a tu r i ty
7 days 1 month 3 month
Rising .039 .022 .011
(.005) (.005) (.002)
Constant .005 .004 .004
(.001) (.002) (.009)
Falling .030 .011 .009
(.008) (.004) (.005)
Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 5.3 
M ean change in the one m onth rate 
around a stop rate change
S to p  R a te N u m b e r  o f M ea n  ch an g e  in
ev en ts 1 m o n th  r a te
Increases 12 82.5
(21.8)
Decreases 11 4.9
(11.0)
Standard errors in brackets.
C hapter 6
The Excess L iquidity Prem ium  
on Sterling E ligible B ills
The yield on sterling eligible bills of exchange has, for many years, been 
below the yield on equivalent money market assets. This differential un­
doubtedly reflects the special role which these instruments play within the 
sterling money market. For two reasons, eligible bills are considered by UK 
banks to be so-called “prime liquidity” . First, bills are routinely purchased 
by the Bank of England in its money market operations. This means that 
the holder of an eligible bill is guaranteed, under most market conditions, to 
exchange this asset for cash. Second, and because of this feature, bills are 
classified by the Bank of England as reserve assets, which institutions may 
hold in order to satisfy their statutory liquid asset requirements. There is an 
obvious circularity here: eligible bills are considered as reserve assets by the 
Bank because they are liquid; but bills are only considered as liquid because 
they are eligible for sale to the Bank. The superior liquidity of bills, there­
fore, is derived solely from their eligibility and implies that eligible bills will 
be voluntarily held even when their yield is below that of equivalent money 
market assets. Eligible bills, in other words, carry a liquidity premium.
Unfortunately, this liquidity premium (<f>t > 0) is not directly observable. 
W hat is observable, is the spread (St >  0) between the yield on eligible bills
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(if) and the yield on other sterling money market instruments (it). However, 
this yield spread will be equivalent to the liquidity premium in the absence 
of any constraints on the demand for, and supply of, eligible bills, i.e.
St — it — i\ — <f>t-
To see why, consider what would happen if, in the absence of any such con­
straints, the yield spread on eligible bills became larger than the (unobserv­
able) liquidity premium. In practical terms, this would mean that the yield 
on eligible bills was below the yield on some equivalent asset, such as an un­
secured sterling loan for example, i.e. LIBOR, by more than was warranted 
by the extra liquidity of bills. Faced with this yield differential, bank treasur­
ers would clearly rather lend via the unsecured deposit market rather than 
via the bill market. Conversely, corporate treasurers would rather borrow by 
drawing a bill. Wherever possible, both parties would engage in arbitrage, 
selling (drawing) bills and lending in the unsecured deposit market. These 
forces would quickly tend to narrow the yield spread between bills and LI­
BOR, to the point where their liquidity-adjusted yields became equal. Thus 
any spread would reflect only the liquidity premium, which would tend to 
stay more or less constant over time.
As this chapter indicates, the reality is less straightforward. The annual 
average spread between one month LIBOR and one month eligible bills has 
varied considerably in recent years, being as low as 10 basis points in 1987 
and as high as 50 basis points in 1992 (see table 6.1 and figures 6.3 and 6.4). 
Indeed, the trend over the past five years has been for this yield spread to 
widen rather than to narrow. This implies that there has in fact been an 
excess liquidity premium  on eligible bills, i.e.
St > <f>t ■>
and indicates the likelihood of constraints which have tended to counter the 
equilibrating forces suggested above. These constraints, moreover, are likely 
to have emanated from the Bank of England’s own regulation of the bill 
market, particularly its imposition of accepting limits on eligible acceptors. 
Thus the Bank’s practices are not only responsible for the appearance of a
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liquidity premium on eligible bills, but may also be responsible for an excess 
liquidity premium on these instruments in recent years. But why should an 
excess liquidity premium matter?
Unlike many other sterling money market instruments, like certificates of 
deposit (CDs) or commercial paper (CP), bills have been, and still are, the 
fulcrum of the Bank’s money market operations, through which the Bank 
seeks to influence the level of sterling money market interest rates generally. 
The yield on bills, therefore, is relevant to the behaviour of those institutions 
which routinely buy, hold and sell these bills to the Bank (such as the discount 
houses and, latterly, the clearing banks) in a manner that the yield on CDs or 
CP is not. Discount houses, for example, are obliged by the Bank of England
“ ... to make to banks and to non-bank members of either CHAPS or 
the Town Clearing, on demand and in any trading conditions, ... continuous 
and effective bid prices ... at which they stand committed to deal in eligible 
bills for same day settlement and in marketable amounts” (Bank of England 
1988, para 9).
Clearly if eligible bills earn less -  on a liquidity adjusted basis -  than 
equivalent money market assets, yet have to be bought and held by some 
institutions as a necessary part of the normal operation of the UK bank­
ing system and monetary policy, then these institutions will face incentives 
to recoup their costs by generating cheaper funding opportunities (or more 
profitable lending opportunities). Indeed, only by being able, occasionally, 
to borrow very short-term funds at a lower than average rate (or being able 
to lend funds at a higher than average rate) will the holders of bills be able 
to fund these instruments profitably. This is precisely the behaviour which 
does characterise very short-term sterling interest rates (i.e. overnight rates), 
which are widely known to be more volatile than those elsewhere. This sug­
gests that the cost of the excess liquidity premium is not being borne so much 
by the holders of bills, but by the users of the market for short-dated sterling 
funds, which includes domestic as well as foreign banks, and implies that this 
market is less efficient than it could be.
Section 1 presents a brief history of the sterling bill market followed, in 
section 2, by an empirical picture of the behaviour of eligible bill yields (in
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particular one month yields) which confirms the presence, in recent years, 
of a considerable widening in the spread between LIBOR and the yield on 
eligible bills. Section 3 then provides a profile of the supply side of the bill 
market, where eligible bills are created as credit instruments. W ith this profile 
in place, section 4 goes on to examine several hypotheses as to the supply 
constraint which is most likely to have driven the “scarcity” of eligible bills. 
Having identified the likely causes of the excess liquidity premium on eligible 
bills, section 5 traces some of the effects of this spread. Some concluding 
remarks are made in section 6.
6.1 The evolution o f the bill market
6.1.1 Em ergence
Inland bills first became legal in England in 1697, three years after the forma­
tion of the Bank of England, although they had been extensively used before 
this to finance trade throughout Western Europe. During the eighteenth 
century the Bank routinely rediscounted bills, usually at the maximum legal 
discount rate1, and thereafter at Bank rate (see chapter one, figure 1.1). In 
order to be considered as eligible for rediscount at the Bank, however, bills 
had to bear two good London names and have a tenor not exceeding 65 days. 
The fact that bills could be rediscounted with the Bank increased their at­
traction as high-quality, liquid assets and reinforced their role as the primary 
short-term financial instrument.
In addition to serving as a source of trade finance, bills served as an 
early mechanism whereby funds were redistributed within the nascent bank­
ing system in the absence of a branch network (see chapters 1 and 3). Bill 
brokers developed to facilitate this trade in bills, and by 1822 some twenty five 
bill brokers were in business, although this number fluctuated considerably 
(Scammel 1968). In 1825 a banking crisis occurred which was precipitated, in
1The Usury Law of 1714 stipulated a maximum legal interest rate of 5% until 1833, 
when it was repealed. See Scammel (1968).
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part, by the Bank’s refusal to discount bills. This prompted a reorganisation 
of the financial system which not only heralded the emergence of joint-stock 
banking (in 1826), but also led to the bill brokers being transformed into a 
unique set of financial institutions known as discount houses. Consequently, 
commercial bills retained their place at the centre of the sterling money mar­
ket, a position they were to hold for nearly eighty five years.
In 1873 the overall growth of commercial bills reached a turning point, 
whilst inland bills began to suffer a gradual decline relative to foreign bills as 
an instrument of finance. One explanation for this decline was the develop­
ment of branch banking, which had reduced the role of bills in redistributing 
cash within the banking system. King (1936) argues that it became a matter 
of indifference to the banks whether they financed their customers by dis­
counting their bills or by granting loans and advances, and to the customers 
the flexibility of the overdraft system had definite advantages. Nishimura 
(1971) disputes this explanation, claiming that branch banking only reached 
maturity in the 1890s. He argues, instead, that it was the development of 
communication and transport which reduced the general level of inventories 
(and so, too, the need for bill finance) for internal trade, whilst at the same 
time stimulating foreign trade and the demand for foreign bills.
6.1.2 W ar and th e dom inance o f Treasury bills
The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, and the attendant disruptions of 
trade and increases in government borrowing, brought about a sharp decline 
in the issue of commercial (bank) bills and a rapid increase in the issue of 
Treasury bills. Although Treasury bills had first been issued in 1877, they 
had thus far played a minor role in the finance of government. This changed 
dramatically with the advent of the war, when Treasury bills rapidly out­
stripped commercial bills as the dominant money market instrument. In­
deed, they remained dominant until the 1960s, at first due to the depression 
in the 1930s which further disrupted trade, and then due to the second world 
war2. This development meant that the Bank of England, over this period,
2For a brief history of the sterling Treasury bill see Midland Bank (1961).
180 CHAPTER 6.
routinely made advances against Treasury bills instead of commercial bills in 
its lending operations with the discount houses.
It is noteworthy that, during the 1930s, the business of the discount houses 
came under severe threat due to the government’s “cheap money” policy, 
under which the Bank of England dropped its Bank Rate to a level of 2%3. 
Low demand for loans and advances due to the depression led banks to invest 
in Treasury bills, which pushed the discount rate on Treasury bills even lower, 
to below 1%. This caused the houses to incur losses on their bill portfolios 
since the clearing banks, under a cartel agreement, refused to lend cash on 
call to the houses at less than 1% under Bank Rate. After several discount 
houses failed, it was eventually decided to resuscitate the market via a series of 
gentlemen’s agreements in 1934. The clearing banks agreed not to participate 
in the weekly Treasury bill tender, not to buy Treasury bills which had run 
for less than seven days and, lastly, to buy bills at a rate which was at 
least as high as their minimum call lending rate to the houses. W ithout 
these agreements, which essentially guaranteed that the houses made a small 
profit, it is almost certain that these institutions would not have survived the 
1930s.
The bill market which emerged from the second world war thus had a small 
number of discount houses (eleven) and an outstanding issue of Treasury bills 
which, in 1958, exceeded the issue of commercial bills almost sixfold (see 
Bank of England 1961 and 1967). Bank bills, which were commercial bills 
accepted by a British bank or one of the eighteen “accepting houses” , were 
still considered eligible for discount at the Bank of England, but formed a 
small part of the Bank’s lending operations, which mainly comprised advances 
to the houses against security of Treasury bills.
6.1.3 T he resurgence o f th e bank bill
By 1965, the amount of commercial bills had risen to the point where their 
issue equalled that of Treasury bills. The reasons for this post-war resurgence,
3Where it remained for nineteen years; see Scammel (1968).
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according to a commentator at the time, included the abolition of ad valorem 
stamp duty on bills in 1961, a reduction in acceptance fees, a desire on the 
part of the Treasury to keep the Treasury bill issue low, and “a shift in the 
attitude of the banks towards the commercial bill, and a suspected shift in 
that of the Bank of England” (Law, 1965, p.341). At that time, the Bank’s 
policy regarding commercial bills was to maintain the standards of quality 
associated with the prime bank bill, and to allow reasonable development of 
bills of all classes, given their usefulness as financial instruments. To this 
end, the Bank had regularly purchased small amounts of bills to monitor 
their quality.
The corset
Renewed growth in eligible bills during the 1970s was prompted by the 
scheme of supplementary special deposits4, otherwise known as the “corset” , 
which was introduced by the monetary authorities in 1973 to curb excessive 
credit growth. Under this scheme, banks had to place non-interest bearing 
reserves with the Bank of England whenever their eligible liabilities grew 
beyond a specified rate. Acceptances were, however, excluded from the defi­
nition of eligible liabilities. Predictably, therefore, bank bills quickly became 
a dominant channel for short-term lending, with the result that the bill issue 
rapidly expanded. From a level of about £350 million at the beginning of 
the first corset period (1973), the amount of bills eventually peaked at £2700 
million just before the scheme was abolished (1980). The corset had hardly 
been abandoned, however, when the monetary authorities, again as part of 
their attem pts to meet monetary targets, embarked on a policy of “overfund­
ing” the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). This policy, even 
more than the corset, once again placed the eligible bill at the centre of the 
sterling money market.
O verfunding
The PSBR represents the difference between public sector revenue and 
expenditure and thus measures the borrowing (or funding) need of the public
4For details and definitions see Bank of England (1982b).
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sector5. Overfunding, as its name suggests, occurs whenever the public sector 
borrows more funds than are needed to meet the PSBR6. Since most public 
sector accounts are held with the Bank of England, a natural consequence 
of overfunding is the accumulation of public sector balances at the Bank 
and a corresponding reduction in clearing bank balances. Overfunding thus 
results in an increase in the money market shortage7, which requires increased 
lending operations by the Bank of England in order to replenish aggregate 
reserves.
An initial response by the Bank to the introduction of overfunding was to 
reduce the amount of Treasury bills issued at the weekly tender in order to 
lessen the impact of these bill sales on the money market shortage. However, 
shortages remained so large that this strategy soon depleted the outstand­
ing stock of Treasury bills to the point where discount houses (and banks) 
had insufficient Treasury bills to cover the shortage. The Bank thus had to 
rely increasingly upon purchases of bank bills to remove the shortage. This 
increased the demand for bank bills as eligible liquid assets, which tended 
to depress their yields relative to comparable assets leading, in turn, to bills 
becoming more attractive as a source of short-term finance.
N ew  operating procedures
In 1980 the Bank announced that its money market operations would in 
future rely less upon direct lending to the discount houses and more upon 
open market purchases of eligible bills. These purchases would, however, still 
be conducted via the discount market. In order to ensure an adequate supply 
of bills, held by the discount market, two further steps were taken. First, the 
list of eligible accepting banks was extended to include those foreign banks 
which had a substantial and broadly based sterling acceptance business in
5For a good account of funding in the post-war period up to 1984, see Bank of England 
(1984).
6This policy was motivated by an attem pt to reduce broad money growth without 
resorting to higher short-term  interest rates; see Goodhart (1989b).
7The relationship between overfunding and the money market shortage is not one-for- 
one, however, due to the presence of other factors which influence the shortage. See chapter 
4, section 3.
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the United Kingdom and whose bills could command the finest rates in the 
market. Second, eligible banks were required, as part of their liquid asset 
requirements, to lend a minimum amount of funds on call to the discount 
houses (see chapter 4).
These changes clearly rejuvenated the role of the bank bill as a prime 
liquid asset to banks and as a source of short-term finance to borrowers. Be­
tween 1978 and 1983, for example, UK banks’ holdings of bank bills relative 
to Treasury bills rose from about 50% to over 90%, whilst over this period the 
volume of sterling acceptances rose by nearly 300%. The changes also rein­
forced the position of discount houses as intermediaries in the sterling money 
markets, a position which had been under increasing pressure from the large, 
active interbank markets in unsecured sterling funds which had developed 
throughout the 1970s. The development of these markets meant that banks 
could now borrow funds directly from other banks, financial institutions or 
corporations, without recourse to the discount market as an intermediary.
During the early 1980s the policy of overfunding, due to the large money 
market shortages it created, led to a dramatic and sustained increase in the 
portfolio of eligible bank bills held by the Bank of England. As shown in figure 
6.1, this “bill mountain” had reached a peak of £12 billion in 1985 (against 
a Treasury bill issue of about £1 billion) and the Bank’s bill purchases had 
become increasingly large relative to the stock of outstanding eligible bank 
bills. In the 1985-86 fiscal year it was decided to discontinue the overfunding 
policy8 and to adopt the following full fund rule9:
“The authorities will seek to fund the net to tal of m aturing debt, the 
PSBR and any underlying increase in the foreign exchange reserves by sales 
of debt outside the hanking sector*' (emphasis added).
Although it was called a full fund rule, this was a misleading name, as the
8This was due, in part, to the reduced emphasis on broad money targets and, in part, 
due to “distortions” introduced by overfunding, in particular the possibilities for bill arbi­
trage (see section 4).
9For a sum m ary of funding policy see Annex A to chapter 2 of the Chancellor’s Financial 
Statement and Budget Report 1990-91, from which the definition below is taken, or the 
Treasury Bulletin (1992).
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rule would continue to imply either overfunding or underfunding depending 
on the behaviour of the non-funding sector (i.e. banks). Net purchases of gilt- 
edged securities (gilts) by banks, for example, would result in overfunding, 
since the government would then have to issue gilts in excess of the funding 
requirement and vice versa.
Initially, the new full fund rule resulted in a small degree of underfund­
ing, reversing the previous trend of large money market shortages and bill 
purchases by the Bank. In 1988-89, however, overfunding of some £2 billion 
again occurred, even with a PSBR which was in surplus. Two subsequent 
amendments to the full fund rule also increased its future potential to cause 
overfunding. In 1988-89 net purchases of government debt by the building 
society sector were no longer considered as funding, whilst in 1989-90 all sales 
of Treasury bills were excluded from the definition of funding. The upshot 
was that overfunding, and hence large money market shortages, continued to 
require substantial amounts of bank bills to be sold to the Bank of England 
on a daily basis. As figure 6.2 indicates, whilst gross annual assistance by the 
Bank of England (i.e. total bill purchases and lending by the Bank) peaked in 
1985 and declined for some years thereafter, it subsequently increased beyond 
its 1985 level, totalling over £250 billion in 1992.
6.2 T he yield  on eligible bills
The yield on eligible bills over the period 1975-1993 is presented in figures 6.3, 
6.4 and 6.5, which depict, for a maturity of one month, the spread between 
LIBOR and the yield on Treasury bills, the spread between LIBOR and 
the yield on bank bills, and the spread between the yield on bank bills and 
Treasury bills, respectively10.
The adoption of new money market operating procedures by the Bank 
of England in September 1981 indicate a clear break in the time pattern of 
these spreads. As noted in the previous section, the period leading up to
10The data is daily (weekdays), but has been smoothed using a 21-day centred moving 
average to facilitate presentation.
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this date was characterised by rising money market shortages, which saw the 
Bank buying substantial amounts of Treasury bills and a growing number of 
bank bills, and reducing the Treasury bill tender. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
Treasury bill yields responded to this increased demand and decreased supply 
by falling substantially below LIBOR. The yield on bank bills -  instruments 
which had played a more limited role in the Bank’s money market operations 
-  had, until this time, been primarily above LIBOR, but also began to fall 
in response to these developments, especially in 1980, which was a year of 
unusual and persistent stringency in the money market. It is also noteworthy 
that, before the change in the Bank’s operations, the yield on bank bills 
fluctuated somewhat independently of the yield on Treasury bills.
After 1981, when bank bills and Treasury bills effectively became perfect 
substitutes (as assets), their yields were driven, as would be expected, to 
(approximate) equality (see figure 6.5). Similarly, the yield on both of these 
assets was now consistently below LIBOR and showed less fluctuation as 
the sterling money market adjusted to the Bank’s new operating procedures. 
From 1982 onwards, therefore, it is no longer meaningful to distinguish be­
tween the yield on bank bills and Treasury bills. Consequently, the remainder 
of this chapter will simply refer to the yield on eligible sterling bills, where 
this refers to bank bills and Treasury bills and will be concerned primarily 
with the difference, or spread, between this yield and LIBOR.
6.2.1 P roperties o f th e spread betw een  1982 and 1993
The yield spread, S t , between LIBOR and sterling eligible bills between 1982 
and 1993 is, as one should expect, a stationary process11 which, from the 
sample autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions, appears to be 
an autoregressive process of order 1, i.e. AR(1). Consequently, fitting the 
model St =  a 0 +  a?i5«-i +  et, where | ct\ |<  1 and et ~  Af(0,cr2), to the data 
over this period provides a relatively good description of the evolution of the
11A test for a unit root yielded a Dickey-Fuller t-statistic o f -21.8, conclusively rejecting 
the presence of a unit root. A similarly strong result obtains over the entire sample period 
from 1975 and 1993.
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spread over time, as shown in the table below:
Coefficient Value Standard Error t-Statistic
<*o 0.12 0.006 20.25
<*i 0.53 0.016 33.81
R 2 =  0.285, F i(3i30 =  1142.
It is encouraging that the (long-run) expected spread implied by the above 
equation is
E(St) =  = 0.2 5 ,
1 -  C*i
or 25 basis points, which accords with most market participants’ belief about 
the “typical” spread between LIBOR and bill yields in recent years12. The 
actual sample mean over the period 1982-1993, however, was higher than this, 
being equal to 32 basis points. A look at either figure 6.3 or 6.4, moreover, 
indicates that the spread varied considerably about its (long-run) expected 
value, increasing sharply in 1984-1985, then decreasing briefly and then in­
creasing again over a sustained period.
In order to examine these deviations, the annual mean, standard deviation 
and volatility13 of the spread was calculated for each year between 1980 and 
1993. These values are provided in table 6.1. The table indicates that both 
the standard deviation and the volatility of the spread declined steadily over 
the 1980s and into the 1990s, with the exception of 1992, when the variance 
of the spread increased temporarily 14.
The mean spreads, however, tell a very different story. The last column 
of the table provides the outcomes of a (one-sided) hypothesis test of the 
equality between means in successive years and, where the hypothesis of
12Furthermore, bill arbitrage (see below) is possible for certain borrowers once the spread 
becomes wider than  25 basis points.
13Calculated as the standard deviation of daily differences in the spread.
14This is plainly visible in figures 6.3 and 6.4, and was clearly only due to the extraor­
dinary events surrounding the withdrawal of sterling from the ERM in September 1992, 
which are discussed below.
6.2. THE YIELD ON ELIGIBLE BILLS 187
equality between means could be rejected, includes the level of significance 
in brackets. In the period of interest, namely 1982-1993, the annual mean 
spreads are the same in only one instance, namely 1983-1984. In all other 
cases, these tests verify the pattern identified above: successive mean spreads 
were significantly lower in 1986-1987, and significantly higher in 1984-1985 
and in each year after 1987 until 1992.
It is the increase in the spread in this latter period which will be of primary 
interest in subsequent sections of this chapter. From its low of about 10 basis 
points in 1987, the mean annual spread increased to nearly 50 basis points 
in 1992, before coming down somewhat in 1993. An OLS regression of the 
spread on a time dummy variable over this period confirmed this secular 
increase (t-statistics in brackets):
St =  0.093 +  0.000255(0*
(10.2) (14.5)
The coefficient on the time variable is highly significant, and corresponds to 
an annual (i.e. 261 days) increase in the spread of about 7 basis points.
6.2.2 W hy were eligible bills scarce?
The observed widening of the spread between bills and equivalent assets 
strongly suggests the presence of forces which tended to make eligible bills 
more scarce over time creating, in effect, an excess liquidity premium on these 
instruments. In other words, the demand for eligible bills rose, or their supply 
fell, or both.
The primary source of demand for eligible bills arises from the substantial 
daily purchases of these instruments by the Bank of England in its money 
market operations. Such purchases are, in turn, driven by the size of money 
market shortages. The previous section has indicated that these shortages, 
and hence the Bank’s purchases and holdings of eligible bills, rose substan­
tially between 1982 and 1985 due to the policy of overfunding. This is cor­
roborated by figures 6.1 and 6.2. The abolition of this policy in the 1985-86
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fiscal year and the subsequent adoption of a so-called full fund rule temporar­
ily eased these money market shortages. As the banking sector’s purchases of 
gilts rose in 1990, however, this full fund rule again resulted in overfunding, 
increasing money market shortages and prompting rising bill purchases by 
the Bank.
This broad pattern in the demand for bills by the Bank matches rea­
sonably closely the pattern in the annual average yield spreads. This co­
movement can be seen even more clearly from figure 6.6, which plots the 
annual changes in these spreads against the annual changes in the Bank’s 
holding and purchases of bills. The question, then, is why the supply of eligi­
ble bills did not adjust, in the manner suggested at the outset of this chapter, 
in response to the cheaper cost of borrowing via bills, especially over the pe­
riod 1990-92. Before examining several possible answers to this question, the 
next section briefly presents a recent profile of the supply side of the bill 
market since 1987, describing the creation of eligible bills and looking at the 
factors which influence the volume of acceptances.
6.3 A ccepting: bills as credit instrum ents
6.3.1 T he creation o f an eligible bill
Corporate customers who borrow funds via bill finance usually do so through 
an acceptance credit facility with one of a large number of eligible accepting 
banks. These 150 or so institutions are listed by the Bank of England as 
eligible acceptors and comprise the UK clearing banks, domestic and foreign 
merchant banks, and other domestic and foreign banks (a full list of eligi­
ble acceptors is attached in the appendix). Having been approached by a 
customer for an acceptance facility, an accepting bank will first assess the 
customer’s credit needs which, if the bills drawn under the facility are to be 
claused as eligible, should be of a short-term, self-liquidating nature15. The
15In practice, however, clausing may be so broad (e.g. “receivables” ) as to make it 
impossible to discern the purpose for which funds were borrowed.
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accepting bank will also assess the credit standing of the customer, so as to 
establish a borrowing limit under the facility and decide an acceptance fee 
in return for the credit risk which it will assume by accepting the customer’s 
bills.
Unlike many other forms of credit, which may be extended entirely via 
book entries, the issue of bills under an acceptance facility is governed by 
the Bills of Exchange Act which defines the bill as an unconditional order in 
writing. Thus bills cannot be dematerialised like other negotiable securities, 
such as sterling Treasury bills or sterling certificates of deposit. In order to 
reduce the time and transport costs, as well as the risks, of drawing and 
signing individual bills as they are needed, one of two alternatives is usually 
adopted. The customer may sign a number of undated bills for the amounts 
and periods required and return these to the accepting bank, which will 
then date and discount the bills whenever the customer requires cash. Or, 
alternatively, the customer may simply give the accepting bank Power of 
Attorney to sign bills on the customer’s behalf.
Once the accepting bank has dated and signed the bill it assumes a con­
tingent liability: that is, although the accepting bank becomes liable to pay 
the face value of the bill at maturity, an actual liability is incurred only if the 
customer who drew the bill fails to make funds available at maturity. Having 
signed and dated the bill, the acceptor will also usually purchase, or discount, 
the bill, thereby acquiring an asset in the form of a negotiable instrument16. 
The customer’s account is then credited with an amount less than the face 
value of the bill (calculated as in equation (4.1) in chapter 4). At maturity, 
the customer’s account is debited by the amount of the face value of the bill.
Having acquired an asset in the form of a bill and paid out the consid­
eration to the drawer of the bill, the accepting bank is then faced with a 
choice. It can either retain the bill on its balance sheet, in which case it must 
“fund” the asset (i.e. borrow cash). A profit will be realised if the bill can 
be funded at a cost below its yield, or if the bill is subsequently resold at a
16This is a comparatively recent practice in the long history of the bill, and became 
common in the 1970s. Before this, bills were almost always initially discounted in the 
market (i.e. bought by a discount house or another bank).
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higher price. Alternatively, the accepting bank can remove the bill from its 
balance sheet by selling (i.e. rediscounting) it in the secondary market. In 
this case the accepting bank simply earns the acceptance fee. In practice, 
the choice between these alternatives will depend upon the expected path of 
future short-term interest rates (see section 5 below).
Regardless of whether the bill is initially retained or sold, the accepting 
bank will immediately deliver the physical bill to the Bank of England, where 
the instrument is then logged onto CMO, thus permitting any subsequent 
changes in its ownership due to secondary market trading to be achieved via 
computerised book-entry.
6.3.2 Sterling acceptances
Size, m aturity, fees
Although sterling acceptances now account for over 96% of all acceptances 
drawn in the UK, this share has risen to such a high level only recently (during 
1992). At the end of 1991, for example, sterling acceptances represented only 
about 80% of the total drawn. Virtually all sterling acceptances drawn are 
eligible, with non-eligible acceptances representing only 0.35% of bills drawn.
Total sterling acceptances outstanding at the end of 1993 stood at just 
over £20 billion, having exhibited considerable variation since 1987: figure 
6.7 indicates that from their lowest level of just over £15 billion in June 1987, 
acceptances rose to a peak of almost £25 billion in October 1992 before falling 
again to their current level. Figure 6.8 shows that the annual growth of accep­
tances became negative between mid-1990 and mid-1992, thus coinciding with 
the recession in the UK over this period. Acceptance growth surged strongly 
after September 1992 (when sterling left the ERM), for reasons which will be 
discussed below.
The use of acceptances as compared with overall sterling bank lending is 
relatively small and acceptances only represented 6% of total bank credit to 
the UK private sector at the end of 1993. Moreover, and more importantly, 
figure 6.9 indicates that this proportion has fallen steadily since 1987, when
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it stood at over 14%.
Drawers
Acceptances are typically drawn to finance short-term, trade-related 
transactions. Table 6.2 bears this out, indicating that the sectors which cur­
rently rely most heavily on acceptance finance (relative to total bank lending) 
are food, motor and other manufacturing, the chemical and energy industry, 
electrical engineering and wholesale distribution. Of these, the sectors with 
the largest volume of acceptance credit are the food sector (£2.7 billion), fol­
lowed by wholesale distribution (£2.3 billion) and other manufacturing (£1.4 
billion).
The table also indicates that the largest overall drawers of acceptances are 
firms in the financial sector, which suggests that finance bills now constitute a 
significant proportion of the sterling market. Unfortunately, the CSO’s non­
specific definition of “other financial firms” makes it impossible to identify 
the underlying activity which is generating these bills. Undoubtedly, however, 
this figure is likely to include bills that are issued by the (notionally) separate 
financing arms which many large industrial or commercial companies employ 
to manage their financial requirements. Since these companies will issue bills 
for a host of reasons, such as to raise working capital or to finance inventories 
(e.g. cars sold on a hire-purchase basis), the simple clausing which is required 
on a bill makes it impossible in practice to establish whether such bills are 
commercial bills or finance bills.
A cceptors
The UK clearing banks are the largest group of acceptors, with about 
22% of all accepting business. Of this group, the two largest clearing banks, 
Barclays and National Westminister, account for over half of the acceptances, 
making them the largest individual acceptors. However, the overall accepting 
share of the clearing banks, although it is large, has fallen significantly over 
recent years (see figure 6.10). British accepting houses (merchant banks) 
and Japanese banks are the next largest group of acceptors, with about 15% 
and 12% of the market share respectively. Whilst the market share of the 
accepting houses has been roughly constant during recent years, Japanese
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banks have assumed a marginally increasing share of the acceptance market. 
This is in sharp contrast to American banks, whose share of the accepting 
market has fallen from 8% in 1987 to less than 3% at present. Overall, foreign 
banks account for over 50% of all acceptances drawn in London (sterling and 
non-sterling).
6.3.3 T he volum e o f acceptances
Like many other forms of credit, variation in the volume of acceptances will 
be influenced by the overall level of activity in the macroeconomy. In addi­
tion, factors which are specific to those sectors which traditionally rely on 
acceptance credit, such as the demand for industrial and manufacturing out­
put, retail sales and the level of imports and exports, which are themselves 
not independent of overall activity, will also play an important role.
Another factor driving the volume of sterling acceptances is clearly the 
cost of acceptance credit relative to other sources of short-term finance. Un­
der an acceptance facility the cost of one month funds (say) is given by the 
prevailing market discount rate on one month bills, plus an acceptance fee. 
Corporate borrowers will compare this cost with alternative sources of one 
month funds, which will include unsecured wholesale loans over a range of 
currencies17 and maturities (e.g. overnight, 7 days and one month). These 
loans are usually obtained at a spread above LIBOR, where this spread will 
depend upon the creditworthiness of the borrower and will also include an 
associated cost18.
17For example, borrowers requiring one month dollar funds have sometimes been able to 
raise these more cheaply by issuing sterling bills and swapping the proceeds from sterling 
into dollars.
18According to  practitioners, this cost (which is usually yg%) arises due to the cash 
ratio requirement which is levied as a fraction of banks’ retail liabilities. Funding a  loan 
is therefore more expensive, since the bank not only has to borrow the full amount of the 
loan, but also the non-interest bearing reserves which then need to be held against this 
liability. In the case of bill, the bank has a choice between funding the bill, or selling in 
the secondary market, and hence an associated cost is not levied in this case.
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For borrowers who require sterling funds, therefore, the relative cost of ac­
ceptance finance will depend mainly on the level of the discount rate relative 
to LIBOR (plus the associated costs), since the additional credit-risk pre­
mium is charged by the lender irrespective of whether the credit is extended 
via acceptance or unsecured loan19. From the discussion in the previous sec­
tion (and figure 4.5) it is clear that acceptance credit was almost always 
cheaper than the alternative, often by a significant margin. However, this 
spread does vary considerably over time, which is likely to cause the use of 
acceptances to vary on a month-to-month basis.
Finally, the payment of taxes is likely to affect the volume of acceptances. 
Inland revenue statistics20 show clearly that corporation tax payments in the 
UK are almost all made in the months of January, April, July and October. 
These place additional seasonal cash flow demands on firms, which they are 
likely to meet via short-term borrowing such as acceptance credit.
In order to assess the significance of these factors in the monthly varia­
tion in sterling acceptances, the following OLS regression was estimated on 
monthly data over the period from January 1988 to December 1993:
GROWTH* =  f t  +  f t  (OUTPUT*) +  f t  (SPREAD*) +  f t  (TAX*) +  e* ,
where e* ~  N(0,  a2). The dependent variable, GROWTH, is the monthly 
percentage change in total sterling acceptances. Three independent variables 
were included to measure the contribution of macroeconomic, tax and relative 
cost factors to the monthly variation in acceptances. OUTPUT is the month- 
on-month percentage change in the CSO index of total industrial production. 
SPREAD is the average monthly spread (in basis points) between LIBOR and 
the yield on one month eligible bills. Finally, TAX is a dummy variable to 
measure the significance of corporation tax payments, taking the value of 
unity in the tax-paying months of January, April, July and October, and the
19For borrowers who require non-sterling funds, the relevant comparison is between one 
month LIBOR in this currency and the all-in cost of swapping their bill funding (which is 
in sterling) into this currency.
20See for example chart 1.2 of the Inland Revenue Statistics (1993, HMSO:London).
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value of zero in all other months. The results of this regression are presented 
in the table below:
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic
CONSTANT -3.67 1.05 -3.5
OUTPUT -0.14 0.63 -0.23
SPREAD 8.92 4.11 2.17
TAX 8.06 1.43 5.65
R 2 =  0.35, Durbin — W atson  =  2.14, F^jo  =  11.99
The coefficient on monthly changes in industrial production is insignifi­
cant and of the wrong sign21. The coefficient on the yield spread variable is 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that acceptances do respond to changes 
in their relative price. The magnitude of the coefficient implies that a 10 basis 
point increase in the spread is consistent with an increase of just under 1% in 
the growth of acceptances. The tax dummy coefficient is also significant (at 
the 1% level) and its value implies that acceptances are about 8% higher in 
tax-paying months than in non tax-paying months. The overall significance 
of the regression indicates that the joint hypothesis that all the coefficients 
are zero can be rejected at the 1% level.
6.4 T he excess liquidity premium: causes
The profile of the bill market developed in the previous section has indicated 
that eligible acceptances comprise a diminishing share of sterling bank lend­
ing to the private sector, currently representing only 5% of bank lending. 
Moreover, clearing banks, which are the largest potential acceptors of eligible 
bills, have reduced their share of the acceptance market from 40% at the end
21This is not altogether surprising, and one might expect annual, rather than monthly, 
changes in national output to be a more im portant explanatory factor. Indeed, regressing 
annual changes in the volume of acceptance on annual changes in industrial production 
yielded a significant, positive coefficient.
6.4. THE EXCESS LIQUIDITY PREMIUM: CAUSES 195
of the 1980s, to less than 25%. At the same time, persistent daily money 
market shortages have caused the Bank to continue to buy large quantities 
of eligible bills on a daily basis. Thus the demand for bills by the Bank has 
remained high, increasing from 1989 to 1992. On the other hand, empirical 
evidence was found which indicates that the volume of acceptances does re­
spond to a change in the relative cost of bill finance, increasing as this gets 
cheaper. Yet the supply of bills clearly did not respond sufficiently to meet 
the increased demands by the Bank of England, resulting in a “scarcity” 
of eligible bills and reflected in the excess liquidity premium on bills. This 
section now examines why the supply of bills has failed to respond to this 
relative price incentive between bills and other sources of short-term funds.
6.4.1 W as supply lim ited by borrowers?
The effects o f the recession
Although the previous section has indicated that the monthly volume 
of acceptance credit is responsive to the relative price of acceptance credit, 
it is nonetheless true that the overall volume of acceptances is ultimately 
driven by the needs of companies to finance inventories and domestic and 
international trade. Hence the annual growth in acceptances also fluctuates 
with the overall growth of production and trade. Most indices of production 
and trade show that a severe recession occurred in the UK between 1990 
and 1992, which will in turn have reduced the demand for acceptance credit. 
Indeed, annual growth (measured monthly) of sterling acceptances became 
negative in mid-1990, only becoming positive again in mid-1992, thus roughly 
coinciding with the recession. It might be argued, therefore, that the effects 
of the recession placed an inherent limit on the volume of acceptances, which 
could account for the failure in the supply of acceptances to respond to the 
clear yield advantages of borrowing via this channel.
During this period, 1990-1993, average monthly acceptances fluctuated 
between £20-23 billion. Over the same period, the value of imports averaged 
about £110 billion per annum, whilst total bank lending to the UK private 
sector averaged about £360 billion. This would suggest that acceptances
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still represented a relatively small part of companies’ overall borrowing needs 
when compared either with the overall level of trade or bank lending, and 
could have increased substantially in volume before approaching some “nat­
ural” limit. It is unlikely, then, that depressed demand for acceptance credit 
due to the recession could have constrained the overall volume of acceptances. 
To the contrary, depressed conditions are likely to have increased consider­
ations such as the cost of credit, making bill finance more, rather than less, 
attractive.
Did borrowers use substitutes?
The experience of the US dollar banker’s acceptance market, which con­
tracted considerably during the mid-1980s, may offer another explanation. A 
study of this market by Jensen and Parkinson (1986) indicates that a signif­
icant factor in its decline was the increasing use by borrowers of non-bank 
sources of finance such as commercial paper22. This was prompted by the 
deterioration in the credit-rating of many US financial institutions through­
out the 1980s, which made alternatives such as commercial paper a cheaper 
source of funds than acceptances. Is it possible that a similar shift towards 
non-bank finance occurred in the UK, leading to a decline in the issue of 
eligible bills?
The sterling commercial paper (SCP) market was launched in 1986 by the 
Bank of England due to increased demands by borrowers for this instrument. 
As noted in chapter 4, SCP is the liability of the issuer only (one name paper) 
and, consequently, issuers do not have to pay an acceptance fee. If their 
credit-standing is well known, this means they could (potentially) borrow 
more cheaply via SCP than via bills. By the end of 1987, one and half years 
after its inception, SCP outstanding had reached £2 billion. Subsequent 
growth in the SCP market, however, was much slower, with the total issue 
only reaching £5 billion at its highest and averaging only about £3 billion.
There is little evidence, therefore, that the introduction of commercial pa­
per has been accompanied by any significant substitution away from sterling
22For additional discussion of the US banker’s acceptance market see Helfrich (1976), 
Hill (1986) and LaRoche (1993).
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bills. Indeed, the opposite conclusion is warranted, namely that the presence 
of cheap bill finance has been the single most important reason why the use of 
sterling CP has remained so limited since its introduction. This conclusion is 
corroborated by the strong growth in other commercial paper markets, such 
as those on the continent (see Alworth and Borio 1993), whose introduc­
tion was even more recent than that of sterling CP. Total commercial paper 
outstanding in France and Germany, for example, already exceeds sterling 
CP outstanding. Until bill yields fall relative to other money market rates, 
therefore, this state of affairs may be expected to continue.
Bill arbitrage
Perhaps the strongest reason why constraints on eligible bill issue are 
unlikely to have emanated from the borrowing side is bill arbitrage. As its 
name suggests, bill arbitrage consists of borrowing by issuing eligible bills and 
relending these funds in the sterling deposit market (see Bank of England 
1982b). Of course, this is only profitable if the cost of raising bill finance, 
which comprises the discount rate plus an acceptance fee, is below the rate at 
which funds can be lent in the money market23 (i.e. LIBID). Thus bill rates 
have to be sufficiently low to compensate the borrower’s acceptance fee and 
also the prevailing bid-ask spreads in the money market24. Prime borrowers, 
for whom the acceptance fee is the lowest, thus have the greatest potential to 
engage in bill arbitrage. Figure 6.12 indicates that for prime borrowers (who 
typically face an acceptance fee of §%), bill arbitrage opportunities presented 
themselves during 1988 and 1991, and especially in 1992-1993.
Borrowers are not unconstrained in the amount of bill arbitrage which 
they can and will undertake. Acceptance facilities, like all other bank loans, 
are subject to bank-imposed credit limits. Furthermore, acceptances facilities 
which are used to their limits for arbitrage purposes will leave the company 
with less flexibility in the event of a genuine cash need or financial cori-
23Note th a t this lending may be in another currency, such as dollars. There have been 
instances where profitable arbitrage has been possible by raising sterling funds in the bill 
market, swapping these funds into dollars, and then lending these dollar funds.
24Bid-ask spreads in the one-month sterling unsecured deposit market are typically in 
the region of |% .
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tingency. Finally, administrative costs will be incurred, which imply that 
a minimum spread may be necessary before arbitrage is seen as worthwhile. 
Spreads of 12.5 basis points were not uncommon after 1991, however, and are 
consistent with a riskless profit of £6250 for each £5 million of bills drawn 
and relent in the money market. This will have provided a sufficient incentive 
for such arbitrage during this period, and borrowers would have engaged in 
such arbitrage to the fullest extent possible, suggesting again that the de­
mand for acceptance credit is unlikely to have been a significant explanatory 
factor in the observed scarcity of bills over this period.
6.4.2 W as supply lim ited by th e Bank o f England?
R egulation o f th e  bill market
Like any bank, a central bank will be concerned about credit risks, and 
will monitor and limit its exposure to particular debtors in order to manage 
these risks. The credit risks assumed by central banks are clearly limited by 
the fact that they have long ceased to operate as commercial banks and thus 
hardly ever engage in commercial lending25. In addition, the assets held by 
most of the major central banks often comprise government securities, which 
are seen as (virtually) riskless. From the earlier discussion of the evolution of 
the Bank of England’s daily operations it is clear that this is less true of the 
Bank. A large proportion of the Bank’s assets consists of eligible bank bills, 
which are not riskless assets, and which involve credit exposures to eligible 
accepting banks (and the drawers of bills). For this reason, the Bank has 
regulated the issue of eligible bills.
Originally, bills eligible for rediscount at the Bank of England had to bear 
two good London (and, later, British) names, which automatically excluded 
any bills accepted by foreign banks. Similarly, the Bank showed a preference 
for bills drawn upon self-liquidating (i.e. trade) transactions. During the 
interwar period, when the Bank did not actively purchase commercial bills
25Although it is generally understood th a t they may have to undertake such risky loans 
- dubbed “last resort” loans - in the event of a crisis which threatens the stability of the 
financial system.
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and their outstanding issue remained small relative to Treasury bills, these 
regulations were of little consequence26. Nonetheless, throughout this period, 
and particularly after the second world war, the Bank’s policy was “to main­
tain the standards of quality long associated with the London prime bank 
bill” (Bank of England 1961, p.28). To this end, the Bank imposed accepting 
limits on the major acceptors, which were then the British merchant banks, 
although these limits were informally established and policed. According to 
the Bank, “... the prime status accorded by the Bank to the acceptances of 
the accepting houses depends upon the readiness of the latter to make their 
balance sheets available to the Bank and to answer any enquiry that the Bank 
might wish to make as a result of their sampling of the bills coming onto the 
market” (p.29). In addition, the Bank discouraged accepting houses from 
issuing finance bills by “prior consultation” with the houses and by “[taking] 
only a limited proportion of finance bills [in its sampling purchases, which] 
tends to restrict the market’s willingness to take up finance bills” (p.29)27.
Given that the Bank itself did not purchase large quantities of eligible 
acceptances after the second world war, the issue of eligibility and accepting 
limits was clearly of secondary importance within the Bank and within the 
overall functioning of the sterling money market at the time. The policy of 
overfunding the PSBR, however, described in section 1, dramatically changed 
the status of eligible bills and placed them at the centre of the Bank’s money 
market activities. As the Bank was forced to purchase ever larger quanti­
ties of eligible bills under its obligation to relieve the growing money market 
shortages, it must have become apparent that the existing eligibility criteria 
were too narrow to provide sufficient eligible bills. To some extent, there­
26 Although some foreign banks which had operated for many years in the sterling market 
probably found it irksome, and unfair, th a t the acceptances of their British rivals traded 
a t a premium above their own bills.
27Evidence as to the impact of these restrictions is contained in the Radcliffe Committee 
Report (1958), which investigated B ritain’s post-war monetary system. According to the 
Report, “the evidence is th a t [the accepting houses] are never accepting as much as they 
could” (para. 190) but goes on to claim that variation in total eligible acceptances “co­
incides very largely with the movements of the total value of UK [external] trade” (para. 
193).
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fore, the advent of overfunding created a dilemma: increased money market 
shortages meant that the Bank had to increase its asset acquisition, but in a 
manner which would not compromise its overall credit risP8.
The only true way out of this dilemma (of how to increase asset purchases 
without also increasing credit exposure) would have been for the Bank to 
increase its purchases of government securities (via repurchase agreements so 
as not to distort their prices). This has become the preferred money market 
intervention technique of most central banks. Instead, the route which was 
chosen by the Bank was to include, for the first time, foreign banks on the 
list of eligible acceptors29. As before, issue limits were again placed upon all 
eligible acceptors:
“The Bank does not propose to impose any direct limit for monetary 
control purposes on the volume of acceptance business written by eligible 
banks. It does, however, intend to set limits on the holdings within its 
own portfolio of individual acceptors’ paper; all limits would be increased 
in equal proportion should the Bank’s total portfolio, for reasons of market 
management, expand beyond the notional level to which the basic limits are 
related. These [basic] limits ... will be related to the size of the acceptor’s 
capital and to the proportion of the bank’s global business th a t is conducted 
in sterling. If the Bank’s holdings of an individual acceptor’s bill approached 
the limit, the Bank would discuss the situation with the acceptor concerned”
(Aide Memoire Giving the Bank's Guidance on its Practices when Purchasing 
Eligible Bills from  the Discount Market, Bank of England, 4 August, 1981).
A ccepting lim its
The calculation of these accepting limits was published by the Bank in 
November 1986 in a public notice concerning eligibility. As stated above,
28T hat the increased purchases for bills had caused existing eligibility criteria to become 
binding is evidenced by the fact th a t the Bank, on several occasions, rediscounted finance 
bills, even though these were explicitly defined as ineligible. Such occurrences have con­
tinued through the 1980s, and market participants readily acknowledge that, in practice, 
the Bank regularly rediscounts bills which are not claused on the basis of a self-liquidating 
transaction.
29These banks were chosen on three criteria: their overall credit-standing, the quality of 
their existing sterling acceptance business, and the ability of British banks to have similar 
access in the home-country of the bank under consideration (i.e. a “reciprocity principle” ).
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accepting limits are based on two criteria, namely capital and the extent of 
the acceptor’s sterling business. Thus an acceptor’s basic limit (/,) is given
by
^  i ( Sterling Liabilities A
k  =  Capital; x (  Total Liabilities< )  • (6-1)
This places an upper limit on the aggregate stock of eligible bills equal to 
L =  J^r=i where n is the number of eligible acceptors. If all acceptors 
issued up to their limit, therefore, an individual bank’s maximum, or limit, 
share (s;) of bills in issue can be calculated as
*  =  | , (6-2)
which clearly varies inversely with the basic limits of other acceptors. The 
limit share st , however, bears no specific relationship to the size of the Bank’s 
bill purchases. In practice, the Bank only holds a bill portfolio which is some 
fraction 7r, 0 <  7r < 1, of the aggregate basic limit30. Thus an acceptor’s 
actual limit share (sj), which determines the maximum proportion of the 
Bank’s portfolio which may be accounted for by that acceptor’s paper, is 
calculated as
*5 =  ^ . (6.3)7T
Note that sj >  s,, i.e. s'{ is a scaled-up measure of st-. Since the Bank’s actual 
holdings of bills is not published, however, acceptors are required instead to 
apply their limit share to the most recently published measure of the total 
stock of bills outstanding (B ). Thus an individual acceptor’s actual limit (/{) 
is given by
l\ =  s \B  (6.4)
-'■(A)' <6-5>
which depends positively on the acceptor’s basic limit L and the outstanding 
stock of bills i?, and negatively on the basic limits of other acceptors L and 
the Bank’s purchases of bills 7r31.
30In 1986 the B ank’s portfolio was estimated as equal to one third of the aggregate basic 
limit (implying th a t 7r =  | ) ,  but this may well have changed since then.
31 Notice th a t i.e. acceptors’ actual limits exceed the basic limits implied by their
capital and share of sterling business.
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Accepting limits, since they depend on an acceptor’s capital and sterling 
business, are not equally binding across eligible acceptors. Foreign acceptors, 
due to their more limited sterling business, will face tighter limits than do­
mestic acceptors, whilst smaller domestic acceptors (e.g. merchant banks), 
due to their smaller (absolute) capital base, will face tighter limits than larger 
domestic acceptors (e.g. the clearing banks). Indeed, the size of the clearing 
banks is such that they are unlikely to be constrained by accepting limits, 
regardless of how these limits are actually calculated. This is borne out by 
the fact that, in practice, the clearing banks are typically unaware of their 
accepting limit, whilst most other accepting banks are not only aware of their 
limits, but frequently reach these limits.
This is significant, for it means that the degree to which accepting limits 
constrain the overall level of acceptances will depend crucially on the accepting 
behaviour of the clearing banks. A reduction in the level of acceptance credit 
supplied by the clearing banks, therefore, prompted (for instance) by capital 
considerations, will require a greater proportion of the existing demand for 
acceptance credit to be supplied by non-clearing acceptors. These acceptors, 
however, are only able to respond to this demand as far as their limits will 
allow, which then constrains the supply of acceptance credit. Indeed, from 
(6.5) is it apparent that a reduction in the supply of acceptance credit by the 
clearing banks, by reducing the outstanding stock of bills B , actually makes 
the accepting limits of non-clearing banks tighter.
This impact of accepting limits may well explain the observed scarcity of 
bills identified in section 2. There is evidence that the clearing banks have, 
in recent years, reduced their share of acceptances (figure 6.10). This may be 
due to the fact that capital considerations have played an increasing role in 
the lending decisions of financial institutions. Consequently, the profitability 
of loans made under acceptance facilities, where fees have become increas­
ingly competitive, will have been compared with the profitability of loans 
under alternative lending arrangements, and may have been found to be less 
attractive32. The considerable loan loss provisions made by some of the clear­
32Note the im portant distinction between accepting a bill and purchasing a  bill accepted 
by another bank. The latter entails virtually no credit risk, since a bill is two-name paper.
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ing banks during the recession of 1990-1992, especially due to their exposure 
to the property sector, will undoubtedly have sharpened these comparisons. 
W hatever the reason for the observed reduction in acceptances by the clear­
ing banks, however, this reduction will have caused demands for acceptance 
credit to shift towards other acceptors. Accepting limits on these banks may 
have been such that they were unable to accommodate these demands. For 
obvious reasons banks will not wish to divulge their limits, nor will they read­
ily admit that they are up against these limits. Nonetheless, casual evidence 
obtained from these banks suggests that many acceptors were frequently at 
their accepting limits33.
Another shred of evidence in favour of the above hypothesis lies in the 
different time pattern of the (annual) growth of acceptances by the clearing 
banks as compared with those of all other accepting banks. As figure 6.15 
indicates, the growth rates of acceptances for these two groups is highly 
correlated, but the growth rate in acceptances for the clearing banks is much 
more variable than that of the other acceptors34. Thus, while the acceptance 
growth of the clearing banks became progressively negative through 1991, 
that of the other accepting banks remained much closer to zero, suggesting 
that there may have been the type of spillover effect described above. Then, 
in September 1992, acceptance growth for the clearing banks became sharply 
positive and in October rose to nearly 50%. In contrast, the acceptances 
of the other accepting banks only grew by about 25%, suggesting that their 
capacity to expand acceptances was constrained relative to the clearing banks.
This sharp reversal in acceptance growth -  which saw the annual growth
Accepting a bill, on the other hand, entails a direct credit exposure to the drawer of the 
bill, which is rem unerated by the acceptance fee. It is this return which a bank will weigh 
up against the return on its other lending business.
^C ustom er relationships are valuable, and thus acceptors may continue to accept bills 
even when they have reached their limit. They must, however, hold and fund these bills 
for some tim e before selling them into the wider market, which usually incurs a cost given 
the low yield on bills.
34This is partly  the result of the fact th a t the clearing banks have a smaller share of 
acceptances, which means th a t any given change in acceptances will necessarily reflect a 
greater percentage change.
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rate in acceptances surge above 25% in October 1992 -  is likely to have 
been triggered by the huge money market shortage resulting from the large 
purchases of sterling by the monetary authorities just before the currency 
left the ERM. Even though the Bank offered temporary facilities whereby 
it could relieve most of this shortage, its purchases of bills rose significantly. 
The market discount rate on bills thus fell sharply (see figure 6.4), stimulating 
the observed increase in the demand for acceptance finance. This is also the 
time when bill arbitrage opportunities were at their greatest (see figure 6.12).
Although the experience of September 1992, together with some degree of 
overfunding of the PSBR, kept shortages large for most of 1993, conditions 
in the money market have been less stringent of late, for two reasons. First, 
the Bank has made permanent -  and more frequent -  the temporary facility 
invoked in 1992 (see chapter 4). And, secondly, the government has now 
modified its definition of funding to include government securities purchased 
by banks and building societies, thereby reducing the potential for its previous 
funding rule to result in overfunding. These changes have reduced the Bank’s 
demands for bills, and so have probably eased the impact of accepting limits 
on bill yields. Furthermore, they have in all likelihood reduced the chances 
that these limits will again become binding in the future.
Having identified a plausible candidate for the causes of the observed 
scarcity of bills, the following section now traces some of its effects.
6.5 The excess liquidity premium: effects
6.5.1 Funding and rediscounting costs
The fact that the Bank of England buys bills each day should result in the 
market discount rate being (approximately) equal to the Bank’s stop rate. 
To see why, note that any difference between the market discount rate and 
the Bank’s stop rate would imply a difference between the market price for a 
bill and the Bank’s price for a bill. Using equation (4.1), this price difference 
may be expressed as
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p  _  p   m  ( d  s )  ,  .
* B a n k  * m arket  —  3 6 5  * V /
where d is the market discount rate, 5 is the Bank’s stop rate, and m  is the 
unexpired maturity of the bill. When d ^  s there would thus exist either 
a sure capital gain or capital loss on bills which were sold to the Bank of 
England. Under normal circumstances, therefore, the market price of bills 
would adjust to eliminate such a sure gain or loss.
This has not, however, happened in practice. Figure 6.11 indicates that 
market discount rates on one month bills have typically been below the official 
stop rate (the same is true for the discount rate on three month bills). The 
explanation for this differential is clearly the same as that profferred, in the 
previous section, for the yield spread between bills and other money market 
instruments.
Given the price differential between market bill prices and the Bank’s 
price, any institution which accepted a bill and then immediately sought to 
rediscount this bill with the Bank of England, would incur a capital loss. In 
practice, therefore, acceptors have had an incentive not to rediscount their 
bills with the Bank, selling them into the market instead. In any event, 
as noted in chapter 4 the Bank does not purchase bills until seven days 
have elapsed since the day of their acceptance, which means that all eligible 
bills must be funded for at least seven days before they can be sold to the 
Bank. However, the existence of an excess liquidity premium on eligible bills 
-  namely the large yield spread between eligible bills and other money market 
assets between 1990-1992 -  implies that there has not been an incentive to 
hold bills either, given that they could not be profitably funded. Indeed, 
aside from the fact that bill holdings contribute towards satisfying banks’ 
liquidity requirements, there has been little incentive for acceptors or any 
other financial institution, such as a discount house, to hold any bills at all 
in recent years.
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6.5.2 T he ownership of eligible bills
Who, then, holds the outstanding stock of eligible bills? Figure 6.13 indicates 
that the Bank of England, through its regular bill purchases, has owned an 
increasing share of the overall stock of bills and at the end of 1993 owned over 
50% of all sterling eligible bills outstanding. Discount houses, traditionally 
the largest non-official holders of bills, have held a declining share of the stock 
of bills, and now own less than 10% of non-official holdings. In contrast to 
the houses, and as shown in figure 6.14, the clearing banks have become the 
largest non-official holders of bills, now regularly owning over 90% of non­
official holdings. W ithin this group, the “big four” clearing banks are the 
major holders and account for over 80% of the groups’ holdings. Note that 
this is a fairly recent development, with the major increase in clearing bank 
holdings occurring after the middle of 1990.
This development in the ownership distribution of the stock of non-official 
bill holdings has had several, interrelated consequences. First, the increase 
in the bill holdings of the larger clearing banks has undermined the role of 
the discount houses as the official counterparties to the Bank of England. 
Instead of acting as principals, the discount houses now operate largely as 
passive agents in the operations of the Bank, “passing through” the bill offers 
of the clearing banks to the Bank on most occasions. Clearly, therefore, the 
timing and magnitude of the daily bill sales to the Bank now depend to a 
significant extent on the portfolio decisions of a few institutions. In itself, 
this is not a remarkable situation, since these decisions have been the domain 
of a relatively small number of discount houses for many years. Coupled 
with the fact that these large bill portfolios incur an opportunity cost in 
foregone revenue, however, this situation implies that the clearing banks face 
incentives to generate cheap funding through reserve management strategies 
which utilise the timing and magnitude of their bill operations with the Bank.
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6.5.3 V olatility
For example, a clearing bank may be in a position to sell enough bills to the 
Bank in its 9h45 operations to “remove” the entire money market shortage, 
thereby alleviating the aggregate reserve “pressure” that would otherwise 
result from the shortage. If the clearing bank itself remains short of cash 
(i.e. has a borrowing need in excess of the money market shortage) some 
other financial institutions will necessarily be long of cash (i.e. has excess 
reserves)35 and will be seeking to lend, usually for a short period such as 
overnight. By delaying its demands for cash in the market, the clearing bank 
may succeed in lowering the cost at which it eventually borrows, as lenders 
will gradually lower the rate at which they are prepared to lend as the end of 
the trading day approaches. In this way, a clearing bank is able to fund its 
large bill portfolio profitably because it can deploy this portfolio to generate 
cheap short-dated funding sufficiently often to offset the lower yields on its 
bills36.
Alternatively, a single clearing bank may be in the position where, by 
delaying its sales of bills to the Bank, a substantial amount of the money 
market shortage remains outstanding throughout the day. If the bank is also 
long of cash, other banks will necessarily be short of cash and will be seeking 
to borrow in the overnight market. This excess demand for funds will tend 
to drive up the price of overnight funds, as borrowers become increasingly 
willing to pay a higher overnight rate as the end of the day approaches.
Obviously these sorts of funding/timing strategies are not without risks, 
particularly since the aggregate cash position of the banking system is not 
known with certainty. Hence an expected intraday movement in short-term
35This follows because the aggregate reserves of the banking system are close to zero 
after the money market shortage has been removed. See Schnadt (1994a).
36This strategic behaviour on the part of clearing banks is discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 7. Note, however, th a t this behaviour is not collusive, as clearing banks compete 
vigorously for funds in the money market. Clearing banks are, however, usually large net 
takers of short-term  wholesale funds. Strategic behaviour on the part of one clearing bank 
which results in a lower overnight rate, therefore, may indirectly lower the funding costs 
of another clearing bank.
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rates does not always materialise. Similarly, clearing banks are, to some ex­
tent, constrained by their existing bill portfolio and their cash position and 
thus they cannot simply pursue these strategies at will. Nevertheless, the 
breakdown of the timing of the Bank’s operations (in chapter 4) -  which in­
dicates that large shortages are sometimes removed entirely in the morning 
or, alternatively, that they sometimes remain until the money market closes 
-  suggest that these strategies are deployed. A more obvious indication, per­
haps, is the volatility in short-dated sterling interest rates, which is examined 
more closely in the following chapter. Whilst the funding strategies of the 
clearing banks are not the only cause of volatility in short sterling rates37, 
they are certainly a prime suspect. These strategies, moreover, have had a 
tendency to create periodic cycles of “feast or famine” in the bill market.
6.5.4 The secondary bill market
These cycles are promulgated as follows. Although the clearing banks are the 
largest individual acceptors in the UK, they only accept one-fifth of all eligible 
sterling bills. Since they routinely hold over three-quarters of all eligible bills, 
the clearing banks have become large net buyers of bills. Most other accepting 
banks, being unable to fund their bills profitably, are thus usually net sellers 
of bills into the market. The periodic attempts by clearing banks to generate 
lower short-dated interest rates, as described above, have two effects on this 
scenario. Accepting banks (and discount houses) temporarily become able 
to fund their bills at a profit (since short-term rates are temporarily low) 
and thus sell fewer bills into the market. Secondly, short-term borrowers 
temporarily switch from issuing bills to borrowing unsecured funds in the 
money market. This reduces the overall flow of bills to the clearing banks, 
whose portfolios become depleted due to their regular bill sales to the Bank. 
As bills become increasingly “scarce” , bill rates are bid down whilst short­
term money market rates begin to tighten, often “spiking” to high levels as
37Reserve requirements elsewhere are generally higher than those of the UK, and re­
serve maintenance periods are longer, which will tend to insulate short-term  rates from 
movements in aggregate reserves.
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large money market shortages are removed with increasing difficulty. This in 
turn induces a greater flow of bills into the market, as holders of bills can no 
longer fund them profitably and borrowers again switch to bill finance.
These market dynamics are a far cry from a “conventional” picture of 
secondary market activity, such as may be found in the sterling CD market 
(or, say, in the US Treasury bill market). Eligible bills are not held by 
a wide group of institutions, and are not employed as liquid assets in the 
conventional38 sense, i.e. as an asset which is purchased when an institution 
has excess reserves, or sold when an institution must cover a reserve deficit. 
Instead, secondary market activity is essentially unidirectional, with (non­
clearing bank) acceptors selling bills to the clearing banks (and, to a limited 
extent, to the discount houses). Even this, unidirectional, activity is limited, 
since the clearing banks themselves will not usually sell their acceptances 
into the market, but will “swap” acceptances instead, since this avoids the 
bid-ask spread.
Thus, whilst the primary bill market is clearly attractive to borrowers, 
since they can obtain funds at below market rates, the secondary bill mar­
ket is essentially redundant. The classic function of this secondary market, 
namely reserve redistribution, has long been carried out in the short-term, 
unsecured deposit market, which is much deeper and more liquid. Unfortu­
nately, this is also where those banks who face the funding and rediscounting 
costs associated with eligible bills must, and do, attem pt to recover these 
costs. Consequently, that market in which reserve redistribution does take 
place, is also rendered less efficient.
38The conventional or classical definition of a liquid asset is an asset which is actually 
employed to manage cash on a day-to-day basis; it is hard, otherwise, to think why liquidity 
would be such a valuable attribute. Of course, financial institutions also consider as liquid 
those assets which could be readily exchanged for cash in the event of some unforeseen 
contingency.
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6.6 Concluding remarks
In order to provide reserves to the banking system on a regular basis, the 
Bank of England has, virtually since it opened its doors, elected to purchase 
private sector assets, namely bills of exchange. Such bills were, originally, a 
natural choice for this purpose, as they were the only short-term financial 
assets which existed in any quantity. Having chosen to purchase these assets, 
however, the Bank has also had to regulate their issue for prudential reasons, 
to contain its credit exposure to individual banks or firms.
One way in which the Bank has regulated the issue of eligible bills is via 
accepting limits. And, whilst the notional constraints placed by these limits 
on the overall supply of bills has never been reached, let alone approached, 
this chapter has outlined how, in practice, the supply of eligible bills has 
recently been constrained by these limits -  due to circumstance rather than 
to design. It is difficult, otherwise, to explain the yield on eligible bills, which 
has fallen, for prolonged periods, below the level suggested by the liquidity 
premium due to their eligibility status.
The Bank did not always purchase bank bills. During and between the two 
world wars, the Bank routinely bought Treasury bills, whose supply had far 
eclipsed the stock of bank bills. Obviously, this made regulations in the form 
of accepting limits unnecessary for prudential purposes. However, the pursuit 
of overfunding by the government dramatically changed this situation:
“[During the 1970s] increased attention was given to the control of the 
stock of money, but a buoyant trend developed in bank lending to the private 
sector. At least in the short-run, unduly rapid monetary growth could most 
easily be m oderated by selling government debt to the non-bank private sec­
tor on a larger scale than hitherto in relation to the Government’s borrowing 
requirement [i.e. overfunding]. This combination of circumstances created 
persistent underlying shortages in the money market. The Bank responded 
in the first instance by reducing the quantity of Treasury bills on offer a t the 
weekly tender. Even so, the Bank still found it necessary to buy Treasury 
bills - often more than were being issued. Inevitably, the proportion of these 
in the banking system ’s portfolio declined and the Bank was then obliged to 
operate increasingly by purchasing bank bills... ” (Bank of England 1982, 
p.88; emphasis added).
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The Bank’s resumption of bank bill purchases, therefore, was a reaction to 
the circumstances created by overfunding. The advantage of overfunding was 
that it could -  mechanically -  lower bank deposits and so too the measured 
money stock, thereby assisting the monetary authorities in meeting their ex­
plicit broad money targets (introduced in 1976). This mechanistic reduction 
was possible because most public sector accounts were -  and still are -  held 
with the Bank of England and overfunding simply decreased private bank 
deposits by increasing public sector deposits at the Bank of England. This 
flow of deposits (reserves) from the private to the public sector, however, had 
the disadvantage of generating larger money market shortages, which then 
had to be offset by increased purchases of private sector assets (i.e. bank 
bills) by the Bank. The same conditions which made overfunding possible, 
therefore, similarly rendered it impossible that the shortages so created could 
be met through an increase in the issue and purchase of Treasury bills by the 
Bank.
Even though overfunding as a policy objective was abandoned in 1985/86 
(see section 1) the phenomenon of overfunding has continued to accompany 
government funding in recent years. This was due to the funding policy pur­
sued by the government, which excluded gilts sold to banks and building 
societies from the definition of funding. Consequently, the Bank has con­
tinued to purchase large quantities of bank bills. Although this definition 
was scrapped in 1992/93, a modification to the funding rule in 1990/91 had 
excluded Treasury bills from the definition of funding. According to the 
Treasury,
“... because the underlying intention is th a t the public sector does not 
finance itself by creating money, the authorities need to ensure th a t funding 
is not concentrated in very short-term  debt, where the public liabilities have 
the attributes of money and liquidity .... [Thus] Treasury bills, which have 
such characteristics, no longer count as funding” (Financial Statem ent and 
Budget Report 1990-91, HMSO, p .25).
This position is inconsistent for at least two reasons. First, eligible bank 
bills and Treasury bills are, in terms of liquidity, perfect substitutes: both 
may be sold to the Bank and both satisfy banks’ liquidity requirements.
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Secondly, all gilt-edged securities, regardless of their initial maturity, will 
eventually have an unexpired maturity which makes them indistinguishable 
from a Treasury bill (except, perhaps, for a coupon). They, too, count to­
wards banks’ liquidity requirements. If the funding policy of the Treasury 
were consistently applied, therefore, it should similarly exclude bank bills and 
gilt-edged securities with a short unexpired maturity from the definition of 
funding, which it clearly does not39.
Inconsistent or not, the current funding policy of the government is that 
Treasury bills are excluded from the definition of funding. Until this definition 
is changed, it is unlikely that their issue will increase enough for them to play a 
significant role within the sterling money market or within the Bank’s money 
market operations. Consequently, the Bank is likely to rely increasingly upon 
repurchase agreements involving gilt-edged securities as a means of supplying 
reserves to the banking system. Not only are such repos more flexible in terms 
of their maturity -  a feature whose advantages were outlined in the previous 
chapter -  but they also involve no credit exposure to banks or firms and thus 
do not require additional regulation or monitoring by the Bank.
It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the Bank may eventually curtail 
altogether its purchases of bank bills. These instruments will then cease to 
be considered as primary liquid assets and will cease to bear a liquidity pre-
39This is exemplified by the following exchange during the proceedings of the Treasury 
and Civil Service Committee during 1993:
303. Why do you not allow sales of Treasury bills to count as funding?
(M r Lamont) As I have said, I have the instinctive apprehension about
monetary financing.
304. Unless I am mistaken, if the banks buy short-term  government debt 
in the form of Treasury bills this does not count as funding. But if they buy 
gilts within six months or less to m aturity this presumably does count as 
funding. W hat is the reason for this distinction?
(M r Lamont) I am  sure we should not go in the direction of funding more 
and more of our debt on a short-term  basis. You can argue about where we 
eventually draw the line (Fourth Report from the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee, 1992-93, HC578, HMSO, p.45).
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mium (other than that which is due to their being tradable on a secondary 
market). This will affect both the firms which rely upon bill finance as a 
cheap source of short-term funds, as well as the financial institutions which 
hold bills to satisfy their liquidity requirements. Borrowers will switch to the 
cheapest alternative which, in the case of prime names, may be commercial 
paper, which avoids the acceptance fee on a bill. Sterling commercial paper 
programmes are thus likely to become more actively used. Other borrow­
ers, however, may well find that bills remain an attractive means of raising 
finance. Financial institutions, on the other hand, are likely to hold larger 
amounts of gilt-edged securities for liquidity purposes. Indeed, this demand 
for additional liquid assets may, finally, provide the impetus for increasing 
the Treasury bill issue. Lastly, the cessation of eligible bank bill purchases by 
the Bank may see the restoration of more orderly conditions in the overnight 
market, and very short-term sterling interest rates, the current behaviour of 
which is examined in the following chapter.
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Figure 6.1
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Figure 6.3
L IB O R /T reasu ry  bill yield spread  (one m onth)
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Figure 6.5
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Figure 6.6
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Figure 6.7  
Sterling acceptances:  
total outstanding (£m n)
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Figure 6.9  
Sterling acceptances: 
share of total bank lending to th e  UK  private sector (%)
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Figure 6.10  
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share accepted by clearing banks (%)
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Figure 6.11
M arket d iscoun t ra te  — band one stop  ra te  (one m onth)
0.5
- 0 . 5
1990 1991 1992 1993 19941988 1989
Figure 6.12 
Bill yield (-ffees) -  LIBID  (one m onth)
0.5
0.375
0.25
0.125
- 0.125
- 0.25
- 0.375
- 0.5
19941990 1991 1992 199319891988
T
ho
us
an
ds
220 C H A P T E R  6.
Figure 6.13 
Bank bills: 
total holdings (£m n)
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Figure 6.14  
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Figure 6.15 
A nnual acceptance grow th (%): 
clearing banks versus o th e r eligible accep tors
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Table 6.1
The L IB O R /eligib le bill yield spread 1980-1993
Y ear M ean V arian ce V o la tility Ho : h t  =  Ht - i?
1980 -0.05 0.51 76.06 n /a
1981 0.31 0.27 0.33 n /a
1982 0.35 0.20 0.15 yes
1983 0.16 0.13 0.11 no (1%)
1984 0.18 0.17 0.17 yes
1985 0.29 0.21 0.17 no (1%)
1986 0.18 0.14 0.13 no (1%)
1987 0.11 0.12 0.12 no (1%)
1988 0.22 0.12 0.09 no (1%)
1989 0.26 0.07 0.06 no (1%)
1990 0.33 0.08 0.03 no (1%)
1991 0.36 0.14 0.09 no (1%)
1992 0.48 0.73 0.06 no (5%)
1993 0.31 0.14 0.08 no (1%)
Source: Datastream
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Table 6.2 
Largest Users o f A cceptances
S e c to r
(CSO classification)
A ccep tan c es
£m n Outstanding 
(% of Total)
% of Total Bank 
Lending to Sector
Other finance 4907 (27) 10
Food, drink, tobacco 2737 (15) 29.7
Wholesale distribution 2326 (13) 15.9
Other manufacturing 1363 (7) 12.2
Leasing companies 902 (5) 3.5
Other retail distribution 807 (4) 7.3
Electrical engineering 785 (4) 15.9
Business services 778 (4) 2.5
Oil and natural gas 602 (3) 8.5
Other energy industries 558 (3) 16.7
Motor manufacturing 523 (3) 25.6
Chemical industry 520 (3) 16.7
Source: CSO Financial Statistics.
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C hapter 7
 ^The Behaviour o f th e  
Sterling Overnight Interest R ate
This chapter investigates the behaviour and the determinants of the short­
est maturity interest rate in the sterling money market -  the overnight rate. 
In the US the overnight rate is known as the federal funds rate and is gener­
ally considered to be an important indicator of the stance of monetary policy. 
Consequently, it is one of the most highly scrutinised variables in the finan­
cial markets and in the wider economy. The federal funds market has also 
been the subject of numerous academic studies, which have examined the 
institutional structure of the market and the banking system more generally, 
and have traced the effects of this structure on the behaviour of the fed funds 
rate1.
The sterling overnight rate, in contrast, is not “targeted” by the Bank of 
England in the same manner that the federal funds rate is targeted by the 
Fed. The overnight rate is thus not considered as an im portant information 
variable as regards monetary policy in the UK and is not closely monitored 
by anyone aside from those institutions which are active in the money mar­
ket. Indeed, apart from two published papers by the author (Schnadt 1994a, 
1994b) and a recent working paper by Ayuso, Haldane and Restoy (1994),
1See Minsky (1957), Poole (1968), Ho and Saunders (1985), Spindt and Hoffmeister 
(1988) and Brunner and Lown (1993).
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no analytical studies of the sterling overnight funds market and of the deter­
minants of the overnight rate have been conducted.
Why might such issues be important? One reason has been put forward 
by Poole (1990):
“In debating how best to stabilise the economy, a tendency exists to 
dismiss day-to-day operating procedures as irrelevant .... But ignoring the 
very short run issues is a mistake. The analysis of monetary policy should 
proceed in the same way as the analysis of possible schemes for successful 
speculation in the securities markets. A common research design in finance is 
to specify what hypothetical speculators would do and when they would do 
it. Investors cannot buy shares at the monthly average price without buying 
every day. Thus, in finance research, our hypothetical speculators buy and 
sell at actual market prices and pay actual transactions costs. The analysis 
of m onetary policy should proceed in the same way. (p.40)
Even though the Bank of England does not attem pt to influence the overnight 
interest rate directly, it certainly influences this rate indirectly. This was 
clearly demonstrated in chapter 5, where the term structure of sterling inter­
est rates was derived, and the behaviour of very short-term interest rates was 
seen to depend crucially on the interest-rate expectations of money market 
participants. The level of overnight rates, therefore, is fundamentally linked 
to the expected path of official interest rates and may contain information 
about these expectations, at least to money market participants.
A more important reason for studying the overnight funds market, how­
ever, pertains to efficiency. It has been argued in previous chapters that 
the money market, especially the overnight funds market, is vital to banks 
for liquidity management purposes. Activity in the sterling overnight mar­
ket is substantial -  easily £15 billion daily -  and is many times larger than 
the volume of trading in other sterling financial markets such as the Lon­
don Stock Exchange2. If the overnight interest rate is extremely volatile as 
compared with other interest rates -  which this chapter will confirm -  then 
this may be detrimental to the efficiency of the overnight funds market in
2Daily turnover on the stock exchange rarely exceeds £2 billion.
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facilitating reserve management3. Money market participants, for example, 
will have to devote additional resources to predicting rates more accurately, 
or to seeking out alternative means of managing their liquidity. Studying 
the microstructure of the overnight market, therefore, and the determination 
of prices there, is essential to an understanding of its allocative efficiency, 
and may also provide insights into the possible design of alternative -  more 
efficient -  institutional arrangements.
It is not the intention of this chapter to develop a specific theoretical model 
of the sterling overnight market. Instead, it aims to provide a descriptive 
framework and, more importantly, to characterise empirically some of the 
factors which influence both the level and the volatility of the overnight rate. 
Whilst the level (or the mean) of the overnight rate and its determinants may 
be examined using a simple regression model, the volatility of this rate is more 
usefully studied by using recent developments in the empirical modelling of 
volatility.
Most economic models, when subjected to empirical estimation, are for­
mulated as follows:
y* =  0 ' £ =  1, . . .  , T  , (7.1)
where yt is the variable whose behaviour is to be explained, x t is a vector 
of explanatory variables, 0 is a vector of coefficients, and et is a random 
component, or error. Since the explanatory variables are given, and are 
thus non-stochastic (non-random), statements about the relationship between 
these and the dependent variable rely crucially on the statistical properties 
of the error term, which forms the stochastic part of the model. By far the 
most common assumptions, and the basis of classical (OLS) regression, are 
that et ~  N (  0, a 2).
These assumptions, particularly the latter assumption concerning con­
stant variance, essentially ensure that the distribution of the disturbances is
3The dram atic increase in the volatility of federal funds rate between 1979 and 1982, 
for example, led to a spate of surveys and studies of the effects of this volatility; see Evans 
(1981), Kasriel (1981) and Rasche (1985).
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unchanging across observations (i.e. over time if the data are time series), 
and that the dependent variable yt has the conditional distribution
Vt \ x * o'2 ) -
Unsurprisingly, the statements of economic interest are then typically about 
the conditional mean of the dependent variable rather than its variance. Of 
course, the assumption of constant variance (of the error) may not be valid 
in practice, in which case conventional regression techniques may give mis­
leading results4. This problem -  heteroscedasticity -  is known to pervade 
cross-section data, but is also prevalent in the distribution of financial prices, 
of which short-term interest rates are an example. A substantial literature has 
emerged recently which examines whether the variance of the random com­
ponent in (7.1) exhibits (a particular form of) time-variation, a phenomenon 
which has been called autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity or, more 
simply, ARCH (see Engle 1982). And, whilst conventional estimation tech­
niques are then more or less maintained, the statements of economic interest 
are usually about the variance, or volatility, of the dependent variable and 
the nature of its time-variation.
These developments in the literature suggest a convenient way of organis­
ing the empirical examination in this chapter. Section 1 presents a description 
of the overnight market and of the recent behaviour of the overnight rate, 
whilst section 2 discusses the factors which may influence this behaviour. Sec­
tion 3 then examines the determinants of the level of the overnight rate; that 
is, a model of conditional mean is estimated using conventional OLS regres­
sion. Thereafter, section 4 examines the volatility of the overnight rate; that 
is, a model of the conditional variance is estimated using ARCH regression. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are made in section 5.
4In particular, the estim ators <9 become inefficient; see Greene (1993).
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7.1 T he overnight funds market
7.1.1 W h at are overnight sterling funds?
The market for overnight funds is by far the most active component of the 
sterling money market. Here, banks, other financial institutions and corpo­
rations borrow (lend) unsecured sterling funds -  for same day settlement -  
with a m aturity of one day. This “day”, however, is not defined in terms of 
real time, e.g. 12 or 24 hours, but refers to the next trading day. The end of 
one trading day is marked by the cut-off time at which it is no longer possible 
to trade funds for same day value. In the UK, this is governed by the rules 
of the large value payment systems discussed in chapter 4, and is normally 
15hl0 for non-clearing banks and 15h30 for clearing banks.
This has two noteworthy consequences. First, although banks may con­
tinue to trade overnight funds after 15h30 on the same calendar day, these 
are already considered as having taken place on the following trading day. 
In principle, therefore, there is no difference between an overnight trade con­
ducted after 15h30 on one calendar day and before 15h30 on the next calendar 
day. Normally, however, participants in this market will trade most actively 
on the morning and early afternoon of a trading day. Secondly, overnight 
funds traded before 15h30 on a Friday have a maturity of three days rather 
than one day, given that the markets are closed on Saturdays and Sundays. 
Similarly, overnight funds traded before bank holidays also carry a longer 
maturity than one day. If, for instance, both Friday and Monday are bank 
holidays -  this is commonly the case at Easter -  then an overnight loan made 
on the Thursday becomes a five day loan since it will only be repaid on the 
following Tuesday. Effectively, therefore, the shortest maturity at which it 
is possible to borrow or lend funds is not always one day, an institutional 
feature which is discussed further below.
The average size of trades in the overnight market naturally differs ac­
cording to the needs of the borrowing or lending institution, but is usually 
around £5 million. Obviously smaller banks and corporations will be able to 
lend and borrow smaller amounts, whilst the larger clearing banks may make
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single trades as large as £1 billion. Quoted spreads are usually |% , although 
these are usually only firm for interbank trades. Corporate participants typ­
ically face a slightly wider spread of about
7.1.2 U K  reserve requirem ents
There is an important institutional difference in the UK between clearing 
(settlement) banks and all other money market participants. It is that the 
latter all utilise accounts at clearing banks for purposes of trading in the 
money market -  indeed, for any trading, financial and non-financial -  whilst 
clearing banks themselves use operational (or reserve) accounts at the Bank 
of England. The reserve accounts of the UK banking system may thus be 
thought of as a “two-tier” structure, in which only the clearing banks face 
an official reserve requirement. As noted in chapter 4, the clearing banks 
are obliged, by the Bank of England, to achieve at least a zero closing (or 
overnight) balance in these operational accounts5. Non-clearing banks, on 
the other hand, do not face any official reserve requirements, although their 
reserve management problem is nonetheless similar to that of the clearing 
banks. The interest return on funds left overnight in transaction (current) 
accounts will be at a substantial discount to the market overnight rate, whilst 
the cost of funds when these current accounts are overdrawn overnight will be 
at considerable premium above the market overnight rate. Thus customers 
of a clearing bank will not want to have either a positive or a negative closing 
balance in their current accounts and will use the overnight funds market to 
lend any surplus balances, or to borrow deficit balances6.
Of course, the activity of the customers of a clearing bank as they with­
draw funds from, or deposit funds into, their current accounts naturally alters 
the cash (reserve) position of that clearing bank. Since this customer activity 
is not perfectly predictable, clearing banks remain inherently uncertain over
5Recall th a t clearing banks aim to end the day with a small, positive target balance 
each day.
6On occasion, however, the overnight rate may rise sufficiently for customers to  utilise 
their overdraft facilities voluntarily.
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the likely evolution of their intraday cash position, and hence of their closing 
reserve position. For instance, a clearing bank may have bought or sold funds 
in the overnight market so as to “square” (i.e. balance) its own reserve posi­
tion, only to receive further customer deposits (withdrawals) which then leave 
its operational balance positive (negative). These customer transactions thus 
necessitate further trading in the overnight market by the clearing bank, as 
it must sell (buy) funds to square its position. It is unlikely, therefore, that a 
clearing bank will be able to end the trading day (i.e. 15h30) without either 
a positive or a negative reserve position, which may be quite substantial (e.g. 
£250 million). It is for this reason that clearing banks -  and not other banks 
-  are able to engage in a “final” round of lending as described in chapter 4.
Given that the Bank of England imposes a daily reserve requirement on 
the clearing banks, it must then ensure that the reserves are made available 
to satisfy this requirement. Earlier chapters have argued that this reserve 
provision is the primary purpose of the Bank’s daily money market opera­
tions. Indeed, if the Bank did not make reserves available during the day, 
it would have no choice but to make them available at the end of the day, 
probably in the form of an overnight overdraft to the clearing bank (or banks) 
whose operational account was in deficit. The relationship between the Bank 
and the clearing banks is, in this sense, directly analogous to the relationship 
between a clearing bank and its customer. When a customer overdraws their 
transaction account by more than the negotiated limit, the clearing bank 
more-or-less automatically lends funds to the customer. Naturally, bank cus­
tomers will try  to avoid this situation, as they will be charged a penalty 
rate by the clearing bank and may be granted less (or more costly) credit 
in the future. Clearing banks, however, cannot avoid incurring a deficit in 
their operational balances if aggregate reserves are insufficient to meet their 
reserve requirements. This will be the case whenever there is a money market 
shortage -  which was defined in chapter 4 as a reserve shortfall of the clearing 
banks below their reserve targets. The shortage thus represents the level of 
reserves which must be provided by the Bank of England during the course 
of the day to ensure that the clearing banks meet their reserve targets.
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7.1.3 T he im pact o f reserve accounting and central 
bank operations on th e  overnight rate
The reserve maintenance period in the UK is extremely short -  one day. 
Unlike their overseas counterparts in the US or on the Continent, therefore, 
who typically face positive reserve requirements with reserve maintenance 
periods of as long as two weeks or one month, UK clearing banks do not have 
any scope for reserve averaging. It is a well known that such averaging tends 
to reduce the day-to-day variability of overnight interest rates, since banks 
can choose to defer their overnight borrowing (lending) if they believe the 
current cost of overnight funds is high (low) relative to its expected level on 
subsequent days (Poole 1968). Consequently, one would expect the day-to- 
day variability in overnight rates to be higher in the UK than elsewhere. This 
is certainly borne out in practice. For example, Kasman (1992) and, more 
recently, Ayuso, Haldane and Restoy (1993) find that sterling overnight rates 
are significantly more volatile7 on a day-to-day basis than US or Continental 
overnight rates.
It is also well known that, under the reserve accounting employed else­
where (e.g. the US or Europe), overnight interest rates become more volatile 
as the end of the maintenance period approaches, essentially because banks 
then have less flexibility in accommodating any deviations from their aver­
age reserve targets. Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) have studied this phe­
nomenon in the fed funds market, noting that “because of the discrete char­
acter of reserve maintenance measurements and settlement, the variance of 
the [overnight] funds rate is higher towards the end of each business day and is 
highest near the end of settlement days ... [Furthermore] funds rate variance 
may be higher on days prior to holidays and on Fridays ...” (p.412). They 
present evidence -  corroborating the results of an earlier study by Dyl and
7Volatility in these comparisons may be defined in a number of ways. Kasman, for 
instance, chooses to  use the deviation of daily rates from a centered moving average, 
whilst Ayuso ei al use the conditional variance of the error from an ARCH regression. A 
third commonly used diagnostic, which is employed below, is the standard deviation of 
day-to-day changes in the overnight rate.
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Hoffmeister (1985) -  that the volatility of the federal funds rate increases over 
the maintenance period and that it is significantly higher before weekends 
and on the final day of the maintenance period. Similar effects in continental 
overnight rates, particularly those relating to greater volatility near the end 
of reserve maintenance periods, are reported by Ayuso et al (1993). These 
results suggest that, whilst the volatility of the sterling overnight rates on a 
day-to-day basis is clearly higher than that observed elsewhere, a more ap­
propriate comparison might be with the behaviour of overnight rates on the 
final day of the maintenance period, as banks are then in a similar position 
to those in the UK.
Of course it is not necessarily the case that a particular structure of re­
serve requirements (i.e. low level, short maintenance period) must be asso­
ciated with greater volatility in overnight rates. If, for example, the central 
bank stood ready to borrow or lend overnight funds at some stated rate 
at all times, the market overnight rate would be kept equal to the central 
bank’s rate irrespective of the structure of reserve requirements. An impor­
tant determinant of the behaviour of overnight rates under any set of reserve 
requirements is thus the money market operations o f the central bank, which 
usually only occur at several discrete points over the maintenance period and 
which influence current and, more importantly, expected reserve availability. 
If reserve availability is expected to become greater (tighter), the current 
overnight funds rate will fall (rise), as those institutions which are expecting 
an average reserve surplus (deficit) attem pt to lend (borrow) reserves.
This expectation of future reserve availability may itself be based upon 
the characteristics of the central banks’ operations, such as their type, their 
timing and their magnitude. Feinman (1993a), for instance, undertakes a 
detailed analysis of the magnitude and the type of open market operation 
employed by the Federal Reserve and finds that these are systematically 
related to certain variables such as the aggregate expected reserve need, the 
aggregate cumulative reserve position and the deviation of the federal funds 
rate from its expected average. This in turn implies that market participants 
will associate particular actions by the Fed as signals of its underlying policy 
stance, prompting an immediate reaction in the fed funds rate when the Fed
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deviates from its “normal” pattern of operations.
7.1.4 Intraday variation o f the overnight rate
Although the reserve maintenance period in the UK is only one day, some of 
the above results regarding overnight rate behaviour should still be observ­
able on an intraday basis. Specifically, the sterling overnight should exhibit 
intraday variation, becoming more volatile as the end of the day approaches.
Unfortunately, detailed intraday data on the overnight rate is not readily 
available. However, intraday data comprising four daily observations -  8h00, 
llhOO, 14h00 and 15h30 (close) -  were obtained8 for a period spanning the 
first five months of 1994 (i.e. over 100 observations, four times a day). Its 
properties are reported in figure 7.1 and tables 7.1 and 7.2. Figure 7.1 depicts 
four histograms of the spread between the overnight rate and the stop rate, 
one for each time of day, and shows a dramatic increase in variance later in 
the trading day. Table 7.1 confirms this result, indicating that the variance 
of the overnight rate was up to five times as high at the close of the day as it 
was during early trading. Table 7.2 qualifies this result further, and indicates 
that movements in the overnight rate were larger (in absolute terms) and had 
a larger variance, later in the day.
Whilst these results are encouraging in that they confirm a tendency which 
characterises overnight rates elsewhere, they also point to the difficulty of us­
ing ordinary daily data on sterling overnight rates for purposes of analysing 
the day-to-day behaviour of this rate. Such data, which is readily obtainable 
from the financial press (e.g. the Financial Times reports the closing rate) 
and other financial data sources (e.g. Datastream reports a midday rate), 
usually consists of a single daily observation of the overnight rate. The sig­
nificant intraday variation in the overnight rate, however, suggests that the 
properties of these alternative time series will be considerably different, and 
may lead to qualitative differences in the inferences which are drawn about 
the determinants of both the level and the volatility of the overnight rate.
8I am indebted to Richard Pattinson (Barclays) for these data.
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W hat is more, the level of the overnight rate does not convey any information 
about the quantity of funds which was traded at that rate. Thus some intra­
day movements in the overnight rate may only be applicable to a relatively 
small volume of trading, leading again to the danger that incorrect inferences 
are drawn.
There are two approaches which, to some degree, circumvent this data 
problem. One approach is to examine time series of the daily highs and lows 
of the overnight rate. Parkinson (1980), for example, argues that a good 
approximation of the variance9 of a continuously evolving random variable is 
given by a measure which employs the extremes of this variable over some 
time interval t (e.g. a trading day):
T
d t = ^ -  ^ ( H i g h t  -  Low,)2 (7.2)
t=l
where H ight and Lowt are the daily high and low respectively and T  is the 
period of interest. These extremes may be employed further to examine the 
moments of the overnight rate, without requiring observations of this rate 
itself10. This is because these extremes are known to fall into a class of 
asymptotic, or limiting, distributions, known as extreme value distributions, 
whose statistical properties have been well-documented (see, for instance, 
Gumbel 1958 or Johnson and Kotz 1970). Consequently, the actual distribu­
tions of the extremes may be estimated -  using maximum likelihood methods 
-  and these results used to make inferences about the behaviour of the dis­
tribution of the underlying variable, i.e. the overnight rate. Indeed, this 
approach, which is taken in a recent working paper by Dale, Haldane, Mur­
phy and Schnadt (1994), may be used to assess the significance of various 
institutional variables on the parameters of the distributions of the extremes, 
permitting efficient inferences to be drawn. Unfortunately, the technical re­
quirements of this approach are considerable and the results more difficult
9Or, more precisely, of the diffusion constant, which determines the variance of the 
displacement of the random variable from its starting position after a unit interval.
10Such an exercise is conducted by Hols and De Vries (1991) on extremal exchange rate 
returns.
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to interpret in terms of their economic content. Another drawback is that 
the volume of overnight funds traded at the highest or the lowest rate is ig­
nored, thus potentially overstating the effect of the explanatory variables on 
the overnight rate at which the bulk of funds is actually traded.
An alternative approach -  which is pursued in this chapter -  is to utilise 
overnight interest rate data which takes explicit account of the volume of 
trading which occurred at different intraday rates. Rate movements which 
are weighted by the amount of funds traded clearly provide a better reflection 
of the average, or effective, daily overnight rate faced by market participants. 
Whilst such a trade-weighted rate is officially calculated on a daily basis in 
the US by the Federal Reserve -  which labels this rate the effective federal 
funds rate -  no such official calculation is undertaken in the UK. An unof­
ficial series, however, is calculated by Barclays, a large clearing bank which 
is an active participant in the sterling overnight market each day. This se­
ries, which comprises what may be referred to as the daily effective sterling 
overnight rate, was obtained11 for the period January 1991 to May 1994 (938 
observations) and forms the basis of all the empirical results reported in sub­
sequent sections. Obviously, since it is not officially calculated, this data is 
only an approximation of the true effective rate and is thus subject to some 
measurement error. In the absence of better data, this is the most attractive 
alternative.
Even though the effective overnight rate is calculated as a trade-weighted 
rate, it is visibly more volatile -  on a day-to-day basis -  than other short­
term sterling interest rates. Figure 7.2 illustrates clearly how day-to-day 
variability declines at somewhat longer maturities, in this case seven days and 
one month (LIBOR). Note, however, that the dependent variable throughout 
this chapter will not be the level of the effective overnight rate but the spread 
between the effective overnight rate and the Bank of England’s stop rate:
SPREAD* =  (effective overnight rate)* — (stop rate)* .
This variable, which will henceforth be referred to as “the spread” will obvi­
n I am grateful to Richard Pattinson for this data  and also for additional d a ta  on the 
high and the low of the overnight rate which is employed below.
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ously be less than zero whenever the effective overnight rate was below the 
stop rate (converted to a yield), and vice versa.
It is the spread which is of interest since, from the discussion in chapter 3, 
the primary determinant of the overnight rate is the official interest rate itself. 
Indeed, in the highly stylised environment of the model presented in that 
chapter the overnight rate was seen to be equal to the official discount rate 
in the event of a money market shortage. Figure 7.3, which plots the spread, 
confirms that the overnight rate does not deviate systematically from the 
stop rate, but fluctuates considerably around the stop rate. This variation, 
which is indicative of institutional and other forces on the overnight rate, is 
the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
7.2 D eterm inants o f the spread
Table 7.3 shows that the spread averaged only 5 basis points over the period 
1991 - 1994, although the mean spread in any particular year was usually 
somewhat higher or lower than this. Similarly, the (sample) variance and, 
more significantly, the volatility12 of the spread varied substantially in differ­
ent years, being much higher in 199213 and 1993.
These results were confirmed using information about the daily high and 
low of the overnight rate over the same period (table 7.4). It is evident that 
the average difference between the high (low) and the stop rate is fairly wide, 
approaching 200 basis points. The right hand column, which reports the 
Parkinson estimate of volatility -  equation (7.2) - ,  is broadly consistent with 
the measures of volatility contained in the previous table and indicates that 
the volatility of the spread increased considerably in 1992 and 1993.
A further breakdown of the behaviour of the spread on a day-of-the-week
12 Volatility is calculated here as the (sample) standard deviation of day-to-day changes 
in the spread.
13The dram atic events surrounding the withdrawal of sterling from the ERM in Septem­
ber 1992, which saw short-dated money rates rise to virtually unprecedented levels, ac­
counts for the particularly high variance observed in 1992.
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basis (table 7.5) revealed two patterns. First, the average spread between the 
overnight rate and the stop rate is not constant over the week and exhibits 
positive autocorrelation. The pattern in the average spread is typically that 
the spread tends to be lower at the start of the week, higher during the 
mid-week, and lower again at the end of the week. Second, the variance of 
the spread is usually somewhat higher at the end of the week14. These two 
patterns are again confirmed by the behaviour of difference between the high 
(low) of the overnight rate and the stop rate (table 7.6). The mean difference 
between the high (low) and the stop rate also show positive autocorrelation, 
while the Parkinson estimate indicates a clear increase in volatility at the end 
of the week. These patterns in the mean and the volatility of the spread are 
presented diagramatically in figure 7.4.
This behaviour of the spread is, undoubtedly, the result of a complex 
interaction of factors, whose individual influences may be hard to distil em­
pirically. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify three classes to which these 
factors are likely to belong, and also how these factors might be expected to 
affect either the level or the volatility of the spread.
7.2.1 E xpectations
The impact of an expected change in the official stop rate on very short-term 
interest rates (including overnight rates) was derived in chapter 5, which 
presented a model of the term structure of sterling interest rates. Evidence 
was found to support the model, which predicts that very short-term rates 
will move in the opposite direction to an anticipated stop rate change and, 
further, that short-term rates may become more volatile ahead of such an 
anticipated official rate change. A major problem, however, was the iden­
tification of interest rate expectations, which was overcome in chapter 5 by 
splitting the data into three distinct periods, each of which was assumed to 
characterise a particular belief about future stop rates. This technique is not
14The tendency for Thursdays to have a higher variance than Fridays may reflect the 
fact that Fridays are, on occasion, bank holidays. The importance of this is taken up in 
greater detail in the subsequent section.
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particularly useful in the current context, where the intention is to formulate 
a specific regression model with which to explain day-to-day movements in 
the overnight rate. Given the difficulty of obtaining a meaningful proxy for 
market expectations of a stop rate change, the omission of this factor was 
considered to be the best strategy, with the result that interest rate expecta­
tions are not explicitly incorporated into the subsequent analysis. Whilst this 
omission is unfortunate, the fact that overnight rates in 1993 were extremely 
volatile despite only a single change in the stop rate suggests that this may 
not be too serious.
7.2.2 Structural factors
It was noted earlier that studies of overnight markets elsewhere (e.g. Feinman 
1993a) sometimes found that several institutional features -  for example the 
magnitude, the type and the timing of central bank operations -  were sys­
tematically related to the overnight rate. These factors may thus be relevant 
determinants of the sterling overnight rate, for structural reasons and/or be­
cause they convey information about the policy stance of the Bank of England 
(i.e. they act as a policy signal).
Large money market shortages, for example, will mean that large quanti­
ties of eligible bills are sold to the Bank. This may sometimes reduce market 
participants’ bill portfolios to the point where their ability to offer suitable 
bills to the bank is compromised15. These considerations may lead, in turn, 
to difficulties in “removing” the shortage, causing conditions in the overnight 
funds market to remain tighter than normal and driving a positive spread 
between the overnight rate and the stop rate.
By inviting its counterparties to offer eligible bills for repurchase (repo) 
instead of for outright sale, however, the Bank is in a position to alleviate 
these difficulties to some extent. By offering a repo, the Bank allows its 
counterparties to sell longer dated bills, which may be in greater supply than
15This might be due to the supply constraints on eligible bills identified in the previous 
chapter, which reduce the supply flow of fresh bills, and also because banks will wish to 
hold a minimum level of eligible bills for prudential liquidity purposes.
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short-dated bills16. Of course, the Bank may, for whatever reason, choose 
not to offer a repo. This may then be construed by market participants 
as a deliberate signal by the Bank that it is considering a tightening of its 
monetary policy. The Bank, on the other hand, may have declined to offer a 
repo for some other, perhaps purely technical, reason.
It is not possible, in general, to identify particular actions by the Bank as 
clear signals of its policy intentions. Indeed, there is a good reason why the 
Bank may always prefer to give “noisy” policy signals as opposed to signals 
which make its intentions totally transparent: transparent signals reduce the 
Bank’s ability to react freely to the arrival of new information. Such new 
information may cause the Bank to change its policy stance, thus making it 
vulnerable to the criticism that its original signals were misleading, possibly 
bringing its competence into question. Consequently, there are no actions by 
the Bank which are unanimously accepted by all market participants as a 
clear signal about future interest rates17.
In the light of this, the ty p e  of operation (i.e. outright sale versus repo) 
offered by the Bank of England is not explicitly incorporated into the subse­
quent analysis, even though there may be examples elsewhere (e.g. the US) 
where the type of operation is considered as a relevant signalling variable.
The size of the daily money market shortage, on the other hand, is a 
good candidate for a structural variable which may affect the overnight rate, 
since it is not a choice variable of the Bank and is announced each morning 
by the Bank (making it part of the information set of market participants).
16Recall th a t the repurchase date, and not the m aturity of the underlying instrum ent, 
is the relevant determ inant of the m aturity of a repo.
17This does not, of course, prevent market participants from interpreting the Bank’s 
actions as signals, usually at their own peril. A recent market comment by a prominent 
investment bank claimed: “... the Bank of England moved quickly last week to dispel 
any doubts about what had been decided when the Chancellor met with the Governor 
of the Bank of England for their regular monthly meeting ... By setting a repo which 
expires partly on the day of their next scheduled meeting ... the Bank sent the clearest 
signal possible th a t the authorities had decided to keep interest rates on hold ...” ( Goldman 
Sachs UK Weekly Comment, Issue Number 162, 9 Sept 1994). The Bank raised its official 
lending rate by 0.5% on the next trading day.
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As regards the impact of the size of the shortage, larger shortages may be 
expected to result (on average) in a somewhat higher overnight rate (and 
hence spread). More indirectly, and for reasons explained in the previous 
chapter, larger shortages may also result in greater volatility in the spread, 
which is addressed further below.
Related to the size of the shortage, is the tim in g  of the removal of the 
shortage during the course of the day, as measured by the extent of the an­
nounced shortage which remains outstanding after each round of the Bank’s 
three daily open-market operations. Since the Bank chooses the proportion 
of offers for assistance which it accepts -  by “scaling” offers -  this variable 
is partly structural and may, on occasion, contain a Bank signal. To a large 
extent, however, the amount of the shortage remaining will reflect yet a third 
factor, namely strategic behaviour on the part of certain money market par­
ticipants.
7.2.3 Strategic behaviour
Profitable trading in the overnight market is largely a m atter of timing. It was 
seen above that the overnight rate exhibits considerable intraday movement, 
tending either to rise or to fall as the day evolves. Banks will therefore form 
expectations about the intraday behaviour of the overnight rate and will want 
to time their trading accordingly. If a bank needs to borrow funds but expects 
the overnight rate to fall, for instance, it will tend to delay its bid for funds 
in the hope that cheaper funds can be obtained later in the day.
One potentially important piece of information regarding the likely be­
haviour of the overnight rate is the announced shortage, adjusted by the 
amount of reserves already supplied by the Bank in its money market opera­
tions. Albeit with considerable error, the remaining shortage represents the 
aggregate reserve need of the banking system which is still outstanding. If 
the remaining shortage is expected to be substantial as the day progresses, 
therefore, the aggregate demand for overnight funds will be expected to stay 
high and so the overnight rate will be expected to rise. Of course, this expec­
tation will provide banks with a greater incentive to offer bills to the Bank of
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England, which would tend to alleviate the shortage more quickly, countering 
the expected increase in the overnight rate. If the sterling money market were 
populated exclusively by identical, atomistic banks, each of which could par­
ticipate equally in the daily operations of the Bank of England, a predictable 
relationship between the overnight rate and the proportion of the shortage 
which remains outstanding at any time during the day would be unlikely18.
If the above characterisation of the sterling money market were correct, 
the proportion of the shortage outstanding would not contain information 
about the overnight rate. Previous chapters, however, have highlighted that 
the sterling money market does not correspond closely to this characterisa­
tion. The clearing banks, in particular, are considerably different from other 
banks, not least because they are substantially larger than most other banks. 
Two additional features also set the clearing banks apart - they are usually 
large net borrowers of overnight funds and they have recently -  since the late 
1980s -  become very large holders of eligible bills. As the major holders of 
eligible bills, the clearing banks have become the dominant counterparties in 
the daily operations of the Bank of England: a substantial proportion of the 
bills which are sold to the Bank via the discount houses each day are thus 
offered by the clearing banks.
This institutional feature is important, for it may permit a clearing bank, 
through strategic behaviour, to gain precise information about its own reserve 
needs relative to those of other banks, enabling it to borrow cheaper overnight 
funds. A clearing bank may “position” itself so that its own borrowing need 
exceeds the forecast shortage by a comfortable margin19. By selling sufficient 
bills to the Bank to remove the entire shortage during the first round of 
operations, the bank is left in the position where it still needs to borrow 
a substantial amount of funds, whilst at the same time ensuring that the
18Imprecise information about the reserve position of other banks, and about the in­
tentions of other banks as regards the sale of bills to the Bank, would make it extremely 
unlikely that any single bank could, through its own actions, influence the overnight rate.
19Given th a t the average size of the shortage is about £1000 million, this is clearly 
only possible for very large banks who, simply by virtue of their size, naturally have a 
substantial absolute short-term  borrowing need.
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aggregate demand for reserves (i.e. the remaining shortage) is zero. This 
then implies that the clearing bank’s reserve deficit must be matched by a 
reserve surplus in some other banks, who do not possess this information and 
who atomistically compete to lend their surplus funds. By lowering its bid 
rate for overnight funds, the clearing bank can then meet its reserve deficit 
at a lower cost20.
The possibility of strategic behaviour has a further consequence. Regular 
participants in the overnight funds market may then try to position them­
selves to take advantage of anticipated overnight rate movements. If, for 
instance, it were suspected that the overnight rate would be low on some 
particular day, it would become rational for all banks to try to borrow (tem­
porarily) cheap overnight funds. This would tend to frustrate the strategy 
outlined above, whose success depends on the fact that it is not anticipated. 
For this reason, a clearing bank may deliberately choose not to offer bills to 
the Bank. Since it is not automatically the case that all the clearing banks 
(and other holders of eligible bills) always offer bills to the Bank, this with­
holding of bill offers may result in the shortage not being removed until fairly 
late in the day. Insofar as this succeeds in causing the overnight rate to 
be higher, it may also lead market participants to expect (incorrectly) that 
similar conditions will prevail on the subsequent day (or days).
In sum, strategic behaviour on the part of the large clearing banks would 
cause the overnight rate to vary positively with the proportion of the shortage 
outstanding (after the Bank’s operations). Furthermore, it may also account 
for some of the weekday effects that were noted in the cursory examination 
of the spread in the previous section. Since the m aturity of an overnight 
loan is longer before weekends and public holidays, the incentive to engage
20Donaldson (1993) has recently presented a model of interest rate determination in 
which larger banks are able to “corner” the market in short-term  funds (cash), thereby 
becoming what he calls “strategic suppliers” of cash to other m arket participants - at 
rates substantially above normal market rates. Although it is employed by Donaldson to 
explain interest ra te behaviour during banking crises, the model offers useful parallels to 
the manner in which strategic behaviour affects interest rate determ ination in the sterling 
overnight market.
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in such behaviour increases at these times. The movement of the overnight 
rate before weekends and public holidays may thus also indicate strategic 
behaviour.
To some extent, however, these effects will also be the result of self- 
fulfilling beliefs rather than strategic behaviour: once it is believed that a 
large remaining shortage (say) will result in a higher overnight rate, those 
banks wanting to lend overnight funds will delay offers whilst those banks 
wanting to borrow overnight funds will immediately submit bids, bringing 
about the anticipated movement (and reinforcing the original belief). Even 
when the size (proportion) of the remaining shortage is not due to strategic 
behaviour, therefore, the overnight rate may react as if this were the case.
Could the relationship between the remaining shortage and the overnight 
rate be entirely attributable to self-fulfilling beliefs rather than to strategic 
behaviour? Examining the variance (volatility) of the overnight rate, and 
its determinants, may provide a useful method of distinguishing between 
these (competing) explanations. An integral part of the strategic behaviour 
described above is to make the timing of bill sales to the Bank a source of 
misinformation about the day-to-day movement of the overnight rate. Offers 
of bills to the Bank are thus withheld in order to generate uncertainty about 
the possible path of the overnight rate on subsequent days. This suggests 
that the variance of the overnight rate would exhibit time-varying behaviour, 
since successive days of a somewhat higher overnight rate (i.e. low variance) 
will be followed by a day (or more) on which rates are suddenly lower (i.e. 
high variance). If, on the other hand, the remaining shortage were simply a 
random variable (i.e. unaffected by strategic behaviour), always generating 
the same self-fulfilling response in the overnight rate, this time variation in 
the overnight rate should not be apparent.
Admittedly, the presence of time variation in the variance of the overnight 
rate may be due to any number of other, unidentified, factors. A much 
stronger case for the presence of strategic behaviour would exist if the vari­
ance of the overnight rate was significantly related to the liquidity premium 
on eligible bills (i.e. the spread between the yield on bills and equivalent 
instruments). As the previous chapter has argued at some length, the size of
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this liquidity premium may penalise the holders of eligible bills and provide 
a strong incentive for them -  i.e. the clearing banks -  to generate cheaper 
funding in the overnight market.
The following two sections now trace the impact of the above factors 
on the level and volatility of the overnight rate. Given that reliable daily 
data on these factors could only be obtained for the sub-period from the 
beginning of January 1992 until the end of October 1993, this served as the 
period for analysis. This sub-period still represented a considerable number 
of data points, namely 464 daily observations, and also incorporates most of 
the period over which the overnight rate was at its most volatile.
7.3 E stim ating a m odel o f th e spread
Recall that the dependent variable in the analysis is the daily spread between 
the overnight rate and the stop rate (SPREAD). The mean spread over the 
sub-period was about -5 basis points, with a minimum and maximum of -2.42 
and 8.08 percentage points respectively (see table 7.8). As there is a strong 
presumption that the overnight rate does not deviate from the stop rate in 
any “long-run” sense -  although it may exhibit short-run deviations -  the 
day-to-day spread should be a stationary process. This was confirmed by a 
test for a unit root, which was conclusively rejected.
7.3.1 A utocorrelation
It was noted above that the average spread between the overnight rate and 
the stop rate exhibits positive autocorrelation. A plot of the autocorrelation 
and partial autocorrelation functions confirmed this, and suggested that the 
dynamics of the spread conformed to an autoregressive process of order one, 
i.e. AR(1). As a benchmark, therefore, the following model was estimated:
SPREAD* =  0O +  0i • SPREAD*-! +  e*. (7.3)
The results of fitting such a model are shown in table I below.
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T ab le  I. C o n d itio n a l m ean o f  th e  sp re ad
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
CONSTANT -0.025 0 . 8 6
S P R E A D t - 1 0.42 12.72
R 2 =  0.173.
The AR(1) representation of the spread is clearly significant and can account 
for about 17% of the variation in the spread. Note also that the (long-run) 
expected value of the spread, given by E (S P R E A D t) =  =  —0.04 (i.e.
4 basis points) is close to the actual mean observed over the sample.
7.3.2 O ther explanatory variables
The previous section identified three variables which may be expected to influ­
ence the spread between the overnight rate and the stop rate on a systematic 
basis, namely the overall size of the shortage, the amount of the shortage 
which remains outstanding during the course of the day, and weekends and 
public holidays. These variables were calculated as follows:
Size of the m oney market shortage
Although the shortage is announced at 9h45 each trading day, this is only 
a forecast figure and is frequently revised over the course of the day. These 
revisions are usually small in relation to the overall size of the shortage, how­
ever, and are more often upwards rather downwards21. It was thus decided to 
use the final revised figure for the shortage, published by the Bank at 14h00 
each day, which is denoted by SIZE.
The average shortage over the sample period was £1168 million, with 
the minimum and the maximum shortage being —£200 (i.e. a surplus) and 
£3950 million respectively (table 7.6). It is noteworthy that the average size
21This is probably because the Bank prefers to understate rather than overstate the 
shortage. The latter could result in reserves being oversupplied, with the aggregate surplus 
of reserves resulting in a sharply lower overnight rate. This may require the Bank to supply 
and remove reserves on the same day - something which it has never dome.
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of the shortage exhibits a weekly pattern, tending to be smallest on Tuesdays 
and highest on Fridays (table 7.7). This probably reflects the behaviour of 
currency holders, who tend to increase their currency holdings just before 
weekends. After the weekend, retailers then redeposit this currency with the 
banking system. Table 7.7. indicates that this tendency is even more marked 
before long weekends (i.e. weekends where either the adjoining Friday and/or 
the Monday is a bank holiday), with shortages on such occasions being larger 
than on normal Fridays.
Proportion of th e  shortage remaining
Having announced its forecast shortage, the Bank then invites its counter­
parties to offer bills for sale to the Bank. The total amount of bills purchased 
by the Bank is then immediately published, indicating the amount of the fore­
cast shortage which remains. The proportions of the shortage still remaining 
after each round of open-market operations thus serve as useful proxies for 
the timing of the removal of the shortage, and were calculated as follows:
REMAINDER, =  1 - Z)?=9M5 Operations, 
Short age3
where s denotes either 9h45, 12h00, 14h00 or 14h45, which are the interven­
tion times of the Bank.
Figure 7.5 shows four scatterplots, each depicting the remaining shortage 
(REMAINDER) against the size of the shortage (SIZE) after each round 
of the Banks’ operations. Two important tendencies are apparent from the 
figure. First, the proportion of the shortage outstanding after the first (9h45) 
round of operations is typically quite high, indicated by the clustering at the 
top of the plot. To some degree this reflects the fact that the Bank of England 
does not usually invite its counterparties to offer bills at 9h45 if the size of 
the forecast shortage is below about £750 million. Using this variable to 
proxy the rate of removal of the shortage, therefore, would produce misleading 
results, since a high outstanding shortage does not necessarily reflect a choice 
by the Bank’s counterparties not to offer bills. A second feature of figure 7.5 is 
that smaller shortages tend to be removed more slowly than large shortages, 
which may give the impression that smaller shortages tend to produce tighter
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money market conditions than large shortages. This would be misleading, 
however, since it is the actual amount of the shortage which is outstanding, 
rather than the proportional amount, which is relevant to the degree of reserve 
availability.
In the light of these problems, REMAINDER as measured at 12h00 was 
deemed to be the best proxy variable for the rate of removal of the shortage. 
Calculation of this variable over the sample indicated that, on average, 50% 
of the shortage remained outstanding at noon. And, as with the size of the 
shortage, this variable also varies over the days of the week (table 7.6.). The 
pattern in this case is reversed, however, with the average proportion of the 
shortage left outstanding at noon being lower at the beginning and at the 
end of the week22.
W eekends and public holidays
On Fridays and before public holidays, an overnight loan effectively be­
comes a longer term loan, proportionally increasing the costs or profits ac­
cruing to overnight trades and thus also the tendency for strategic behaviour. 
To examine the impact of this on the overnight rate, the following dummy 
variable was constructed:
WEEKEND, =
0 if t-f-1 is a working day
, t =  1 , . . . , T.
1 otherwise
Essentially, therefore, the WEEKEND dummy variable simply takes on a 
value of unity on Fridays or before bank holidays (usually a Thursday in the 
UK) and a value of zero on all other days.
These three variables, SIZE, REMAINDER and WEEKEND were thus in­
cluded in the basic regression model (7.3) above, which was then re-estimated 
over the sample period. The results are provided in table II below.
2 2 Interestingly, the proportion of the shortage remaining at 1 2 h 0 0  on days before long 
weekends was even lower than on Fridays, a fact which we return to below in the discussion 
of the estimation results.
7.3. ESTIMATING A MODEL OF THE SPREAD 249
T ab le  I I .  C o n d itio n a l m e a n  o f  th e  sp re a d
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
Dynamics CONSTANT -1.18 -11.91
SPREAD* _i 0.36 9.73
Other effects SIZE 0.00044 7.09
REMAINDER 1.40 14.56
WEEKEND -0.33 3.93
R 2  =  0.43, F4 4 5 4 =  87.47
It is evident from table II that the addition of these three variables dra­
matically improves the explanatory power of the basic model, with the R 2 
rising from 0.17 to 0.43. The t-statistics indicate that each of the explanatory 
variables is significant at the 1% level, whilst the F-statistic shows that the 
explanatory variables are jointly significant at the 1% level.
The coefficients are straightforward to interpret and their sign is consistent 
with the expected impact of the factors identified in the previous section. 
Both the size of the shortage, and the proportion of the shortage outstanding 
at noon, drive the overnight rate above the stop rate, whilst weekends and 
public holidays drive the overnight rate below the stop rate. More specifically, 
an increase of £100  million in the money market shortage tends to widen 
the spread between the overnight rate and the stop rate by about 5 basis 
points, whilst an increase of 10% in the proportion of the shortage remaining 
tends to raise the spread by about 15 basis points. The spread between the 
overnight rate and the stop rate also tends to be about 30 basis points wider 
on Fridays and before public holidays, albeit in the opposite direction to the 
other factors; that is, the overnight rate tends to fall further below the stop 
rate on these days.
W hat is relevant to determining the spread on any particular day, how­
ever, is the combined impact of these factors. This is also consistent with 
the expected impact of these factors as discussed above. From table 7.7 it 
is evident that an “average” day in the money market over the period had
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an announced shortage of about £1100 million, 50% of which remained at 
12h00. These values imply that on an average day the expected spread be­
tween the overnight rate and the stop rate is zero (given that the spread 
on the previous day was zero). An above average shortage of (say) £2000 
million would, ceteris paribus, raise the expected spread to +40 basis points. 
If, additionally, an above average proportion of the shortage remains out­
standing at 12h00 -  for example 80% -  this further increases the expected 
spread to +80 basis points. Alternatively, if the entire shortage is removed 
by 12h00 (i.e. REMAINDER =  0), and the following day is a weekend (i.e. 
WEEKEND =  1), the expected spread is —60 basis points.
Broadly, therefore, the size of the shortage may be interpreted as a struc­
tural factor which, ceteris paribus, tends to drive a positive spread between 
the expected overnight rate and the stop rate. This factor, however, does 
not operate in isolation. The proportion of the shortage remaining at 12h00 
is crucial in determining the expected spread: the spread will be positive 
when the bulk of shortage is taken out late in the day and negative when the 
bulk of the shortage is taken out early in the day. Thus the relationship, if 
any, between the size of the shortage and the proportion remaining at 12h00 
will be of some importance. An OLS regression of REMAINDER on SIZE 
revealed a significant negative correlation but an extremely low R 2: that is, 
virtually none of the variation in the proportion of the shortage outstanding 
can be accounted for by the size o f the shortage. Larger shortages, there­
fore, do not translate straightforwardly into a higher or a lower overnight 
rate: what matters is the proportion of the shortage that is removed during 
the various operations of the Bank, which is not predictable from the size of 
the shortage. Instead, this will depend on the decisions of those institutions 
which hold the bulk of the eligible bills, namely the clearing banks.
A rather clear indication of strategic behaviour is given by the fact that 
the overnight rate on Fridays (and before public holidays) tends to be sys­
tematically lower than on other days. Since the overnight rate is predictably 
lower on Fridays, however, this behaviour would have limited consequences 
for market efficiency, since market participants could adjust their reserve 
management behaviour accordingly. A potentially stronger case for market
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inefficiency could be made if factors such as the size of the shortage, the pro­
portion of the shortage outstanding and, importantly, the liquidity premium 
on eligible bills, were found to increase the volatility (i.e. the conditional vari­
ance) of the overnight rate. This would suggest that market participants were 
facing a higher level of uncertainty due to the influence of these structural 
and strategic variables, and would carry the implication that these variables 
actually inhibited the efficiency of the overnight market in facilitating reserve 
management.
A natural starting point for the examination of this issue, then, is to 
test whether the variance of the spread was in fact constant over the sample 
period. If not, then further analysis of the variance of the spread, and its 
determinants, is justified.
7.3.3 H eteroscedasticity
Whenever the variance of the error, or residual, of a regression are not con­
stant across observations, the regression is said to be heteroscedastic. Conse­
quently, tests for heteroscedasticity typically take the form of Lagrange mul­
tiplier tests which utilise the residuals of the regression (see Godfrey 1988). 
The hypothesis being tested takes the following form:
H0 : <r2 =  <r2
H a : o f =  0 2 • (<*o +  a ' • z()
Essentially, the absence of heteroscedasticity corresponds to the result 
that the a ’s above are equal to zero. Testing this hypothesis is achieved 
by constructing an “artificial” regression in which the squared (normalised) 
residuals of the original regression are the dependent variable. The test statis­
tic is then T  • R2, where T  is the number of observations and R 2 is the un­
centered R-squared obtained in the regression, which is asymptotically dis­
tributed as chi-squared with q (the number of explanatory variables) degrees 
of freedom. Unfortunately this test is somewhat general and the particular
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type of heteroscedasticity being tested for depends only upon the explanatory 
variables zt which are included in this artificial regression.
A common test for heteroscedasticity in financial data is the ARCH test 
(Engle 1982), in which the explanatory variables zt are simply the lagged 
squared errors, up to lag q. As will be shown in the following section, ARCH 
effects imply that the conditional variance (of the error) exhibits a specific 
form time variation in which periods of higher variance are followed by pe­
riods of lower variance. An ARCH test was therefore conducted using four 
lags23. The null hypothesis could be rejected at the 5% level24, indicating the 
possibility of ARCH effects in the data.
Another common test for heteroscedasticity is that of Breusch and Pagan 
(1979), who include in zt some or all of the explanatory variables of the 
original regression, plus any additional variables which are hypothesised to 
influence the variance. Such a test was therefore undertaken using three 
explanatory variables, namely SIZE, REMAINING and, lastly, the liquidity 
premium on eligible bills. The latter variable, which is simply the difference 
between the yield on eligible bills and LIBOR (this was denoted by S  in the 
previous chapter, but will be denoted by PREMIUM in this chapter), was 
included under the presumption that strategic behaviour in the overnight 
funds market might increase with this premium, in turn affecting the variance 
of overnight rate. The null hypothesis could be easily rejected at the 1%
level25, indicating the presence of a relationship between the variance of the
overnight rate and these explanatory variables.
7.4 The variance o f the spread
The heteroscedasticity tests suggest that the variance of the regression errors 
of the model estimated in the previous section not only exhibits ARCH effects, 
but may also be systematically related to several other explanatory variables
23This choice was arbitrary.
24The test statistic was computed as 12.4.
25The test statistic was computed as 106.
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in the model. This section thus briefly introduces the notion of ARCH, 
which may take a number of different forms. For this reason, several ARCH 
specifications are estimated, and a parsimonious specification chosen by using 
some simple tests recently developed by Engle and Ng (1993). It is then a 
straightforward m atter to estimate a more general model of the conditional 
variance, incorporating those explanatory variables which might plausibly 
affect this variance.
7.4.1 A utoregressive C onditional H eteroscedasticity
The notion of ARCH is due to Engle (1982), and can be identified using the 
basic model (7.1) introduced at the outset of this chapter,
y< , t = 1, — , r  .
Summarising the information available at time t by xpt-1, ARCH(q) may be 
expressed as
£< I i/’t- i  ~  N (  0, ht ) (7.4)
where
ht =  u  -f +  . . .  +  fiq • e2_q (7.5)
with LJ > 0 and /?,■ > 0 , i =  1, . . . ,  q by assumption to ensure that the
conditional variance ht is positive. In words, ARCH(q) implies that the
conditional variance of the current error is a linear, symmetric function of
past errors up to lag q26.
The distinguishing feature of (7.5) is that the conditional variance (i.e. 
volatility) varies in an episodic manner, with large (small) errors tending to 
cluster sequentially. The order of the lag, q, simply captures the length of 
time for which any given error will persist in conditioning the variance of 
subsequent errors. Essentially, therefore, and as its name conveys, ARCH is 
simply the specification of temporal dependence in the second moments (i.e
26Since the most recent lagged error is a function of the current information set, i.e. 
£ t- i  — (Vt - 1  — Q! • 2Lt-i )> this means th a t the conditional variance also depends on the 
current information set.
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in the variance) of a time series, and is fully analogous to the specification 
of some form of ARM A process for the conditional mean of a time series (as 
given, for example, by the model of equation 7.3)27.
An important innovation to the basic ARCH(q) formulation is due to 
Bollerslev (1986), who noted that in many empirical applications this model 
assumed an ad hoc linear declining lag structure in the conditional variance 
equation to take account of the long persistence which was typically found. 
This assumption was invoked since free estimation of the lag structure would 
often violate the non-negativity constraints on the coefficients. Bollerslev 
thus proposed the introduction of the lagged conditional variance, ht~i, i =  
1 , . . . , p ,  into the variance equation (7.1). This extension, which is called 
generalised ARCH (GARCH(p,q)), has been found to be applicable in a large 
number of empirical studies (see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner 1992) with only 
a single lag, i.e.
h t  =  uj +  a  • h t - 1  +  /? • £ t - i  • ( 7 * 6 )
Further innovations to the GARCH formulation have often involved the 
explicit incorporation of some kind of non-linearity or asymmetry. Under the 
GARCH specification, past errors can only affect the current variance in a 
linear, symmetric fashion. In reality, however, this dependence between the 
errors and the variance may be non-linear, or asymmetric, and the GARCH 
specification should allow for this.
A simple example of an asymmetric GARCH (AGARCH) model is given
by
ht = u> +  a  • ht- i  +  /? • (et_i +  7 )2 (7-7)
27The estimation of ARCH models is straightforward via maximum likelihood methods. 
If the normality assumption of conventional OLS regression is maintained, the loglikelihood 
of the t ih observation is given by
logLt =  -  i  (log{ht ) +  .
The parameters 0, u  and /?,•, i =  1 , . . . ,  q , can then be estimated recursively by applying 
any one of the several algorithms commonly applied to finding the maximum of the joint 
likelihood for some given sample (see Hamilton 1994 or Greene 1993).
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Clearly if 7  < 0 then negative errors have a greater effect on ht than positive 
errors (the opposite is true if 7  > 0). Another, more general, asymmet­
ric model was introduced by Nelson (1990), namely an exponential GARCH 
(EGARCH) model:
log(ht) = u; +  a  • log(ht- 1) +  p  • — +  7  • ^ - L = =  — • (7-8)
Here it is again the case that, if 7  < 0, negative errors have a greater effect 
on the conditional variance than positive errors (vice versa if 7  > 0).
Although both the AGARCH and the EGARCH specifications permit the 
past errors to influence the conditional variance in an asymmetric fashion, 
the EGARCH model also has two further advantages over other GARCH 
models. First, the exponential form implies that the conditional variance 
cannot become negative, with the result that no non-negativity constraints 
have to be placed on the coefficients: in principle, therefore, this permits a 
more flexible specification. A second advantage of the exponential form is 
that it allows large past errors to have a greater effect on the conditional 
variance than does the standard GARCH model, which may more accurately 
capture the type of ARCH which is present in the data.
Clearly, then, there are many potential models which may be used to 
specify the conditional variance, as is amply demonstrated by the literature 
reviews of Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) and Bera and Higgins (1993). 
How should a researcher discriminate, or choose, between these various al­
ternatives?
7.4.2 W hich GARCH ?
Engle and Ng (1993) have recently suggested that alternative ARCH models 
may be simply viewed as different formulations of how past errors28 affect
28In studies where the dependent variable is asset returns, the lagged error may be inter­
preted as a  collective measure of “news” a t time t, since it is the unexplained component 
in current returns. This interpretation does not carry over to the model in this chapter, 
where the dependent variable is the spread between the overnight rate and the stop rate.
256 CHAPTER 7.
current volatility. This is most easily seen by holding constant all informa­
tion dated t — 2 and earlier, which then leaves the current volatility ht as a 
function of the lagged error et- \  only. The conditional variances of each type 
of GARCH may then be written as
ht =  <
A  +  p  • £f—i GARCH
A  + P • (£ ,- !+  i f  AGARCH (7.9)
B  ■ exp [£±2 . EGARCH (7  > 0) ,
where A =  uj +  a  ■ <r2, f? =  <r2" • exp[u> — /?• ^ /2/tt] and <r2 is the unconditional
variance.
The simple GARCH model is thus just a quadratic function of the past 
error, centred at et- \  =  0- The AGARCH model is also a quadratic function, 
but is centred at et- i  =  7 . Finally, the EGARCH model is similar to a 
quadratic function centred at et-i =  0, but increases exponentially in both 
directions (possibly with different slopes if 7  < 0).
The three functions in (7.9) may be interpreted as “error impact” curves, 
since they trace the effect of the past error on the conditional volatility. In 
other words, they show the manner in which the different GARCH models 
capture ARCH effects. Consequently, they also highlight the potential short­
comings of these alternative models, and how they may misspecify the true 
ARCH which is present in the data. A simple GARCH model, for instance, 
does not distinguish between positive and negative shocks, and assumes that 
these shocks affect the variance through a quadratic relationship. Clearly, 
therefore, the model may have a sign bias, in that the actual ARCH effects 
in the data may be affecting the variance in an asymmetric fashion. Similarly, 
the model may have a size bias, overestimating the impact of small errors on 
the conditional variance whilst underestimating the impact of large shocks 
on the conditional variance. AGARCH and EGARCH models, whilst more 
flexible than the simple GARCH model, may contain similar biases.
For this reason, Engle and Ng (1993) develop three simple diagnostic tests 
which attem pt to capture the bias of an ARCH specification with respect to 
a particular dataset. These tests, which are all very similar to Lagrange
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multiplier tests, examine whether variables which are in the current infor­
mation set but which are not included in the volatility model can predict 
the squared (normalised) residuals. The tests thus provide a useful way to 
discriminate between the potentially numerous GARCH specifications which 
might characterise the conditional variance of the empirical model of the 
previous section.
In the interests of continuity these tests are described in more detail in an 
appendix to this chapter. Three specifications for the conditional variance 
of the spread, namely the GARCH, AGARCH and EGARCH as specified in 
(7.6), (7.7) and (7.8) respectively, were then estimated in conjunction with 
the original model. The results, which are also reported in the appendix, 
reveal that the coefficients in the conditional variance equations of each of 
the three GARCH models are all significant at the 1% level. Potentially, 
therefore, any one of these would be found to be an acceptable specification 
if it were conducted in isolation. The fact that the 7  coefficient is positive 
in the AGARCH model, however, suggests that there is some asymmetry 
between the impact of positive and negative lagged errors on the conditional 
variance, with positive shocks having a larger impact on the variance than 
negative shocks. This asymmetry, which is corroborated by the EGARCH 
model (since both a  and 7 are positive), suggests that either the AGARCH 
or the EGARCH would be preferable to the simple GARCH model.
The diagnostic test results reported in the appendix also reveal that the 
alternative GARCH models are all very similar in the manner in which they 
capture the ARCH effects present in the data. The test statistics indicate 
that in all three cases the null of no sign bias and no negative size bias are 
both accepted, while the null of no positive size bias is rejected. Essentially, 
therefore, all three models tend to tmderpredict the impact of large positive 
(lagged) errors on the conditional variance, and all three models consequently 
fail the joint test. Since the ARCH effects in the data suggest that large 
positive errors have a considerable impact on the conditional variance, the 
EGARCH model seems, overall, to be the most well specified. This conclusion 
is supported by the loglikelihood as well as the results of the joint test, both
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of which are somewhat less in the case of the EGARCH model29.
The presence of ARCH effects (i.e. time variation in the conditional 
variance of the errors of the empirical model estimated in section 3) can, it was 
argued, be accounted for by strategic behaviour on the part of the clearing 
banks. They may also be accounted for by other factors, which have not been 
identified. To strengthen the case for the presence of strategic factors in the 
data, therefore, it is necessary to examine whether other variables directly 
affect the conditional variance.
7.4.3 O ther explanatory variables
There are several variables whose impact on the variance of the spread is of 
interest. First, the size of the shortage (SIZE) may affect the variance. If 
this was found to be the case, it could be interpreted as a form of struc­
tural inefficiency: by increasing market participants’ uncertainty regarding 
the day-to-day evolution of the overnight rate relative to the stop rate, larger 
shortages tend to increase the resource costs (or risks) of reserve management 
in the sterling overnight market. Second, the proportion of the shortage re­
maining at 12h00 (REMAINDER), the incidence of weekends and public hol­
idays (WEEKEND) and the liquidity premium on eligible bills (PREMIUM) 
may also affect the variance. This could be construed as a different form of 
structural inefficiency, arising from the incentive for, and ability of, certain 
market participants to engage in strategic behaviour.
The impact of these variables on the variance of the spread can be straight­
forwardly assessed by reestimating the EGARCH model and including these 
variables in the conditional variance equation. Indeed, for purposes of com­
parison the EGARCH model estimated in the preceding section may be con­
sidered as a restricted form of this, more general, specification. The results,
29The results suggest, however, th a t an even better model would probably be one for 
which the relationship between the positive lagged errors and the conditional variance 
was even steeper than an exponential. This may reflect the few very large positive errors 
experienced in September 1992.
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which were obtained by maximum likelihood estimation, are shown in tables 
III and IV below.
T ab le  I I I .  C o n d itio n a l m e a n  o f  th e  s p re a d
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
Dynamics CONSTANT -1.14 -16.1
AR(1) SPREADt_i 0.33 9.88
Other effects SIZE 0.0004 8.69
REMAINDER 1.33 16.57
WEEKEND -0.27 -3.64
T ab le  IV . C o n d itio n a l v a rian ce  o f  th e  sp re a d
Variable Coefficient t-S tatistic
Dynamics CONSTANT -1.7 -8.05
EGARCH VARIANCE*_i 0.182 2.4
0.082 1.17
0.3 2.91
Other effects SIZE 0.00028 2 . 8 8
REMAINDER 0.51 3.00
PREMIUM 0.65 5.42
The results in table III, for the conditional mean of the spread, do not 
differ much from those reported in table II: indeed, the dynamics as well as the 
original explanatory variables become more significant once the conditional 
variance is modelled explicitly. Table IV, which is of interest here, indicates 
that the GARCH dynamics and three out of the four explanatory variables 
in the conditional variance are significant at the 1% level - WEEKEND was 
not significant. These three variables were also found to be jointly significant
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at the 1% level30.
7.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has confirmed that there are several features of the sterling 
money market which not only systematically affect the level of the overnight 
rate, but also systematically increase its variance. That is to say there are 
elements of the micro structure, or architecture, of the money market which, 
although they can successfully predict almost 50% of the daily variation be­
tween the overnight rate and the stop rate, also tend to make this prediction 
more uncertain. The “explanation” proffered here is that the current archi­
tecture of the money market and the Bank of England’s operations is such 
that some money market participants have both the incentive and the ability 
to generate greater uncertainty about the likely path of the overnight rate. 
And, whilst this may have limited consequences in terms of the transmission 
of monetary policy to the wider economy, it surely affects the efficiency of 
the overnight market as the locus for sterling reserve management31. How, 
then, might the (micro)structure of the money market and the Bank’s daily 
operations be changed to address these problems?
The size of money market shortages has clearly played a major role in 
the determination of both the level and variance of the spread between the 
overnight rate and the stop rate, and has done so on a number of fronts 
-  both direct and indirect. For instance it led, in the early 1980s, to a
30This was evaluated using a likelihood ratio test, which compares the change in the 
maximum loglikelihood attained in the unrestricted versus the the restricted model (the 
simple EGARCH model w ithout the additional variables). The maximum loglikelihood 
achieved in the unrestricted estimation was 17.64, as against -1.74 in the restricted model 
(see the table of results in the appendix). The test statistic is computed as 2 (17.64+1.74) =  
38.76, which easily exceeds the chi-squared variate with 3 degrees of freedom at the 1% 
level.
3 1  As noted at the outset of this chapter, daily trading in overnight funds vastly exceeds 
daily turnover on the London Stock Exchange. Were this market, and the prices established 
there, to exhibit similar behaviour, this would undoubtedly prom pt the interest of both 
academics and regulators, and would certainly lead to debate about possible reform.
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change in the financial instruments that were routinely purchased by the Bank 
(i.e. from Treasury bills to bank bills), a change which was accompanied by 
the imposition of restrictions on the issue of these instruments (see chapter 
6). These restrictions have, in the presence of continuously large shortages, 
lowered the yield on eligible bills, with two consequences. First, eligible bills 
became less attractive as assets, which meant that a typical bank would have 
little incentive to hold bills for purposes of obtaining reserves from the Bank of 
England. Second, by concentrating the ownership of bills within a few, large 
banks, it then created the opportunity for these institutions to deploy bills in 
a strategic fashion. This linkage -  between the liquidity premium on eligible 
bills and the volatility of the overnight rate -  has been clearly demonstrated, 
and it is difficult to conceive of a factor besides strategic behaviour which 
could have resulted in such a link being present.
It is important to think about this situation as an “equilibrium”: the 
unattractiveness of bills as liquid assets must be compensated by their util­
ity as strategic assets. Of course, an alternative equilibrium is conceivable, 
namely one in which the Bank purchases assets which have a high liquidity 
value and a low strategic value. Government securities fit this description 
relatively well32. It is encouraging, therefore, that the Bank has recently be­
gun to move in the direction of relying to a greater extent upon repurchase 
agreements (repo) based upon gilts, although only twice a month (see chap­
ter 4). There is no good reason why the Bank could not rely exclusively (i.e. 
daily) upon gilt repos in its money market operations, a move which would 
go a long way towards eliminating the strategic behaviour discussed in this 
chapter.
Other refinements of the Bank’s operations logically follow from this, and 
have been discussed at some length in Schnadt (1994a, 1994b and 1994c). 
It is not obvious, for example, why three open-market operations are nec­
essary each day or why these operations have to be channelled through a 
narrow group of passive counterparties, i.e. discount houses. A single open
32Their liquidity value derives from the fact th a t they are virtually free of credit-risk, 
which would continue to be true even if the Bank purchased them. Their strategic value, 
on the other hand, would be low, as they are in large supply and relatively widely held.
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market operation conducted (say) at midday, in which a broad group of fi­
nancial institutions is invited to repo gilt-edged securities with the Bank, 
seems sufficient. Thereafter, financial institutions which still wished to ob­
tain same-day reserves from the Bank could utilise a standing facility, which 
would again require the repo of gilts with the Bank, but which would attract 
a higher interest rate than that applied to the open-market transaction33. In 
the absence of totally unexpected variations in the reserve needs of a partic­
ular institution -  or in the money market shortage - , therefore, the standing 
facility would not be utilised. The fact that it were available, however, would 
place a ceiling on the overnight rate that was equal to the implied cost of 
one-day funds under this facility34.
In sum, it is not difficult to envisage comparatively minor adjustments in 
the operating procedures of the Bank which would stabilise overnight interest 
rates but leave the Bank’s flexibility to influence money market interest rates 
unchanged.
33This rate could increase as the cut-off time for same-day value was approached.
34The current regime of reserve accounting in the UK, under which clearing banks strive 
to meet a comparatively small reserve target on a daily basis may also be refined. Larger 
reserve requirements could be imposed, which had to be met over a longer period (thereby 
attaining greater overnight interest rate stability due to averaging) but which were remu­
nerated at close to the market rate (thereby reducing their implicit cost on banks).
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7 .6  F ig u r e s  a n d  T a b le s
Figure 7.1
T he in trad a y  d is tr ib u tio n  of th e  overnight ra te  
(Four daily  observations: Jan  - M ay 1994)
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Figure 7.2
The effective overnight rate com pared w ith  
seven day LIBO R and one m onth LIBO R  
(D aily observations: Jan 1992 - O ct 1994)
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F igure  7.3
T he spread betw een  th e effective  
overnight rate and the stop rate 
(D aily  observations: Jan 1992 - Oct 1993)
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Figure 7.4 
D ay-of-the-w eek patterns in the spread
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F igure  7.5
R E M A IN D E R  (y-axis) versus SIZE (x-axis) 
a fte r each round  of m oney m arket operations
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Table 7.1
Intraday behaviour of the effective overnight rate 
Sam ple variance (Jan - M ay 1994)
D ay 8  am 1 1  am 2  p m C lose
Mon 0.27 0.70 1 . 0 0 1.73
Tues 0.41 0.65 0.97 3.63
Wed 0.41 0.81 0.94 2.06
Thur 0.51 0.89 1.43 1.32
Fri 0.48 0.89 1.03 1.03
All 0.45 0.80 1 . 1 2 2.19
Table 7.2
Intraday behaviour of the effective overnight rate 
Intraday changes (Jan - M ay 1994)
C h an g e  b e tw e e n  ...
8 am -1 1 am 1 1  am-2 pm 2 pm-close
/i n  abs cr2 (i (i abs a 2 fi fj, abs a 2
-0.59 0.49 0.43 -0.09 0.49 0.85 0.21 0.85 2.89
7.6. FIGURES AND TABLES 269
Table 7.3
Spread betw een effective overnight rate and stop rate (annual)
Y ear sam p le
m e a n
sam p le
v a ria n ce
sam p le
v o la tili ty
1991 0.44 0.37 0.77
1992 -0.04 1 . 0 2 1.04
1993 -0.16 0.81 1.19
1994 -0.25 0.67 1 . 0 2
90-94 -0.05 0.75 1 . 0 1
Table 7.4
Spread betw een overnight rate extrem es and stop rate (annual)
Y ear D a ily  H igh D aily  Low V o la tility
<r2 <72 D
1991 1.43 1.99 2.37 3.09 9.41
1992 2.15 6.57 2.03 2.17 21.87
1993 1 . 6 6 6.23 1.72 1.43 17.21
1994 1.17 2.18 1.35 1.17 3.58
90-94 1.80 5.40 1.94 2.32 14.95
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Table 7.5
Spread betw een effective overnight rate and stop rate (daily)
Y ear D ay sam p le sam p le
m e a n v arian ce
Mon 0.07 0.18
Tues -0.07 0.69
1991 Wed 0.09 0.72
Thur 0.14 0.94
Fri 0.06 0.36
Mon -0.28 0.66
Tues -0.07 0.52
1992 Wed 0.11 0.92
Thur 0.17 2.04
Fri -0.11 0.92
Mon -0.15 0.81
Tues -0.26 0.53
1993 Wed 0.14 0.76
Thur 0.00 1.45
Fri -0.46 0.56
Mon -0.33 0.59
Tues -0.29 0.49
1994 Wed 0.21 0.50
Thur -0.12 0.85
Fri -0.71 0.61
Mon -0.33 0.59
Tues -0.29 0.49
91-94 Wed 0.21 0.50
Thur -0.12 0.85
Fri -0.71 0.61
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Table 7.6
Spread betw een overnight rate extrem es and stop  rate (daily)
Y ear D ay D aily  H igh D aily  Low V o la tility
V <r2 V <72 D
Mon 1.43 1.85 1.85 2.58 7.93
Tues 1.02 1.79 2.85 3.48 9.38
1991 Wed 1.98 2.02 2.40 3.21 9.14
Thur 1.98 2.50 2.38 3.34 12.78
Fri 1.25 1.62 2.38 2.75 7.79
Mon 1.19 1.94 2.43 2.24 7.18
Tues 1.68 3.60 1.96 2.28 9.42
1992 Wed 2.00 3.47 1.74 2.23 10.46
Thur 2.40 4.69 1.90 2.01 14.84
Fri 3.49 12.93 2.11 2.13 68.19
Mon 1.31 2.46 1.69 1.37 5.04
Tues 1.18 2.07 1.83 1.51 4.47
1993 Wed 1.92 3.80 1.36 1.50 8.52
Thur 1.58 1.94 1.53 1.36 4.29
Fri 2.40 12.88 2.13 1.37 64.59
Mon 0.98 1.30 1.27 1.16 2.27
Tues 1.71 3.42 1.43 1.13 6.82
1994 Wed 1.59 1.41 0.93 1.34 2.76
Thur 1.41 2.68 1.25 0.96 4.14
Fri 0.18 0.87 1.87 1.13 1.88
Mon 0.98 1.30 1.27 1.16 6.28
Tues 1.71 3.42 1.43 1.13 7.68
91-94 Wed 1.59 1.41 0.93 1.34 8.78
Thur 1.41 2.68 1.25 0.96 10.08
Fri 0.18 0.87 1.87 1.13 42.21
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Table 7.7
The m oney market shortage: size and tim ing of removal 
January 1992 - O ctober 1993
D ay S h o rtag e
S IZ E
(£ m n )
S h o rta g e  
R E M A IN D E R  
a t  n o o n  (% )
Mon 1249 42.3
Tues 918 57.1
Wed 1117 57.3
Thur 1176 51.0
Fri 1392 42.2
Weekend 1405 41.2
Average 1168 50.2
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7.7 Appendix: A lternative G A R C H  m odels
7.7.1 D iagnostic tests
The three tests suggested by Engle and Ng (1993) are:
(i) Sign bias test
This test examines the null hypothesis th a t the particular GARCH specification ade­
quately captures the impact of negative versus positive errors on the condititional variance 
predicted by the model. The explanatory variable which is used is
1 if et~i  <  0 
0 if et- i  > 0 .
If this dummy is significant, the model is clearly biased against finding th a t negative shocks 
have a different im pact to positive shocks.
(ii) Negative size bias test
This test examines the null hypothesis th a t the GARCH specification adequately cap­
tures the im pact of large versus small negative shocks on the conditional variance predicted 
by the model. Consequently, the explanatory variable used is
] £ t- i  if £t~i <  0 
dt - 1 ’£t~ l -  <
( 0 if £t- 1 > 0.
If this variable is significant, the model will tend to overpredict small negative shocks and 
underpredict large negative shocks.
(Hi) Positive size bias test ’
This test examines the null hypothesis th a t the GARCH specification adequetely cap­
tures the impact of large versus small positive shocks on the conditional variance predicted 
by the model. Consequently, the explanatory variable used is
{ 0 if £t—i < 0
et_ i if £<-i >  0.
If this variable is significant, the model will tend to overpredict small positive shocks and 
underpredict large positive shocks.
Finally, a  combined test may be conducted, which examines the jo in t significance of 
all of the three aforementioned variables on the conditional variance.
For details of how to construct the artificial regressions of the squared residuals on 
the explanatory variables consult Engle and Ng (1993, pp. 1758-1760). The relevant test 
statistics are then given by the t-statistics obtained in these artificial regressions.
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7.7.2 R esu lts
G A R C H  S p ec ifica tio n
G A R C H A G A R C H E G A R C H
C o n d itio n a l m e a n  ( s ta n d a rd  e r ro rs in  p a ra n th e se s )
CONSTANT -1.14 (0.024) -1.14 (0.022) -1.11 (0.030)
SPREAD*_i 0.36 (0.035) 0.31 (0.029) 0.35 (0.034)
REMAINDER 1.29 (0.032) 1.29 (0.033) 1.27 (0.053)
SIZE 0.39 (0.017) 0.42 (0.016) 0.43 (0.034)
WEEKEND -0.23 (0.060) -0.24 (0.053) -0.21 (0.080)
C o n d itio n a l v a rian ce ( s ta n d a rd  e r ro rs  in  p a ra n th e se s )
U) 0.18 (0.013) 0.10 (0.012) -0.74 (0.070)
P 0.18 (0.026) 0.25 (0.025) 0.20 (0.040)
a 0.56 (0.029) 0.49 (0.026) 0.39 (0.065)
7 0.41 (0.030) 0.59 (0.080)
Loglikelihood -18.80 -3.66 -1.74
Sign Bias test -1.46 -1.49 -2.00
Negative Size Bias test -0.76 -0.71 0.11
Positive Size Bias test 28.59 28.62 28.06
Joint test 351.4 351.0 335.0
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C onclusion
Since its establishment 300 years ago the Bank of England has discounted 
short-term financial assets. Initially, this was purely for commercial reasons 
and did not really distinguish the Bank from other commercial banks. How­
ever, as the Bank’s position evolved from a commercial bank to that of a 
central bank, its money market operations began to reflect this new status. 
In particular, the Bank’s directors found that they could not refuse to dis­
count assets: not, at least, without threatening a panic in the money market 
and a widespread “run” on the banking system. Thus the Bank’s discounting 
operations gradually became a routine activity, with banks offering bills for 
sale to the Bank whenever the market discount rate rose up to the Bank’s 
discount rate. Once it was routinely discounting bills, the Bank also began 
to appreciate that its discount rate was its primary policy instrument. Un­
derstandably, this instrument was first used in a reactive fashion, to counter 
reductions in the Bank’s gold reserves. Over time, however, the use of the 
interest rate instrument has become more pro-active, to offset anticipated 
deviations from policy objectives1.
1This is not to suggest th a t the interest rate instrum ent has always been succesfully 
deployed in meeting the policy objectives of central banks. Governments, in particular,
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The history of many other central banks shows a similar development and 
has been discussed in Part I  of this thesis. This has shown that, while the 
adoption of an interest rate instrument was a general phenomenon shared by 
all central banks, the particular money market operations adopted by individ­
ual central banks to support their interest rate instrument usually contained 
idiosyncratic elements. Furthermore, while the aim of central bank money 
market operations has remained broadly the same everywhere -  the deter­
mination of money market interest rates -  the structure of these operations 
has, in many cases, changed over the years.
Partly, these changes reflect the ever-changing financial environment in 
which such operations take place. The Bank of England’s money market 
operations -  the focus of much of this thesis -  are no exception. For example, 
these operations initially comprised the outright purchase of prime quality 
bank bills, which were virtually the only money market assets at the time. 
When the issue of Treasury bills outstripped that of bank bills at the outset 
of world war one, the Bank purchased Treasury bills instead. Then, when 
the government’s overfunding policy reversed this situation, the Bank once 
again purchased large quantities of bank bills.
Whilst the assets discounted by the Bank have changed from time to time, 
the Bank’s counterparties -  a small group of institutions known as discount 
houses -  have not. This is noteworthy, if only because these counterpar­
ties arose through circumstance rather than design: early commercial banks 
did not wish to be openly reliant upon the Bank -  a competitor -  for their 
liquidity2. Although these circumstances have changed, this indirect arrange­
ment for providing reserves has been retained for other reasons. In particular, 
the Bank has expressed a preference for making reserves availible through a 
so-called “market-oriented” arrangement as opposed to lending directly to a 
few large clearing banks. However, the analysis in Part II  of this thesis sug­
gests that the Bank’s current operations are no longer fully consistent with 
this stated preference.
have exerted considerable influence over this instrum ent in order to pursue their own 
objectives. See Capie, Goodhart and Schnadt (1994).
2Of course, commercial banks still relied indirectly upon the Bank for liquidity.
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The clearing banks now own the majority of eligible bills in issue, which 
makes them the Bank’s de facto counterparties. W hat, then, is the purpose 
of the discount houses? This question has faced the houses for some time 
now, and several have already diversified their business in response to their 
diminished role in the Bank’s operations. Clearly, however, this question 
is part of wider -  and more important -  issue regarding the Bank’s money 
market operations: should the Bank continue to base these operations upon 
the outright purchase of eligible bills?
The stock of eligible bills is comparatively small relative to the Bank’s 
daily purchases, so counterparties are permitted to offer bills over a fairly 
wide range of (unexpired) maturities. It has been shown (chapter 5) that 
this may cause very short-term interest rates to behave in a manner which 
actually frustrates the Bank’s intentions. In particular, short-term rates may 
(temporarily) move in the opposite direction to an anticipated change in the 
official interest rate. Furthermore, it may cause short-term interest rates to 
become more volatile when market participants expect a change in the official 
rate. Second, eligible bills expose the Bank to credit risks, which it has sought 
to manage through the imposition of accepting limits on eligible acceptors. 
It has been illustrated (chapter 6) how eligible bills have, as a result, become 
“artificially scarce” and are consequently less attractive than other assets in 
terms of their yield. It is primarily for this reason that most eligible bills 
are now held by a small group of clearing banks, who then deploy their bill 
portfolios to generate cheap funding in the overnight market. In sum, the 
common symptom of these problems has been greater volatility in very short­
term sterling interest rates, particularly overnight rates (chapter 7). This is 
disturbing, given the important role played by the overnight funds market in 
the reserve management of banks operating in the UK.
W hat is to be done? Fortunately, these problems point to a common 
solution, which has been suggested at various points in this thesis: gilt repo. 
Repurchase agreements involving gilt-edged securities were amongst the first 
open-market operations3 of the Bank, and have recently again been adopted
3Recall, however, th a t they were originally used to drain reserves from  the banking 
system, rather than to supply reserves to the banking system.
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by the Bank as a permanent component of its money market operations. So 
far, however, these gilt repos have only been used in a supplementary fashion, 
twice a month, rather than on a day-to-day basis. There are a number of 
reasons why the Bank should, in future, supply reserves exclusively through 
gilt repo:
• Maturity -  unlike outright transactions, in which the maturity of the 
funds lent depends upon the unexpired maturity of the security pur­
chased, repurchase agreements would permit the Bank to lend reserves 
at a single maturity to all borrowers, irrespective of the unexpired ma­
turity of the securities offered. Indeed, the exclusive use of repurchase 
agreements would permit the Bank to lend funds on an overnight ba­
sis, considerably reducing the scope for very short-term market interest 
rates to deviate from the Bank’s interest rate in the manner described 
in chapter 5.
• Credit risk -  unlike eligible bills, which involve some credit risks, gilts 
are essentially free from credit risk. By lending funds against the se­
curity of gilts, the Bank would reduce its credit-risk exposure arising 
from money market operations. Furthermore, the Bank would no longer 
have to specify which banks were considered as “eligible” acceptors, nor 
would it have to enforce accepting limits on these institutions as out­
lined in chapter 6.
• Equity -  any financial institution which owned gilts could offer these to 
the Bank as security to borrow funds, greatly widening the potential 
counterparties in the Bank’s money market operations. Although this 
would mean that discount houses would lose their status as official 
counterparties, this role has already been eroded in practice. More 
important, clearing banks would no longer play a disproportionately 
large role in the operations of the Bank, diminshing their capacity to 
engage in strategic behaviour of the kind discussed in chapter 7.
• Simplicity -  the Bank’s money market operations are unduly compli­
cated as regards their objective, which is to determine money market
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interest rates by lending sufficient reserves to the banking system to 
cover the projected money market shortage. Not only does the Bank 
regularly lend funds through three different types of open market trans­
actions (i.e. outright purchase of eligible bills, repo of eligible bills and 
repo of gilts), it also conducts as many as three open market operations 
each day. Inviting a gilt repo twice a day would be sufficient - and much 
simpler.
Although the Bank of England has recently made gilt repo a permanent 
feature of its money market operations, this change was prompted largely 
by an extraordinary event -  namely a currency crisis in September 1992 
-  rather than by a decision on the part of the Bank that its operations 
were in need of revision. Many other features of the Bank’s existing money 
market operations were similarly shaped by a reaction to critical events. The 
subsequent longevity of some of these features -  for instance the discount 
houses -  reflects the fact that these have continued to serve an intrinsically 
useful function during more “normal” times. Nonetheless, financial markets 
continue to evolve even during such periods. Being less perceptible, this 
evolution may give the false impression that there is no pressing need for 
change. This thesis has analysed this gradual development of the sterling 
money market in recent years and has traced its implications for short-term 
interest rates. The upshot is that the Bank of England should now complete 
the process it has initiated and adopt money market operations which can 
support its interest rate instrument for another 300 years.
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